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APPELLATE  COURTS  AS  FIRST  RESPONDERS:
THE  CONSTITUTIONALITY  AND  PROPRIETY
OF  APPELLATE  COURTS’  RESOLVING
ISSUES  IN  THE  FIRST  INSTANCE
Joan Steinman*
In designing court systems in this country, all of the states and the
federal government have created trial courts and one or more levels
of appellate courts.  Legal professionals, litigants, and the people of
this country in general typically conceive of appellate courts as courts
of review, courts that review decisions made by trial court judges, by
decision makers in administrative agencies, or occasionally by arbitra-
tors.  We view it to be the role of trial judges and juries, administrative
agencies, and arbitrators—not appellate courts—to make the initial
findings of fact, reach the initial conclusions of law, apply the law to
the facts in the first instance, and exercise discretion as to issues,
raised in the foundational proceeding, whose resolution is not dic-
tated by rules of law.  We then see it as the function of courts of
appeals acting as such to re-examine fact-findings, conclusions of law,
applications of law to fact, and exercises of discretion under appropri-
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ate standards of review.1  We generally expect courts of appeals to
affirm, reverse, or vacate the judgment of lower courts or other tribu-
nals, but not to act as a court of first instance in finding facts, stating
the law, or exercising other judicial functions.2
Appeals courts sometimes review for clear error, and sometimes
review for abuse of discretion.  When reviewing agency action they
may review for arbitrary and capricious action or for substantial evi-
dence.3  Even when review is de novo, so that the appeals court is
1 A court that is empowered to decide appeals also may be empowered to exer-
cise “original jurisdiction” over certain kinds of cases.  The Supreme Court of the
United States and the supreme courts of many states are examples. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2; KAN. CONST. art. III, § 3; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST. art.
IV, § 4; State ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 (1873) (holding that the Supreme
Court of Missouri has original jurisdiction of an information in the nature of quo
warranto, whether filed on the relation of a private person or by the attorney general,
but also holding that whether it will exercise that jurisdiction in a case involving an
information filed by a private party is within the discretion of the court); State v.
Nelson Cnty., 45 N.W. 33, 33 (N.D. 1890) (“[I]n the exercise of its original jurisdic-
tion, under section 87 of the state constitution, the supreme court, exercising its juris-
diction, will issue the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and
injunction only when applied for as prerogative writs; and where the question
presented is publici juris, and one affecting the sovereignty of the state, its franchises
or prerogatives, or the liberties of the people.”).  When a court is hearing a case
within its original jurisdiction, it is not functioning as a court of appeals.
2 Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 837 n.6 (2000) (explaining that the
authors excluded from their study cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction
“because they are of a fundamentally different nature from the Court’s appellate-
jurisdiction cases.  In original jurisdiction cases, the Court does not ‘affirm,’ ‘reverse,’
or ‘vacate’ another court’s judgment but acts instead as a court of first instance and
indeed as a factfinder”).
3 Commonly, at least in the federal courts, courts of appeals review judges’ find-
ings of fact for clear error, judges’ conclusions of law de novo, judges’ applications of
law to fact either for clear error or de novo depending upon a variety of factors, and
judges’ exercises of discretion for abuse of discretion, with district court judges being
given varying degrees of latitude depending on a variety of factors.  Federal appeals
courts review juries’ findings of fact and applications of law to fact by reference to
whether reasonable jurors acting reasonably could have so concluded, administrative
decisions in accordance with the standards of review dictated by the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006), typically looking for substantial evidence to
support formal agency fact-finding and guarding against arbitrary and capricious
action in informal administrative fact-finding, and reviewing arbitrators’ decisions
under varying standards of review, depending upon the issue to be reviewed. See gen-
erally J. ERIC SMITHBURN, APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS (2009)
(describing appellate standards of review).  Much judicial and scholarly writing has
been devoted to what these various standards of review mean and should mean, what
standard of review ought to be applied to various conclusions, and whether the stan-
dard of review even matters.  The literature is vast.  For preeminent and recent schol-
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giving no deference to the lower tribunal’s conclusion, that earlier
conclusion is being reviewed.  The appeals court does not merely
announce what a correct understanding of the law is.  A lower court
has taken the first stab at the issue, and the appeals court concludes
that the trial court judge (or other decision maker)4 either erred or
reached the correct, or an acceptable, answer.5  The appeals court has
the benefit of the lower court’s thinking and is passing judgment
upon the lower court’s determination.
We traditionally defend the division of function between trial and
appellate courts on functional and institutional grounds.  Despite
some evidence that our beliefs about the relative superiority of partic-
ular decision makers are not always accurate,6 as a society we generally
believe and historically we generally have believed that trial courts—
judges and juries—have advantages in making fact findings, so we
arship, see, for example, Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003) (arguing that there is no meaningful differ-
ence between questions of law and questions of fact, but that the legal fiction is useful
and should be maintained); Debra Lyn Bassett, “I Lost at Trial—in the Court of
Appeals!”: The Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 HOUS.
L. REV. 1129 (2001); Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court
Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975 (2004) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should give greater deference than it does to intermediate courts of
appeals’ interpretations of state law); Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical
Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437 (2004) (arguing for
greater appellate factfinding in criminal cases where there is a need for greater accu-
racy); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 679 (2002) (examining the unpredictable consequences of appellate courts’
application of different agency review standards).
4 To avoid awkward and repetitive locutions, I often will say “the trial court
judge” when I intend the trial court judge or other prior decision maker.
5 Cf. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 519 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[Review de
novo] means that we will look at the case ‘anew, the same as if it had not been heard
before, and as if no decision previously had been rendered,’ and ‘giving no deference
to the district judge’s determinations.’” (quoting Freeman v. DirectTV, Inc., 457 F.3d
1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006))).
6 See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991)
(“According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of
demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness.  On the contrary, there is some
evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather than enhances the accu-
racy of credibility judgments.”); id. at 1096 (“An appellate court may always be ‘in as
good a position to decide as the trial court,’ in the sense that the traditionally dispar-
aged ‘cold record’ may be as good a basis for decision, including judgments of credi-
bility, as the trial court’s traditionally exalted opportunity to see the witnesses.”).
Professor Wellborn argues, however, that “[d]e novo review of facts is nevertheless a
bad idea, and appellate court rejection of trial court findings should continue to be
limited to instances of clear error” in order to maintain confidence in trial courts and
avoid appeals. See id.
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allow appellate courts to review fact-findings but only to avoid severe
aberrations, violations of duty, and clear errors that would result in
injustice to the parties.  We make the review deferential to give effect
to our belief that judges and jurors who were firsthand witnesses to
the testimonial evidence and arguments usually have a superior ability
to accurately find the facts.7  For reasons of consistency and in defer-
ence to trial court experience and expertise in fact-finding, we take
the same tack, making review deferential—although perhaps not to
exactly the same degree—even when all of the evidence is documen-
tary or is otherwise available to appellate court judges in the same
form in which it was presented to the trier of fact.  Technological
advances that can put appellate judges in shoes that very much resem-
ble those of jurors and trial judges raise questions about whether
appellate courts should defer to judges and juries as they traditionally
have done, but thus far, and for the most part, appellate courts have
remained deferential.8
Appellate courts utilize varying degrees of deference when
reviewing matters that are within the district courts’ discretion,
depending on the reasons that discretion is afforded and sometimes
based upon other policy considerations.
Finally, appellate judges typically are authorized and expected to
review questions of law de novo because, as a society, we believe that
appellate judges have advantages over trial judges in deciding what
the law is or should be.  As Professor Chad Oldfather, among others,
has recognized, de novo review has been thought to be appropriate
for questions of law based on beliefs that appellate court judges are
7 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988) (stating that a lower court
may have insights the record may not convey so that even appellate review of the
entire record may not afford an appellate court knowledge equal to that of the trial
judge).
8 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), is a counter-example.  A young motorist
brought an action against a county deputy and others, alleging use of excessive force
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, based upon the deputy having rammed
plaintiff’s car to end a high-speed chase, thereby causing a crash that made plaintiff a
quadriplegic. Id. at 375–76.  The district court denied the deputy’s motion for sum-
mary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at 376.  The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, concluding that the deputy’s actions could have constituted an unwarranted
use of deadly force. Id.  The Supreme Court viewed a videotape of the chase that had
been filed with the trial court. Id. at 378–80.  The Court found that the facts depicted
so blatantly contradicted plaintiff’s version of the facts that no reasonable jury could
believe plaintiff’s version. Id. at 380.  It announced that, in those circumstances, a
court should not adopt plaintiff’s version for purposes of ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, and, based on the videotape, held that the deputy did not violate
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 380–81.
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more competent (than trial judges) to answer questions of law and to
formulate new law when necessary.9  We have reason to believe that
three interacting heads are better than one and that appellate court
judges will bring more expertise than trial judges to the task of law-
making, based both on their greater experience and on advantages
that appellate judges enjoy, such as more and better law clerks and
greater time to devote to research, contemplation, writing, and edit-
ing.  Moreover, appellate courts are better positioned in the judicial
hierarchy (than are trial courts) to enforce uniformity and improve
predictability in the law.  But again the norm is that appellate courts
address questions of law only after a tribunal that is inferior (hierarchi-
cally and perhaps qualitatively) has addressed those questions and has
given the appellate court an analysis that can inform its own.10
Is there any place in our system for appellate courts to rule on
issues upon which no inferior court has ruled?  In fact, appellate
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, sometimes do
this.  There are, indeed, a surprising number of occasions on which
courts of appeals, including the United States Supreme Court, address
and decide questions that a trial court judge did not decide.  On those
occasions, the appellate courts are not reviewing the decision of
another tribunal.  The Supreme Court has declared that intermediate
9 Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO .WASH. L. REV. 308,
327–38 (2009) (discussing the appropriateness of appellate courts’ use of the de novo
standard of review, marshalling the arguments that others have made in support of
universal de novo review of legal questions, including competence-based justifications
(namely, three heads are better than one, appellate judges have expertise in deciding
issues of law, and appellate courts are structurally advantaged over trial courts), and
justifications grounded in appellate courts’ supposed superior ability to make law and
to assure equality and predictability through the precedent-setting quality of their
decisions); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (“Courts of
appeals . . . are structurally suited to the collaborative juridical process that promotes
decisional accuracy.  With the record having been constructed below and settled for
purposes of the appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their primary attention to
legal issues.”); Mark A. Bross, Comment, The Impact of Ornelas v. United States on the
Appellate Standard of Review for Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
871, 872–73 (2007) (arguing that de novo review is preferable to review for clear
error where the constitutionality of a seizure is at issue because of the precedential
effects of the decision).  Professor Oldfather, however, challenges the conventional
wisdom that appellate courts always should review questions of law de novo. See
Oldfather, supra, at 327–56.
10 To the extent that one doubts appellate courts’ pervasive superiority in decid-
ing questions of law, one should be that much more skeptical of appellate courts’
taking the first stab at legal questions and deciding them with no preference for or
deference to trial court determinations of those issues. See Oldfather, supra note 9, at R
330–49.
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federal courts of appeals (“IFACs”) have discretion to decide when
they will address such issues.  For ease of reference, I will describe
questions that no inferior court has ruled upon as “new issues” or
“new questions.”
This reality raises a great many questions.  Preliminarily, there are
what one might call definitional lines that need to be drawn.  Parties
are free to raise, in the appellate court, legal authorities that they did
not cite below, without violating any general rule against appellate
courts entertaining new issues.  The line between new “arguments” or
“theories” that may be raised for the first time on appeal without need
of an exception to the general rule and new “issues” that may not be
raised for the first time on appeal without need of an exception to the
general rule is less clear.11  There is no bright line for determining
whether a matter was raised below, and there is likely a spectrum from
11 Aside from the distinctions made in the text, there are other situations in
which it might be debated whether a particular question posed on appeal was among
the questions decided in the district court or in an intermediate court of appeals
before reaching the Supreme Court.  I describe just one case for illustrative purposes.
In St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), petitioner did not object to a jury
instruction but, in motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict, raised a
legal issue concerning the standard for determining municipal liability that also was
posed by the jury instruction. Id. at 118–21.  Given the absence of objection to the
jury instruction, the district court did not rule on the propriety of the instruction, but
it did rule on the aforementioned motions, and the focus of the petition for certiorari
was those rulings. Id.  The Court commented:
It should not be surprising if petitioner’s arguments in the District Court
were much less detailed than the arguments it now makes in response to the
decision of the Court of Appeals.  That, however, does not imply that peti-
tioner failed to preserve the issue raised in its petition for cert.  Accordingly,
we find no obstacle to reviewing the question presented in the petition . . . ,
a question that was very clearly considered, and decided, by the Court of
Appeals. . . . We therefore do not believe that our review . . . will undermine
the policy of judicial efficiency that underlies [Federal] Rule [of Civil Proce-
dure] 51.
Id. at 120–21 (citation omitted).  In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was
permitting a litigant who had lost in a jury trial to advance legal arguments that it did
not make in the district court, and that, in its motions in the district court, petitioner
had made no argument for any legal standard for municipal liability. Id. at 165–66
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Given the procedural history, he thought it unfair to the
respondent and poor judicial practice to use this case to reshape a legal landscape.
Id. at 166; see also Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.
2009) (noting that a litigant “may not lose in the district court on one theory of the
case, and then prevail on appeal on a different theory, even if the new theory falls
under the same general category as an argument presented at trial” (quoting Lyons v.
Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721–22 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 435 n.12 (5th Cir. 2009)
(responding to the government’s argument that the defendants failed to object below
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old issues to new issues, rather than the two being polar opposites.
Important though these line-drawing problems are, I will not dwell on
them in this Article.  I will focus on situations in which it is posited
that a new issue is proffered.
Beyond this threshold matter, questions one might ask include:
Do Article III or Congressional statutes speak to federal appellate
authority to address new issues—and, if so, what do they say?  What
guidance has the Supreme Court given with respect to appellate
courts’ proper role with regard to new issues?  What is the proper role
of appellate courts with regard to new issues?  When, if ever, is appel-
late courts’ taking the “first stab” appropriate, and why?  Do interme-
diate appellate courts and supreme courts vary in their responses to
new questions, depending upon the different ways in which the new
issues arise or based upon other parameters?  What are those other
parameters, and should appellate courts’ responses vary with them?
What do appellate courts’ acceptance and decision of new questions
say about the roles and capacities of appellate versus trial courts, and
about how we design appellate systems?  In this Article, I attempt to
explore many of these questions and propose some answers.
Introductory Notes address the scope of this Article and of prior
literature on aspects of its subject, and distinguish between raising
issues and resolving issues.  Part I explains the importance of the
issues raised here and discusses sequencing theory because of the light
it sheds on that importance.  Part II explores Article III, Congres-
sional legislation, and pronouncements and decisions by the Supreme
Court concerning the power of the Supreme Court and of intermedi-
ate federal appellate courts to take the first stab at issues.  It also
makes the point that the scope of appellate jurisdiction before and
after final judgment constrains what new issues appellate courts may
hear.  Part III shifts the focus from power to judicial discretion and
examines the realities in the Supreme Court and in the federal inter-
mediate appellate courts.  It categorizes and discusses both cases in
which the Supreme Court or IFACs did consider new issues and cases
in which the Supreme Court or IFACs declined to consider new issues.
In so doing, it categorizes the kinds of issues and the circumstances in
which the Supreme Court and IFACS have been inclined to address
new issues on appeal and the reasons they have given for declining to
do so.  Part IV evaluates these realities, exploring the circumstances in
which appellate courts should and should not exercise their power to
decide issues that were not ruled upon in the district courts.  I am
to provisions of the district court’s remedial order in part with the observation that
there is no bright-line rule for determining whether a matter was raised below).
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interested in seeing how explicitly and how satisfactorily case law
addresses the circumstances under which appellate courts will decide
issues not decided below.  Just as in other areas of the law, case law
developed over time ideally should tend toward greater clarity and
certainty, as it develops theoretically and practically defensible
answers to the questions when appellate courts should decide new
issues and when appellate courts should utilize mechanisms to have
trial judges or adjuncts to the appellate branch make initial determi-
nations that appellate courts can review.  The Article offers a proposal
to govern the circumstances under which a new issue should be heard
on appeal.  It considers whether and when the Supreme Court should
have more leeway than IFACs.  The Article then concludes.
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
Limits on the scope and aspirations of this Article: For the most part, I
focus upon civil cases, not criminal cases, and I do not address issues
raised in connection with petitions for writs of habeas corpus, since
they will be affected by the values that affect criminal cases differently
than they affect civil cases.  Second, I concentrate on the practices of
federal appellate courts.  Although observations made here may have
relevance to state court systems, those systems often are subject to stat-
utory, or even constitutional, dictates that would alter the analysis.
Furthermore, although I examine the considerations that affect the
decision-making processes in the circuits with respect to new issues, I
have not attempted systematically to draw out the differences that
exist among the federal circuits in how they approach questions that
arise for the first time on appeal.  I am painting with a broader brush.
Prior literature: There is a considerable scholarly literature con-
cerning some matters and doctrines that come up in this Article.
Given the fundamental nature of the questions posed by appellate
courts’ acting as “first responders,” however, there is less scholarly
commentary than one might expect on how federal appellate courts
should handle questions that either the appellate courts themselves or
litigants raise on appeal but that were not  decided, and may not have
been raised, below.  Nonetheless, I am by no means the first commen-
tator to have considered the role of appellate courts with regard to
new issues.  I will bring in the insights of other commentators as they
fit into my analysis, but I want to mention some of the most important
prior writings now to suggest the multifaceted nature of “new issues”
on appeal.
An early, perhaps the earliest, published exposition addressed to
some aspects of the problem was a three-part article published in
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1931–33 in the Wisconsin Law Review.  In Extent to Which Courts of
Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved,12  Rich-
ard V. Campbell delved into how far courts “can relieve a client from
the consequences of his attorney’s fault, and consider questions not
properly raised and preserved.”13  And, indeed, such situations—of
issues that might have been raised in the trial court but were not, due
to a failing of counsel, and that counsel has raised for the first time on
appeal—form an important segment of the domain that this Article
addresses.
In addition to Professor Campbell’s writing, the two most com-
prehensive writings concerning new issues on appeal are Professor
Robert Martineau’s treatment in Considering New Issues on Appeal: The
General Rule and the Gorilla Rule14 and Rhett Dennerline’s student
Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on
Appeal,15 which critiqued some of Professor Martineau’s positions and
offered its own proposals.  Later in this Article I will consider the posi-
tions of Professor Martinueau and Mr. Dennerline.  I note here that
Professor Martineau limited the scope of his piece to
issues in a civil case that (1) the appellant knew or should have
known about; (2) could have been raised in the trial court but were
not raised, only because of the act or omission of the complaining
party; (3) [the lower court decision of which might] constitute
reversible error; [and that] (4) [were] sought to be raised by appel-
lant over the objection of the appellee.16
Thus, waiver by the appellant was the focus of Professor Marti-
neau’s work.  Beyond the scope of Professor Martineau’s article were
the “inability to raise the issue earlier for reasons not attributable to
the appellant, new theory to support the judgment, specificity, harm-
less error, and acquiescence of appellee.”17  My Article will be broader
in its scope.
12 Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised and Preserved—Part I, 7 WIS. L. REV. 91 (1932) [hereinafter Campbell,
Part I]; Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised and Preserved—Part II, 7 WIS. L. REV. 160 (1932) [hereinafter Campbell,
Part II]; Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions
Not Properly Raised and Preserved—Part III, 8 WIS. L. REV. 147 (1933) [hereinafter
Campbell, Part III].
13 Campbell, Part I, supra note 12, at 92. R
14 Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the
Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987).
15 Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New
Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989).
16 Martineau, supra note 14, at 1025 (footnote omitted). R
17 Id.
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A distinguishable aspect of the problem arises when counsel’s
failure to raise an issue below may not be clearly blameworthy because
the issue that counsel seeks to raise for the first time on appeal is one
that crystallized only after the trial was over and took shape by virtue
of decisions subsequently made in other cases.  How much (or how
little) fault a court finds with the failure to raise an issue in the trial
court may depend on such factors as how unexpected the newly
decided proposition of law is and how well-settled to the contrary the
law previously was.  The mere mention of these factors raises the ques-
tion whether the degree of counsel’s fault in not raising an issue
below should matter to an appellate court’s willingness to entertain
the newly-raised issue.  The Article will explore what policies under-
gird the general rule that reviewing courts will refuse to consider ques-
tions presented for the first time on appeal in order to appraise the
relevance of that consideration.  Writings that address new issues that
were made prominent by post-trial legal developments are cited in the
margin.18
Whatever degree of attorney culpability may lie behind a failure
to raise, or the inartful raising of, issues in the trial court, an addi-
tional set of issues is posed when appellate courts raise sua sponte and
resolve issues that lower courts did not address.  As pointed out in Sua
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to
Be Heard,19
[w]hen appellate judges believe that a potentially dispositive issued
was missed by the parties . . . [:] (1) they can ignore the issue; (2)
they can spot the issue in their opinion, but treat it as not properly
raised or [as] waived; (3) they can spot the issue and remand it for
resolution in the first instance in the trial court; (4) they can ask the
parties for supplemental briefs before deciding the issue; (5) they
18 See, e.g., Campbell, Part I, supra note 13, at 96–97 (arguing that “questions R
which do not arise until after a case has reached the court of review do not come
within . . . the rule that new questions will not be considered on review” and may be
considered when raised at the first opportunity); Christopher R. Prior, Note, Not Too
Little, But A Little Too Late: The Eleventh Circuit’s Refusal to Consider New Issues Raised by
Supplemental Authority, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 249 (2007); Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation,
When Will Federal Court of Appeals Review Issue Raised By Party for First Time on Appeal
Where Legal Developments After Trial Affect Issue, 76 A.L.R. FED. 522 (1986); see also J.H.
Huebert, How to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 51 FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2009, at 37, 71
(providing an overview of the exceptions to the general rule disallowing new issues on
appeal).
19 Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253 (2002).
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can decide the issue without briefs; (6) they can spot the issue in the
opinion, and write dicta.20
The Article will visit when appellate courts should raise and
decide issues sua sponte, and parties’ entitlement to notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the appellate court decides an issue
that the court raised sua sponte.
Distinguishing Issue Creation from Issue Resolution: It also is funda-
mental to this Article to distinguish between the raising of issues and
the resolution of issues, and between issue creation (the sua sponte
raising of issues) by an appellate court and appellate resolution of
issues raised sua sponte.  Appellate court resolution of issues newly
raised in the court of appeals, whether by the parties or by the court
itself, rather than issue raising or creation, is my concern.
In The Limits of Advocacy, Professor Amanda Frost argues that judi-
cial “issue creation,” that is, judges’ raising of legal claims and argu-
ments that parties have overlooked, ignored, or deliberately chosen
not to advance, is a “necessary corollary [of] the federal judiciary’s
constitutional obligation[s] to articulate the meaning of contested
questions of law . . . [and] to avoid issuing inaccurate or incomplete
statements of law.”21  While arguing that judges should not routinely
raise legal claims and arguments that parties have not made—
“because it can lead to delay, disrupt settled expectations, and under-
mine litigant autonomy,”22—she posits that judges should raise new
claims and arguments in a number of situations.  Professor Frost finds
20 Id. at 1256; see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 511
(2009) (noting that in raising new issues, courts “must be careful to preserve the ben-
efits of the adversarial structure. . . . [T]he parties should be given notice and an
opportunity to respond.  If the parties do not wish to address the issue, stakeholders
should be allowed to intervene, or amici invited to participate”). See generally Adam A.
Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appel-
late Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002) (arguing that it is an abuse of discretion for
appellate courts to decide issues that they have raised sua sponte without input from
the parties, as doing so is inconsistent with due process and with the adversary
system).
21 Id. at 447; see also Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L.
REV. 251 (2005) (focusing at the level of theories and arguments, advocating that
judges should improve the law by applying the most correct reasoning, even when the
parties have not proposed it).
22 Frost, supra note 20, at 453. As Professor Frost points out, the principle that R
parties, and not judges, should frame cases is grounded in the same values that
inform standing doctrine, has roots in our notions of due process—in particular, the
idea that the decision maker should not be an advocate but should be impartial—and
promotes finality and judicial economy. See id. at 450–51.  Thus, “the norm against
issue creation is an important limit on judicial power that should be honored in the
typical case.” Id. at 470.
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judicial issue creation to be legitimate when necessary to fulfill the
federal courts’ duties to accurately say what the law is and to avoid
expanding the judicial role beyond its proper limits; to preserve judi-
cial independence; to enforce constitutional restrictions on other
branches of the government; and also to effectuate constitutional
exercises of legislative power.23  The situations in which she finds it
appropriate for federal judges to raise new claims and arguments—
and in which she therefore argues that federal judges should be rec-
ognized to have discretion to do so—thus include those in which fail-
ing to do so would lead to inaccurate statements of precedent-setting
law,24 cause the court to fail to respect constraints on judicial decision
making (such as the constitutional avoidance doctrine or the pre-
sumption against preemption of state law),25 or cause the court to
ignore or undermine legislative enactments.26  By contrast, she argues
that
a court has no reason to raise issues that are tangential to or distinct
from the claims that the parties have asked the court to decide,
because . . . its opinion will not mislead others or create flawed pre-
cedent . . . . Moreover, questions that are truly independent from
those that the parties have . . . briefed and argued would likely
require the development of facts not already in the record, which is
unfair . . . .27
Although Professor Frost does not always systematically differenti-
ate between federal trial court judges and federal appellate court
judges, she sometimes does so, and some of her arguments apply to
one of these groups rather than, or to a much greater degree than,
the other.  Thus, it is more important that federal courts of appeals
accurately state the law than that trial courts do so.  It is essential that
federal appeals courts not cede to the parties complete control over
the courts’ legal analyses because the decisions of IFACs are preceden-
23 Id. at 470–71, 485.  Professor Frost elaborates on these ideas. See id. at 470–91.
24 See id. at 452–53, 509–10, 516.
25 See id. at 510.
26 See id. at 510–11.  Professor Frost did not purport to provide a definitive set of
criteria. Id. at 509.
27 Id. at 509–10; cf. Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 508–11 (1959) (focusing on issue creation, and assuming that
appellate courts would resolve the issues they chose to raise sua sponte; finding and
sometimes advocating for exceptions to the general reluctance to interfere with the
course of litigation as determined by the parties for questions of jurisdiction, some-
times in the interest of justice or in furtherance of a fundamental public policy, where
public rights are involved, when there is “a pressing need for a statement of a point of
law” or to avoid making new law but, outside the realm of jurisdictional issues, always
in exceptional circumstances).
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tial, affect future litigants as well as the parties before the court in a
particular case, and often are persuasive outside the jurisdiction.28
Moreover, in light of the rarity of en banc or Supreme Court review,
most decisions by appellate panels represent the last word in the cir-
cuit on a legal issue.29  In addition, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, an IFAC cannot decline to hear a case in which the parties have
not done a good job in framing or arguing the issues.30  In Frost’s
view, all of this renders IFACs most justified (as compared with both
federal trial courts and the United States Supreme Court) in injecting
new issues.31  On the other hand, district courts are in a better posi-
tion to raise new issues because they “need not be as concerned about
finality, or the possibility of prejudice, as an appellate court . . . .
[T]he parties can explore factual questions essential to the new legal
issue, and there is far less disruption to settled expectations than when
an issue is injected by a[n appellate] court . . . .”32  Thus, she cautions
against IFACs introducing new legal issues and arguments when the
new issue would turn on facts not in the record or not fully developed
below, particularly as judicial issue creation in that circumstance
would likely be unnecessary to avoid erroneous statements of law.  She
also cautions generally that “raising new questions on appeal may
delay resolution and put litigants to additional expense” and may
cause litigants to feel ambushed by the newly injected questions.33
In Professor Frost’s view, the Supreme Court has less reason
(than IFACs) to engage in issue creation insofar as it can avoid taking
cases in which the parties have failed to raise relevant legal questions.
Moreover, the same concerns about delay, disruption, ambush, unfair-
ness, and the possibility of an inadequately developed record that con-
strain IFACs apply equally or even more strongly when a case is in the
Supreme Court.34  Nonetheless, Professor Frost argues that there may
28 See Frost, supra note 20, at 511–15.  Professor Frost reconciles her view of the R
federal judiciary’s role in issue creation with the adversary system by arguing that: (1)
judicial issue creation can improve the adversary system by helping to level the playing
field between adversaries who are not evenly matched in resources, legal talent, and
the like; and (2) judicial introduction of new issues need not turn judges into adversa-
ries, undermine judges’ impartiality, or undermine litigant autonomy, as amici can be
used when parties choose not to argue a position suggested by the court. See id. at
494–508.  Professor Frost envisions the parties being given the opportunity to address,
in an adversarial manner, any new issues that a court introduces. See id. at 508, 511.




33 Id. at 513.
34 See id. at 513–14.
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be occasions when it is appropriate for even the Supreme Court to
inject new issues—as it is most important that the Supreme Court
issue “accurate” statements of the law, set appropriate limits on the
judicial role, preserve judicial independence, and enforce constitu-
tional restrictions on other branches of the government while effectu-
ating the other branches’ constitutional exercises of authority.  As
previously noted and as will be shown below, there is no question that
the Supreme Court in fact has injected new issues into cases it has
heard.35
Professor Frost’s analysis makes a good case for the legitimacy of
judicial “issue creation” in narrow circumstances, but she considers in
only a very limited way how the role of an appellate court, as such,
should constrain appellate courts in taking the first stab at resolving
issues that the appellate court introduces into a case.  Thus, Professor
Frost notes:
[T]here are good reasons for appellate judges to be cautious about
raising new legal questions at this late stage of the litigation.  An
issue that turns on facts that are not in the record or not fully devel-
oped would be better left unmentioned for fear of prejudice to the
parties. Moreover, any question of law that requires development of
new facts would likely be tangential to the questions the court is
asked to resolve, and thus would not qualify as a case in which issue
creation was essential to avoid erroneous statements of law.36
I would note, moreover, that even if an appellate court has power
to raise new issues and would not abuse its discretion in doing so in a
particular case,37 the appeals court that raises a new issue could
remand the case to the district court to address the newly identified
issue in the first instance, rather than taking the first stab at it.  Such a
remand would result in some disappointment to litigants who hoped
for a quicker end to the litigation, and it would entail some delay and
disruption, but these might be prices worth paying in order for the
35 See id. at 467–69, 514–16.
36 Id. at 513.  Professor Frost also comments on the risk that raising new ques-
tions on appeal will increase costs and delay, will require that the parties be given an
opportunity to be heard, and may generate feelings of ambush. Id.  None of these
has anything to do with the role of an appellate court, however, and none is peculiar
to appellate courts’ raising new issues, though the degree of added cost and delay,
and the degree of feeling ambushed, may be greater when an issue is first raised on
appeal than when it is raised even very late “in the game” in the trial court.
37 That could be the situation because doing so is necessary to avoid the court’s
making inaccurate statements of precedent-setting law, or a failure to do so would
cause the court to fail to respect constraints on judicial decision making (such as the
constitutional avoidance doctrine or the presumption against preemption of state
law) or would cause the court to ignore or undermine legislative enactments.
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trial court to play its customary role of decider in the first instance and
for the appellate court to adhere to its customary role of reviewing
court.  After all, some disappointment and delay would ensue even if
it were the appellate court that required the parties (or intervenors or
amici) to address the newly identified issue.  As the discussion below
will demonstrate, federal intermediate appellate courts do not limit
themselves to deciding new issues in the circumstances in which Pro-
fessor Frost finds that it would be appropriate for them to raise new
issues.  But, as noted earlier, the two are not the same; an appellate
court can raise a new issue but not decide it in the first instance, and
an appellate court can decide a new issue that it did not raise, but a
party did, for the first time, in the court of appeals.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE
The subject of this Article is important.  It affects who decides
issues; what issues are decided; at what point in the course of a case
(when) they are decided, where (by what courts) they are decided; and
potentially how those issues are decided.  Issues may be decided differ-
ently when they are decided in the first instance by appellate courts,
rather than by trial courts, in part because such appellate resolution
of issues affects the standards of decision that an appellate court uses.
Whenever a court of appeals decides an issue that was not decided by
an inferior court, it is acting de novo, not correcting only clear error
in fact-findings or abuses of discretion, and not deciding issues of law
with the benefit of the thinking of the lower court.  This activity goes
to the heart of the role and function of appellate courts, and of how
our judicial system is designed.  Constitutional, statutory, prudential,
and functional considerations all are involved.
Sequencing Theory
Sequencing theory reinforces the importance of the subject
explored in this Article by shedding light on additional consequences
of the order in which courts resolve issues in litigation.  Professor
Peter Rutledge opines that “the order in which courts decide issues
has a significant and underappreciated impact on the law;”38 this
order influences the parties’ behavior in litigation, the incentives they
have to settle, and the development of the law—that is, which areas of
law get more attention and which get less—and in turn influences the
investment of judicial resources.39  Horizontal sequencing rules,
38 Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
39 Id. at 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-4\NDL404.txt unknown Seq: 16 29-MAY-12 12:40
1536 notre dame law review [vol. 87:4
which “determine the sequence in which a single decision-maker . . .
determines issues,” apply to an appellate court, as they apply to trial
courts, and they thus influence how (i.e., on what grounds) a case will
be resolved.40  As a result, horizontal sequencing rules also affect the
outcomes of future cases.  In addition, vertical sequencing rules,
which determine when reviewing courts can review particular deci-
sions of inferior tribunals, obviously influence the relationship
between trial courts and appeals courts, and also can influence the
parties’ behavior in litigation and the incentives they have to settle,
the development of the law, and the amount and allocation of invest-
ment of judicial resources.41  Thus, for example, the immediate
appealability of denials of motions to dismiss based upon qualified
immunity allows defendants to require an investment of resources by
the appellate courts, evokes precedential decisions from the appellate
courts, and enhances the settlement position of defendants.42  More-
over, both horizontal and vertical sequencing rules can be rigid or
flexible and thus affect the degree of discretion that a court has in
sequencing the decisions of the issues it faces.43
40 Id. at 10.  An example of a horizontal sequencing rule that operates at the
appellate level is the rule that the appellate court should decide its appellate jurisdic-
tion over a case and the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, and
confirm both, before proceeding to merits questions.  For an exploration of
mandatory horizontal sequencing rules in the federal appellate courts, see Joan Stein-
man, After Steel Co.: “Hypothetical Jurisdiction” in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 855 (2001).  Other articles on sequencing include Gregory Scott Crespi,
The Underappreciated Importance of Issue Sequencing in Contract Litigation: The “Signed
Offer” Statute of Frauds Cases, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37 (2011); Heather Elliott, Jurisdic-
tional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725 (2009); Scott C. Idleman,
The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2002); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52
VAND. L. REV. 235 (1999); J. Stanton Hill, Note, Towards Global Convenience, Fairness,
and Judicial Economy: An Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismis-
sals Before Determining Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1177 (2008).
41 See Rutledge, supra note 38, at 29–32. R
42 See id. at 22–23.
43 See id.  Compare, for example, the relative rigidity of the requirement that a
court consider its subject-matter jurisdiction (or appellate jurisdiction) before
addressing any merits questions and the discretion that district courts have to deter-
mine the sequence in which they will consider issues of subject-matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, or even forum non conveniens. Compare Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (recognizing district court discretion
to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens without first determining that district
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the
parties), and Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (holding that in
cases removed to federal courts, as well as in cases initiated in federal court, district
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What relevance does Rutledge’s decisional sequencing theory
have to the issues raised in this Article?  When an appellate court takes
the first stab at an issue it is not reversing the normal and expected
vertical sequence of decision, because the district court is not going to
follow the appellate court, in time, and review the appellate court’s
work.  However, for the appellate court to take the first stab typically
changes the sequence in which decisions are made at the same time
that such “first stabs” constitute a re-allocation of authority from the
district court to the appellate court, which in turn changes the ques-
tion that the court of appeals will address.  No longer will the question
be whether the district court erred in deciding the issue through its
misunderstanding of the law or its clear error in determining the rele-
vant facts or its abuse of discretion.  The questions will be de novo:
What is the law on this issue?  What do the facts in the record establish
as to this issue?  How will the appellate court exercise discretion as to a
particular matter?  This Article will consider the circumstances under
which such a reallocation of decision-making authority may be accept-
able and when it would not be,44 but Rutledge helps us to appreciate
several additional consequences of this reallocation of authority.  For
instance,
(a) The reallocation might be regarded as problematic in that
the usual consequences of a district court decision, had it been made
in a timely manner, will be changed by the alteration of the time
frame in which the decision is made, as well as by the status of the
decision maker.  For example, if no party raises forum non conveniens
(“fnc”) in the district court, with the result that that court does not
address the issue but proceeds to decide the case on the merits, the
investment that the district court makes in the case increases, and a
defendant that loses on the merits in the district court has less settle-
ment leverage than it would have had if the court had dismissed on
fnc grounds.  If the fnc issue is raised for the first time on appeal and
the appeals court decides the issue and orders the case dismissed with-
out prejudice, the judicial investments, the settlement dynamics, and
the law that has been announced all differ from what they would have
been had the district court dismissed on fnc grounds.
court may dismiss on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendants without first ruling on a motion to remand or dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction), with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)
(rejecting the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, under which, in some circum-
stances, a court may decide merits questions without first addressing objections to the
court’s jurisdiction, concluding that the doctrine violates separation of powers).
44 See infra Parts III and IV.
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The extent of delay before resolution of an issue that is first
presented to a court of appeals and the change in the sequence of the
rulings made by the trial and appellate courts may be influenced by
whether the appellate court takes on an issue raised for the first time
on appeal or sends the new issue back to the trial court.  If proceed-
ings in the trial court have not been stayed pending appeal, the trial
court may continue to issue rulings while the appellate court is consid-
ering the issue newly raised there, whereas the trial court might
address the “new issue” raised on appeal before it ruled on other mat-
ters, if the appeals court remanded the new issue for the trial court’s
consideration.  The order in which the district court addresses the
issues presented to it after remand, including whether it regards the
appellate court as having commanded it to address initially the issue
that was raised for the first time on appeal and was remanded, again
may affect the extent of judicial investment, the settlement dynamics,
and the law that is announced.
If an appellate court chooses to address an issue that is raised for
the first time on appeal rather than remand the case back to the dis-
trict court, that choice also may change the nature of the decision to
be made because, on remand, the parties might re-frame the issue or
offer the district court alternative grounds on which it could decide
the case.  It seems more likely that this would occur in the district
court on remand than that it would occur in the court of appeals.
Recognizing these facts in the abstract does not say anything
about whether the court of appeals should proceed to decide the new
issue itself or remand the case so that the district court will take the
first stab at it.  In a particular fact setting, however, a court of appeals
might consider the different effects when choosing its course of
action.
(b) More obviously relevant is the fact, discussed below,45 that the
appellate court as an institution may be more or less competent than
the trial court to address the new issue.  To the degree that a new
issue requires fact finding based on oral testimony or an exercise of
discretion as to a matter that trial courts often deal with and appellate
courts seldom deal with, an appellate court presumably will be less
competent than the trial court would have been.
(c) It also should be noted when the parties fail to raise an issue
or a district court misses or ignores an issue, the sequence of decisions
that ensues could violate a mandatory rule of horizontal sequencing,
or it might not do so.  If a district court would have had discretion to
decide an unraised or missed issue last (or if the district court would
45 See infra Part IV.
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not have needed to reach the “missed” issue at all, given how it
decided other issues), its failure to address the unraised or neglected
issue might or might not have any effects on judicial resource expen-
diture, settlement leverage, or law pronouncement, depending upon
the sequence in which the court would have addressed the various
issues had they all been raised and noticed, and its sequencing deci-
sions will not be tainted by error, given the discretionary nature of the
sequencing that we are positing.46  Thus, if the trial court would have
addressed a motion to dismiss under the forum non conveniens doc-
trine only after it denied motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
or personal jurisdiction (had it addressed fnc at all), its postponement
of the fnc issue would not be erroneous and would not have changed
judicial resource expenditure, settlement leverage, or law pronounce-
ment.  However, a district court’s violation of a mandatory sequencing
rule may lead to judicial resources being wasted on issues that need
not have been addressed, may affect settlement leverage, and certainly
will alter what law was and was not made by the district court. The
district court’s critical rulings on discovery as to the merits, before
ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, could have all of those conse-
quences.  The effects would, at best, be remediable only in part.47  An
appellate court could vacate rulings that ought not to have been made
and reverse rulings that are erroneous, but the law announced by the
district court may have had influence in the interim.  If the appellate
court takes the first stab at the issue that the district court ought to
have addressed under mandatory horizontal sequencing rules, that
will affect how the appellate court’s resources are expended, the man-
ner in which the appellate court addresses the question—because it
will address the issue de novo, regardless of what standard of review it
normally would have employed—and settlement leverage. Some or all
of these are matters that a court of appeals should consider in decid-
ing whether to take a first stab.
46 See Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limita-
tions from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 306–07
(2011) (opining that trial judges have a great deal of discretion to sequence their
decisions of issues and that the primary constraints on them are the requirement that
federal courts confirm their subject-matter jurisdiction before deciding merits issues
and the common law rule “that when a common factual issue will come before both
judge and jury . . . [because it is] common to the merits of both law and equity claims
for relief joined in the same case . . . the jury must decide it first”).
47 One cannot recover the judicial resources that were expended—although per-
haps some of that expended time and effort will help to facilitate resolution of other
cases or can otherwise be put to good use.  One cannot undo the effects on settle-
ment leverage, although perhaps other developments in the case will tend to undo
any distortions.
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(d)  Moreover, just as a relatively strict final judgment rule
increases the burden on district courts, a rigid rule that required
appellate courts to remand to district courts to take the first stab at
issues that arose for the first time on appeal would increase the
required investment by trial judges while conserving, or at least post-
poning the expenditure of, appellate resources.  A flexible rule that
permitted appellate courts to take the first stab at issues that arose for
the first time on appeal could increase, or at least hasten, the invest-
ment by appellate judges and could increase the quantity of appellate
precedent, when the appellate courts chose to accept the new ques-
tion.48  An appellate court that permits a new question to be raised on
an interlocutory appeal enables the appellant to get an appellate dis-
position of the issue less expensively and more quickly than if the
party had to wait until after final judgment.49  An appellate court that
permits a new question to be raised after final judgment also may save
the litigants time and money, as compared to the time and money
they would expend if the new issue were remanded to the trial court.
Also, if the unavailability to defendants of immediate appeal of deci-
sions adverse to them strengthens plaintiffs’ settlement leverage,50 it
would seem to follow that the ability of defendants to raise a new issue
on an interlocutory appeal reduces a plaintiffs’ settlement leverage,
both because the defendant may prevail on the appeal and because
the raising of the new issue increases the plaintiff’s costs.51  Appellate
courts seem well aware of the reallocation of work that results from
their addressing issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.52
But the effect on settlement dynamics is not something that they have
explicitly recognized, and might be something that appellate courts
would want to consider when they contemplate whether to entertain a
question that is raised for the first time on appeal.53
(e) Finally, focusing on horizontal sequencing rules as they apply
in appellate courts, one could ask what, if any, principles govern (or
should govern) where, among the issues presented to the appellate
48 See Rutledge, supra note 38, at 23. R
49 See id. at 29–30.
50 See id. at 12.
51 See id. at 21–22, 31–32.
52 It is not equally clear that they adequately take into account the change in the
standard of review that is entailed in their taking the first stab at issues, but the appel-
late courts’ tendency to favor issues of law, as to which the standard of review is de
novo, see infra text accompanying notes 179–84, does indicate some sensitivity to this R
matter.
53 As to the effects of vertical sequencing rules generally, see Rutledge, supra note
38, at 27–30. R
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court, that court should consider issues that were not raised below.
For example, should an appellate court consider new issues only if
none of the presented issues that were raised in the district court lead
to an acceptable result?  Should the appellant’s argument on the new
issue be the analogue of an affirmative defense in which the appellant
argues, “Even if I would lose on every other basis, I should prevail on
this basis?”  Even in that situation, it does not follow that the new issue
always should be the last issue that an appeals court considers, for a
mandatory sequencing rule such as that which requires a court to con-
firm its subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching merits questions
could dictate otherwise.  For example, upon the appeal of denial of
summary judgment to a government official whose “claim” to quali-
fied immunity was rejected by the district court judge, the defendant
might also raise the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if the
plaintiff’s claim was based upon violation of state-created rights.
Affirmance would lead to the case moving forward in the trial court
but the appeals court should consider the district court’s subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction first, because, if the district court lacks jurisdiction
over the case, it will be unnecessary to determine, and it will not mat-
ter, whether the defendant was qualifiedly immune from suit.
It should be clear then that the opportunity for appellate courts
to take the first stab at issues has important implications for who
decides issues; what issues are decided; at what point in the course of a
case (when) they are decided, where (by what courts) they are decided;
and potentially how those issues are decided.  It also has consequences
for party behavior, litigation costs, settlement incentives, the relation-
ship between trial and appellate courts, and the allocation of judicial
resources.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A fundamental initial question to ask is: How it is that appellate
courts ever are permitted to reach questions that no inferior tribunal
has addressed?  In the federal system, do Article III or Congressional
statutes confer authority on appellate courts to address new issues?
A. Article III and Congressional Legislation
Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. . . .
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
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States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a
State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects . . . . In [specified]
cases . . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.54
Congress then “conferred” jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,55
by stating the circumstances under which parties “may appeal to the
Supreme Court” from orders entered in proceedings required by
Congress to be determined by district courts composed of three
judges,56 providing the methods by which cases in the intermediate
federal courts of appeals “may be reviewed by the Supreme Court”57—
implicitly recognizing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all
such cases—and stating which judgments and decrees issued by State
courts “may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.”58
Additional statutes confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the inter-
mediate federal courts of appeals.  Those of broadest application are
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292, both of which confer “jurisdiction of
appeals from” specified kinds of decisions, orders, and decrees.59
54 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (emphasis added).
55 Article III of the Constitution, after vesting the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish,
states that in all cases not within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, “the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” Id. § 2.  None-
theless, the Court and commentators often regard Congress as having “conferred”
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3525, at 521 (2008) (“The orthodox view of McCardle
remains that Congress has plenary power—at least under Article III—to confer or
withhold appellate jurisdiction [from the Supreme Court and subject to limitations
derived from other parts of the Constitution].”)
56 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).
57 Id. § 1254.
58 Id. § 1257.
59 Id. §§ 1291, 1292.  In addition to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a), see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), authorizing federal courts of appeals to permit appeal from interlocutory
orders that district courts have certified under that section; § 1292(c), stating that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal
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Thus, for present purposes, “appellate jurisdiction,” “review,” and
“appeal” are the key words in these statutes.
Others have noted that Article III does not define the judicial
power60 and “says nothing about the procedures by which courts
vested with the judicial power must or may consider and decide
cases.”61  Article III similarly invokes but does not say what it means
for the Supreme Court to “have appellate Jurisdiction.”  Article III,
Section 2 does make clear that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion extends to both law and fact, and that Congress may make excep-
tions to and may regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
How far Congress may go in doing so has been the subject of much
scholarly debate62 and of some case law,63 but the issues that have
from specified interlocutory orders and judgments; and § 1295, stating that the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction on an appeal from
further specified final decisions of district courts, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
the U.S. Court of International Trade, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and cer-
tain final decisions of an agency board of contract appeals.
60 Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1877 (2001) (noting that Article III does not define
the judicial power); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973) (observing that Article III is unhelpful in clarify-
ing who may obtain constitutional declarations from the Supreme Court and under
what circumstances).
61 Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1335 (1999).
62 See, e.g., John Eidsmoe, The Article III Exceptions Clause: Any Exceptions to the Power
of Congress to Make Exceptions?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 95, 145 (2007) (considering the
historical evolution of the Exceptions Clause and the possible negative consequences
of a broad interpretation of the Clause that allows jurisdiction-stripping); Eugene
Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 516–31 (1983) (advocating maintenance of a narrow
interpretation of the Exceptions Clause, for a broad interpretation could strip the
Supreme Court of essential functions); Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Reg-
ulations Clause: Legislative Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32
AM. U. L. REV. 497, 513, 515 (1983) (noting that, at the Constitutional Convention,
the debate did not focus on Congressional control over the Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion but on whether that jurisdiction should reach findings of fact as well as conclu-
sions of law, and concluding that, “[t]he remarks of the Framers leave no doubt that
the exceptions clause was intended to permit only those exceptions to the Court’s
jurisdiction over factual issues as would be necessary to preserve the integrity of state
juries. . . . At no time did the Framers consider the possibility that the exceptions
clause could be used to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction over questions of law”);
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 201 (2007) (arguing that cer-
tain forms of jurisdiction stripping violate the constitutional requirements of
supremacy and inferiority); Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing
Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729, 792 (2005) (discussing the possibility that Congress
could transfer a category or sub-category of cases from the Court’s appellate to its
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been raised with respect to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction relate
primarily to the constitutionality of “jurisdiction stripping,” and so are
peripheral to the concerns of this Article.
Similarly, neither § 1291 nor § 1292, nor other jurisdictional stat-
utes, speak to what it means for a federal court to have jurisdiction of
original jurisdiction); Mark Strasser, Taking Exception to Traditional Exceptions Clause
Jurisprudence: On Congress’s Power to Limit the Court’s Jurisdiction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 125,
126, 145–48, 186–87 (arguing that Congress’s power to limit appellate jurisdiction is
more limited than traditionalist scholars believe, especially if the limitation does not
involve an area requiring specialized legal expertise); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recognizing the “clamors”
against Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over matters of fact, and its response to
those concerns).
63 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658–64 (1996) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of a Congressional statute that imposed restrictions on successive habeas
corpus petitions, but did not preclude the Supreme Court from entertaining a habeas
corpus petition filed as an original matter in the Supreme Court and that appeared to
leave open other avenues to Supreme Court review); Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
85, 103–07 (1868) (suggesting limiting constructions of McCardle, as explained for
example in Strasser, supra note 62, at 151–52); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) R
506, 515 (1868) (indicating that Congress has “plenary power” over the Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction, but in circumstances that permit limiting interpretations of the
case); cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (striking down, as
violative of separation of powers principles, a statute that would have allowed plain-
tiffs to obtain judicial relief after the courts had held them entitled to none); United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146–47 (1872) (holding unconstitutional a statute that the
Court construed to require courts to rule in favor of the government in cases pending
before them, under an existing law; indicating that the exceptions clause does not
grant legislative authority to mandate the result of particular cases); Mickenberg,
supra note 62, at 516–23 (arguing that early judicial interpretations of the exceptions R
and regulations clause that some litigants and commentators have argued established
Congressional authority to strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction did not create
exceptions but rather reflected acceptance of mere procedural regulations).  The
cases that Professor Mickenberg distinguished in this way include United States v. Good-
win, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 108 (1812), United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159
(1805), and Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).  He also argued that many
of the Court’s statements recognizing broad Congressional power over Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction have been mere dicta.  Mickenberg, supra note 62, at R
522–23.  Finding both constitutional history and judicial precedent indeterminate
with respect to which exceptions to jurisdiction are within or beyond congressional
power, he argues on public policy grounds that the exceptions clause should not be
used to undermine constitutional separation of powers, stare decisis, and uniformity
of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 531–38, 541–42. See generally ERWIN CHEMERIN-
SKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2 (5th ed. 2007) (canvassing the most pertinent U.S.
Supreme Court cases and scholarly commentary, and concluding that there is no con-
sensus on the constitutionality of restrictions on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to
hear cases on particular topics); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3525 (addressing R
congressional control of U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction).
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an appeal, or authority to “review” lower court decisions.  Because the
very existence and jurisdiction of the intermediate federal appellate
courts depend upon Congress’s will, however, Congress has greater
authority to shape and confine the appellate jurisdiction of those
courts than Congress has vis-à-vis the Supreme Court, whose existence
uniquely is dictated by and whose powers uniquely find their source in
Article III.  Courts and scholars have theorized about limits upon Con-
gress’s authority vis-à-vis the intermediate federal courts of appeals.64
However, legal scholarship seldom has focused directly upon what it
means, within the meaning of Article III or jurisdictional statutes, for
a court to have jurisdiction of an appeal, as we currently understand
the term—either in general or in particular with respect to the kinds
of questions posed in this Article, having to do with appellate courts’
proper role in deciding questions in the first instance, without prior
district court consideration.65
64 See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 207–09 (1997) (critiquing the
theory proposed in Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the
Two Tiers of Federal Court Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985)); James E. Pfander,
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2000) (arguing that “the constitutional requirement of
‘supremacy’ may leave Congress free to fashion exceptions and regulations to the
Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction, but limit its ability to couple such regulations
with restrictions on the Court’s supervisory role that would threaten the constitutional
requirement of lower federal court ‘inferiority’ to the one ‘supreme’ court specified
in Article III”); Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on
Congress’s Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132,
139 (1995) (arguing that the case law record is much less clear than previously
thought as to Congress’s power to restrict the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction). See
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 63, § 3.3 and articles cited therein (noting a lack of R
consensus as to the constitutionality of congressional restrictions on lower federal
court jurisdiction); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3526 (exploring approaches to R
congressional restrictions on lower federal court jurisdiction).
65 One could, however, consider the scholarship that relates to Congress’s power,
or lack of power, to interfere with appellate decisions in pending cases as speaking to
certain aspects of what it means for a court to have jurisdiction of an appeal, but this
too is peripheral to the concerns of this Article.  Scholarship addressing cases such as
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128 (1872) would fall into this category. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of
Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75 (identifying and
examining intrinsic limits on Congress’s power to legislate regarding the federal judi-
ciary, deriving from the necessary and proper clause); Amanda Frost, supra note 20, at R
472 (“Judicial decisions are not open to revision either by Congress or the president,
no matter how strongly the political branches disagree with courts’ conclusions about
the meaning of law.  The political branches can, of course, override a judicial decision
. . . through the constitutional mechanisms for enacting new law.  Unless and until
they do so, however, judicial pronouncements are the law.” (footnotes omitted));
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B. A Very Short History of the Appeal
We do have history that distinguishes early “appeals” from other
mechanisms for obtaining appellate review:
In current legal terminology, the word “appeal” is often used in
a generic sense, to designate any attempt to have a higher court
review the factual or legal findings of a lower tribunal.  In the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries . . . the word appeal was a term of
art, defining a specific kind of review and requiring that appellants
follow specific procedures in order to obtain review.  “An appeal
[was] a process of civil law origin, and remove[d] a cause entirely;
subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to a review and retrial.”  A writ
of error, in contrast, was “a process of common-law origin, and it
remove[d] nothing for re-examination, but the law.”  The Judiciary
Act of 1789 drew a sharp distinction between “appeals” and “writs of
error,” and established specific regulations governing the use of
appeals and writs of error to gain circuit court review of district
court decrees and judgments.66
We also have enlightening explorations of how our notion of an
appeal broadened to encompass not only that which the common law
writ of error permitted to be heard by a superior court but also some
of what equity permitted to be revisited.  As Professor Mary Sarah
Bilder has explained:
We refer to a higher court review of a lower court or administrative
agency decision as an “appeal.”  We call these higher reviewing
courts “Courts of Appeal.” And we describe our vertical, multi-tiered
legal system in which a Supreme Court is the final arbiter of judg-
ment as an “appellate” system. . . .
John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 504–05
(2000) (pointing out “that Congress at least may adopt any norm of stare decisis that
a court reasonably could recognize” and therefore, Congress “may adopt or modify
rules of precedent in pursuit of accuracy, economy, stability, and predictability in the
law”); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of
the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998)
(exploring questions relating to the integrity of the federal courts and the constitu-
tionality of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996).
66 Mickenberg, supra note 62, at 517 (footnotes omitted) (citing Wiscart v. R
D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796)); see also Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional
Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 173–74 &
n.77, 191–93 & n.178 (1960) (discussing appeals as contrasted with writs of error in
exploring Congress’s power to make exceptions to and to regulate the jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court and the scope of statutory restrictions on United
States Supreme Court jurisdiction).
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But how did the word and concept of “appeal” ever get into
American legal culture and discourse? Almost every legal system
develops procedures to address grievances about initial judicial
determinations.  However, . . . [t]hree hundred years ago, the term
“appeal” referred to a legal procedure which was available only in
the separate system of English courts governed by canon and civil
law—and not in the common law system with which the Puritan set-
tlers were so enamored.  The legal procedure known as “the appeal”
did not refer to what we now think of as an “appeal”—the correc-
tion by a higher court of errors of law made by a lower court.
Instead, the “appeal” referred to a procedure under which a higher
tribunal could completely and broadly rehear and redecide not only
the law, but also the entire facts of a case. Moreover, the legal proce-
dure called “the appeal” represented a substantive theory of justice,
emphasizing the importance of equity and a particular attitude
towards the hierarchy of authority.  It was this more liberal system of
redress that eight of the colonies initially adopted, including Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island.
. . . .
Over time, many of these American colonies would replace or
combine the appeal with the more traditional review procedures of
the common law: the writ of error and the writ of certiorari.  And by
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these more common-law-
like procedures had significantly narrowed the possibilities of
review—for example, courts only permitted redress for errors of law
shown in the written record of the case, similar to procedures in
England.  Yet the word “appeal” and arguably some of its broader
jurisprudential connotations never completely vanished from the
American legal system.
The appeal and the writ of error thus were two separate paths,
and although our modern appellate system seems to owe more
today to the narrow theory of redress represented by the writ of
error, the fact that we stubbornly continue to use the word “appeal”
suggests that some part of the original substantive theory of the
appeal remains with us. . . . [P]erhaps the word still survives because
we still remember, perhaps still continue to believe in, this early,
broader and more flexible and equitable notion of appeal.
. . . .
The meaning of the appeals script arose from the long heritage of
canon and civil law in which a commitment to equity required that a
higher tribunal must be able to rehear and redecide both the facts
and law of an individual’s case.  The decisions to adopt the appeals
script betrayed the colonial leaders’ . . . agreement with the
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broader, more flexible, and more equitable theory of review and
redress that the appeal reflected.67
The general rule in our system today is that courts of appeals will
not consider new issues on appeal, but will entertain only errors that
were complained of below.  As the short history presented above indi-
cates, this approach came out of English common law.  In the compet-
ing tradition from equity, an appellate tribunal did not limit itself to
issues that had been presented to the lower court, review was de novo,
and the appellate court could render any judgment it thought justice
required.  Many of the exceptions that our courts have made to the
general rule68 reflect the philosophy that the English courts of equity
had embraced.
C. Guidance from The Federalist Papers and the Supreme Court’s
Actions and Words
From The Federalist Papers and from Supreme Court opinions as
well we have indications of the meaning of “appellate jurisdiction”
and of federal appellate courts’ authority to review lower courts’ deci-
sions.  The Court regards the terms “review” and “appeal”—or at least
the terms “original jurisdiction” and “appellate jurisdiction both as to
law and fact”—as “borrowed from the common law, meaningless with-
out that background, and . . . meant to carry their common-law impli-
cations.”69  The current Court may be content to look to dictionaries.
Thus, in Wall v. Kholi,70 in which the Court in 2011 construed the
term “collateral review” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),71 the Court looked
to WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993),72 to
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009),73 and to the OED for the
meaning of “review.”  It adopted the definition of “a looking over or
67 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913,
913–15, 922 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
68 See infra text accompanying notes 171–78. R
69 D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471 n.9 (1942).
70 131 S. Ct. 1278 (2011).
71 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 generally requires a
federal habeas petition to be filed within on year of the date on which a judgment
became final, but provides that a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review tolls that period.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006).  The
Court was called upon to interpret the term “collateral review” in that context. Wall,
131 S. Ct. at 1283–89.
72 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 444 (1993).
73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009).
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examination with a view to amendment or improvement,” quoting
WEBSTER’S.74
Neither the word “review” nor the phrase “jurisdiction of
appeals” obviously suggests that appellate jurisdiction encompasses
authority to determine issues that no inferior court has reached. The
Federalist Papers say that the word “‘appellate’ . . . denotes nothing
more than the power of one tribunal to review the proceedings of
another, either as to the law or fact, or both.”75  Commentators like-
wise speak of appeal and review as processes that have reference to the
decisions of inferior tribunals.  Thus, highly respected authorities tell
us that,
appellate courts serve as the instrument of accountability for those
who make the basic decisions in trials courts and administrative
agencies.  The traditional appeal calls for an examination of the rul-
ings below to assure that they are . . . at least within the range of
error the law . . . allows the primary decision-maker. . . . [At the
same time,] appellate courts are needed to announce, clarify, and
harmonize the rules of decision . . . .76
Yet the Supreme Court reaches new questions itself and has long per-
mitted intermediate federal appellate courts to reach them.  At the
same time, the Court and its members sometimes have expressed dis-
comfort or displeasure with this practice.
What guidance has the Supreme Court given with respect to
appellate courts’ proper role with regard to “new” issues?
There have been occasions on which the Court has sought to con-
fine its own appellate jurisdiction and that of the IFACs, and to distin-
guish appellate from original jurisdiction.  In no less a case than
Marbury v. Madison,77 in the course of deciding whether the Court
could issue a writ of mandamus—as it was statutorily authorized to
do—the Court observed:
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdic-
tion, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be
original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has
declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made
in the constitution, is form without substance. . . . [Thus, t]o enable
this court . . . to issue a mandamus, it must be shewn to be an exer-
74 Wall, 131 S. Ct. at 1285.
75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed., 1982).
76 PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2–3 (1976); see also FLEMING
JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 766 (5th ed. 2001) (“Appellate review is not a
retrial of the case, but rather a review of the trial court’s determination to discern
whether prejudicial error occurred.”).
77 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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cise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.78
Having concluded that issuance of a writ to an officer, command-
ing the delivery of a paper, did not belong to the appellate jurisdic-
tion and was not necessary to enable the court to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, the Court concluded that the statutory grant of authority
to issue a writ of mandamus was repugnant to the Constitution and
therefore could not be implemented.79  By contrast, the Supreme
Court regards jurisdiction to issue mandamus to an inferior court
judge to fall within appellate jurisdiction.  As explained in a 1910 deci-
sion, “[w]here a case is within the appellate jurisdiction of the higher
court[,] a writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the appellate jurisdic-
tion which might otherwise be defeated by the unauthorized action of
the court below.”80
In an 1892 decision, about ninety years after Marbury, the Court
denied a writ of prohibition to a district court to prevent further pro-
ceedings in a suit to obtain the return of a yacht and damages for its
seizure for non-payment of duties.81  The writ was sought on the
ground that the district court had no jurisdiction over the suit.82  The
Court responded, saying that for it to decide in the first instance
whether the yacht was an article imported from a foreign country and
subject to duty would be to render a decision as a matter of original,
and not of appellate, jurisdiction, and to decide a question that was
duly pending before the district court.83
In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. ICC,84  the Court interpreted
an act of Congress—one that authorized the federal appeals courts to
certify questions of law to the Supreme Court (a predecessor of 28
U.S.C. § 1254)—not to permit certification of an entire case before
any judgment had been rendered.85  The Court reasoned that to per-
mit certification of an entire case before judgment would run afoul of
78 Id. at 174–75.
79 The Court in Marbury had defined appellate jurisdiction as jurisdiction
invoked to revise or correct a prior court judgment. Id. at 175.  In Marbury there was
no prior judicial proceeding that the Court was being asked to revise. See Reinstein &
Rahdert, supra note 62, at 790. R
80 McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 269 (1910); see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 75, 101–07 (1807) (finding appellate jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus that were filed directly in the Supreme Court because the Court was being
asked to revise a decision of an inferior court).
81 See In re Fassett, 142 U.S. 479, 488 (1892).
82 See id. at 484.
83 See id.
84 215 U.S. 216 (1909).
85 See id. at 221–25.
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the limits on the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.86  It quoted
Chief Justice Taney for the proposition that such a practice would
convert the Court “into one of original jurisdiction in questions of law,
instead of being, as the Constitution intended it to be, an appellate
court to revise the decisions of inferior tribunals.”87  Because the certi-
fication at bar attempted to send a whole case to be determined by the
Court, the Court disallowed the certification, and remanded the case
to the circuit court.88
In Baltimore & Ohio RR the Court did not explain why the limita-
tion to appellate jurisdiction was not violated by the Court’s decision
of some issues, rather than all those presented by a case.  But Wheeler
Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States89 may furnish the answer.  It
indicated that certification from a court of first instance, restricted to
definite and distinct questions of law, invokes appellate action, and
that this was settled by early and long-continued usage that amounted
to a practical construction of Article III.90  The same long-continued
usage might well not support the forays into decision-making in the
first instance that now can be found in federal appellate decisions,
although appeals courts often restrict themselves to definite and dis-
tinct questions of law.  The difference is that they are not doing so
pursuant to a certification from a district court.91
In modern times, one of the hints that the Court continues to
believe in limits on appellate jurisdiction can be found in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Singleton v. Wulff.92  The Court there
stated that, “[t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and
resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discre-
tion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual
cases.  We announce no general rule.”93 But the opinion warrants a
closer look for what more it can teach.  In that case, physicians had
sued to challenge the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that
excluded certain abortions from the services for which needy persons
86 See id.
87 Id. at 221 (emphasis added) (quoting Webster v. Cooper, 51 U.S. 54 (1850)).
88 See id. at 224.
89 281 U.S. 572 (1930).
90 Id. at 576–77.
91 As to the history and structure of Article III generally, see Eidsmoe, supra note
62; David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original Intentions R
and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1041 (2006); Daniel J. Meltzer,
The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); James E. Pfander,
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1515, 1589–92 (2001).
92 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
93 Id. at 121.
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could obtain Medicaid benefits.94  On motion, the district court dis-
missed the complaint against a state-official on the basis that plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue him.95  The defendant had filed no pleading
addressed to the merits, stipulated to no facts, and given no intima-
tion of what other defenses he might have; he had answered some
interrogatories.96  On plaintiffs’ appeal to the Eighth Circuit, defen-
dant addressed only the question of standing.97  The Eighth Circuit,
however, after reversing—holding that plaintiffs did have standing to
sue—went on to decide the merits of the case, rather than remanding
to the district court for it to decide the merits.98  The appeals court
justified its decision to reach the merits on the grounds that “the ques-
tion of the statute’s validity could not profit from further refinement,
and indeed was one whose answer was in no doubt.  The statute was
‘obviously unconstitutional.’”99
After affirming the holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring
the suit, the Supreme Court disapproved the Eighth Circuit’s exercise
of appellate jurisdiction over the merits.100  The Court explicitly
assumed, without deciding, that the court of appeals had jurisdiction
to proceed to the merits in this case.101  In so assuming, the Court
communicated that there is a question whether federal courts of
appeals have jurisdiction to reach merits questions that were not
decided by an inferior court; it is not a foregone conclusion that they
have such jurisdiction.102  Perhaps this recognition also lies behind
the Court’s pronouncement that the matter of which merits questions
not decided by the trial court an appellate court may reach “is one left
primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals.”103  Until the Court
announces limits that derive from the statutes that confer jurisdiction
to review lower court decisions and decide appeals, if not from Article
III itself, however, we are left to come to our own conclusions as to
what those limits may be.
At times, dissenters have complained that the Supreme Court was
permitting and even requiring IFACs to exceed the proper bounds of
appellate jurisdiction and exercise what amounted to original jurisdic-
94 See id. at 109–10.
95 See id. at 110–11.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 111–12.
98 See id.
99 Id. (citation omitted).
100 See id. at 119.
101 See id. at 119–21.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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tion.  The first Justice Roberts so opined in a case in which a party
came directly to the court of appeals, arguing that its adversary had
committed a fraud on the Patent Office and on the court of appeals
itself in a closed infringement suit.104  After the court of appeals
denied relief, the Supreme Court declared that the appellate court
had the power and the duty to vacate the earlier judgment and to
direct the district court to set aside its judgment, deny relief to the
plaintiff in the infringement suit, and take appropriate additional
action.105  The first Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the appel-
late court had no power to do as the majority ordered and was without
authority to try the issues:
Neither this court nor a circuit court of appeals may hear new
evidence in a cause appealable from a lower court.  No suggestion
seems ever before to have been made that they may constitute them-
selves trial courts, embark on the trial of what is essentially an inde-
pendent cause and enter a judgment of first instance on the facts
and the law.  But this is what the opinion sanctions.106
Similarly, in Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,107
the Court held that a stay order was immediately appealable and that
the court of appeals had acted within its authority in deciding that the
parties’ contract dispute was arbitrable.108  Justice Rehnquist, dissent-
ing, criticized at length what he viewed as the Court’s approval of “an
extraordinary departure from the usual and accepted course of judi-
cial proceedings by affirming the Court of Appeals decision on an
issue that was not decided in the District court.”109  That is, the Court
of Appeals had commanded the district court to enter an order com-
pelling arbitration even though the district court had not considered
that issue, and even though the Arbitration Act gave the hospital a
right to jury trial on disputed issues of fact.110  The appeals court had
decided that there were no such disputed issues, although there was
no motion for summary judgment before it.111  Justice Rehnquist con-
demned the appellate court’s order as a non-appellate act that the
appeals court had no discretion to take, asserting that 29 U.S.C.
§ 2106 “does not grant the courts of appeals authority to constitute
104 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 257 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 251 (majority opinion).
106 Id. at 258 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
107 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
108 Id. at 13, 29.
109 Id. at 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 See id.
111 See id. at 29 (majority opinion).
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themselves as trial courts.”112  It was not enough that the appeals court
had in its possession the memoranda filed in the District Court:
There was no reason to believe that the District Court would
not have acted promptly to resolve the dispute on the merits after
being reversed on the stay.  [The fact t]hat judges of a court of
appeals believe they know how a case should be decided is no rea-
son for them to substitute their own judgment for that of a district
judge without regard to the normal course of appellate
procedure.113
On the other hand, the Supreme Court allows questions of fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction to be
decided on appeal either to the IFACs or to the Supreme Court itself,
although those questions were not raised below.114  Indeed, the Court
has made clear that it is a duty of federal appellate courts to raise and
decide such issues sua sponte, if the parties have failed to raise
them.115  Notice that a trial court (ordinarily) would have no occasion
to address appellate jurisdiction and it would seem very peculiar for a
federal appellate court to remand a case to a district court to have it
consider the appellate court’s jurisdiction over an appeal.  But it
would not seem comparably strange for an appellate court to remand
to have a district court address, in the first instance, whether the dis-
trict court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a case.  And yet the
norm is for federal appellate courts to address issues of district court
subject-matter jurisdiction if the district court has failed to do so, as
well as when a party argues that the district court erred in its determi-
nation of its subject-matter jurisdiction.116  The fact that jurisdictional
112 Id. at 36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113 Id; see also Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 54 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (commenting, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, that nothing in the
case record suggested any reason the Court should assume a function more properly
exercised by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court, and order consolidation of
this case with another action pending in the District Court).
114 See infra note 116 and accompanying text. R
115 See id.
116 See, e.g., Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Comm’rs, 549 F.3d 641, 649 (6th
Cir. 2008) (in a case in which terminated teachers alleged that defendants violated
the teachers’ Establishment Clause and due process rights and in which the district
court granted summary judgment to defendants and denied partial summary judg-
ment to plaintiffs, the court reached the question whether plaintiffs had municipal-
taxpayer standing, an issue that defendants had raised below but that the district
court had not reached although it held that the teachers did not meet individual
standing requirements for an Establishment Clause claim), vacated, 2009 WL 1045462
(2009); see also Martineau, supra note 14, at 1047 (“[a]llowing the issue of subject R
matter jurisdiction to be raised at any time is not an exception to the general rule but
a precondition” to the applicability of the general rule).
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issues can be raised for the first time on appeal also results in issues
sometimes arising for the first time on appeal as to whether a particu-
lar issue is “jurisdictional” for purposes of this principle.117
The Supreme Court also allows arguments of “plain error” to be
raised in federal appellate courts, both in criminal cases and in civil
cases.118  In United States v. Marcus,119 the Court stated that an inter-
mediate appellate court, in its discretion, may correct an error not
raised at trial when the appellant demonstrates that: (1) there was an
error; (2) that is clear or obvious; (3) that affected the appellant’s
substantial rights, that is, the outcome of the proceedings, or is a
structural error (a category that the Court has not defined clearly),120
whose effect is difficult to assess; and (4) that seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.121
Back in the year 1850, the Court opined:
There is nothing in the nature of an appellate jurisdiction, proceed-
ing according to the common law, which forbids the granting of
amendments [to libels]. . . . But it has been the practice of this
court, where amendments are necessary, to remand the cause to the
Circuit Court for that purpose.122
A few years later, in Udall v. S.S. Ohio,123 the Court expressed concern
that if amendments that created jurisdiction were allowed in the
Supreme Court, “parties would be taken by surprise, and litigation
would be encouraged.  The plaintiff . . . would never fail to sustain the
jurisdiction of this court, on his appeal.”124  Not liking that result, the
Udall Court dismissed the appeal for lack of federal jurisdiction over
the case.125  Yet, years later, in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,126
the Court took advantage of the notion that “there is [nothing] in the
nature of an appellate jurisdiction, [proceeding according to the com-
mon law] . . . which forbids the granting of amendments,” to hold that
a court of appeals has authority to grant a motion to dismiss a dispen-
117 See, e.g., Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (raising sua sponte
the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity, concluding that it was a jurisdic-
tional issue).
118 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256–57 (1981) (indi-
cating the Court’s view that plain error doctrine can be used in civil cases).
119 130 S. Ct. 2159 (2010).
120 Id. at 2168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2164 (majority opinion).
122 Kennedy v. Bank of Ga., 49 U.S. (8 How.) 586, 610–11 (1850).
123 58 U.S. (17 How.) 17 (1855).
124 Id. at 19.
125 Id.
126 490 U.S. 826 (1989).
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sable party, and need not remand the case to the district court for
dismissal in that court’s discretion.127  It cautioned that appellate
courts should exercise sparingly the authority to allow such amend-
ments and should remand to the district court “when appropriate,”
but it declined to erect a per se barrier to appellate courts’ making
the determination.128  The Court cited the deep historical roots of the
understanding of appellate power to include such power, widespread
modern authority in the federal IFACs and in the Supreme Court
itself upholding appellate authority to dismiss dispensable non-diverse
parties consistently with the policies underlying Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21, a lack of evidence that the authority had been abused,
and the efficiencies that such self-help created.129  While acknowledg-
ing that although “[a]ppellate-level amendments to correct jurisdic-
tional defects may not be the most intellectually satisfying approach to
the spoiler problem, . . . ‘some consideration must be given to practi-
calities.’”130  The Court did concede that if factual disputes arose, for
example as to prejudice that might result to the remaining parties as a
result of a dismissal of a dispensable party, it might be appropriate to
remand to the district court to make the determination.131  Justice
Kennedy, in dissent, did not believe that the appellate court had
power to dismiss the dispensable party, did not believe that the cases
relied on by the majority sufficiently supported the asserted power,
and was not persuaded that practical considerations warranted
upholding the power when a limited remand to the district court
would be expeditious and would put the issue into the court best able
to determine whether to dismiss anyone.132
These are examples, by no means exhaustive, of the circum-
stances in which the Supreme Court itself has resolved issues that were
not raised or were not ruled upon in a lower court and in which the
Court has approved intermediate appellate courts’ decisions of new
issues.  Indeed, Professor Amanda Frost has observed that “some of
the Supreme Court’s landmark cases were decided on grounds that
were never raised by the parties.”133 She cites as examples Erie Railroad
127 Id. at 834.
128 Id. at 827.
129 Id. at 833–37.
130 Id. at 836–37 (quoting Newman-Green v. Alfonzo-Lorrain, 854 F.2d 916, 925
(7th Cir. 1988)).
131 Id. at 838.
132 See  id. at 839–43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133 Frost, supra note 20, at 450. R
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Co. v. Tompkins,134 Washington v. Davis,135 and Dickerson v. United
States.136  Additional cases in which the Supreme Court decided issues
that had not been raised or decided below are discussed in subse-
quent sections of this Article.
Although this history does not give us any litmus test, the history
is important.  Past scholars have not given it the attention that it
deserves.  At a minimum, it tells us that constitutionally grounded lim-
its on appellate jurisdiction do exist, and that intermediate appellate
courts as well as the Supreme Court itself should keep that in mind
when they contemplate deciding issues that were not decided by lower
tribunals.  Perhaps at some point the Supreme Court will better delin-
eate the boundaries of appellate jurisdiction.  In the meantime, even
an exhaustive examination of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
would not definitively determine whether particular contemporary
instances of appellate courts’ taking the first stab at issues were or
would be constitutional.  It would be naive to think that “fine and
ambiguous points of constitutional history will determine the out-
come of the present . . . debate.”137
We will continue our investigation by considering potential
sources of appellate judicial power to take such first stabs, although, of
course, any statutory sources of such appellate judicial power would
themselves have to be permissible under Article III and the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the Constitution.138
134 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) and
holding that federal courts must apply state common law where state law governs,
without any challenge to Swift by the parties).  For discussion, see Frost, supra note 20, R
at 467–68.
135 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the Constitution forbids only intentional
discrimination despite the parties’ agreement that conduct having a racially disparate
impact was barred by the Equal Protection Clause).  For discussion, see Frost, supra
note 20, at 468. R
136 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (invalidating a federal statute that addressed the admis-
sion of confessions, overruling the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which had
held the statute to govern, where neither party had relied on the statute).  For discus-
sion, see Frost, supra note 20, at 468–69. R
137 Mickenberg, supra note 62, at 531 (speaking of the debate over the meaning of R
the exceptions and regulations clause of Article III).
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
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D. 28 U.S.C. § 2106
Appellate powers of the Supreme Court and of the federal IACs
sometimes are rested in 28 U.S.C. § 2106.  That section provides, in
pertinent part, that:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may
affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or
order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may
remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judg-
ment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be
had as may be just under the circumstances.139
What that section has been held to authorize and what it has
been held not to authorize in general could form the subject of
another article or book.  With reference to the subject matter of this
Article, it too provides no definitive answers.  While the statute does
confer and confirm judicial powers, it does not authorize appellate
courts and the Supreme Court to do whatever they like, and it cer-
tainly does not address explicitly the circumstances under which it is
proper for the Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdic-
tion to decide issues that were not resolved in the courts of first
instance.  The Court has referred to § 2106 as the statute that provides
power to give plenary consideration to an issue that was not properly
raised in the trial court.140  However, it also has made clear that the
power is not limitless.  The Court refused to find in § 2106 authority
for a court of appeals to hear arguments in support of increasing a
criminally convicted person’s sentence when the Government failed
to appeal or cross-appeal for such relief.141  Similarly, in Unitherm Food
Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,142 the Court observed that § 2106
“must be exercised consistent with the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by this Court.”143  And in 1996, in
discussing the Supreme Court’s power to “GVR,” that is, to grant certi-
orari, vacate the lower court judgment, and remand for further con-
sideration under the auspices of § 2106, Justice Scalia wrote that,
“[t]his facially unlimited statutory text is subject to the implicit limita-
tions imposed by traditional practice and by the nature of the appel-
late system created by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.”144  Although the majority disagreed that the statute imposed
139 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
140 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 257 n.16 (1981).
141 See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 249 (2008).
142 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
143 Id. at 402–03, n.4.
144 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 178 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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implicit limitations on the Court’s power, at least with respect to
GVRs,145 Justice Scalia argued that
[some] applications of no-fault V&R . . . are appropriate to preserve
the operational premise of a multi tiered judicial system (viz., that
lower courts will have the first opportunity to apply the governing
law to the facts) and to avoid the unseemliness of holding judg-
ments to be in error on the basis of law that did not exist when the
judgments were rendered below.  They thus serve the interests of
efficiency and of concern for the dignity of state and lower federal
tribunals.146
But he objected to the expansive view, that he attributed to the
majority, that the Court had power to vacate lower court orders, unfet-
tered by Constitutional or even prudential limits:
When the Constitution divides our jurisdiction into “original Juris-
diction” and “appellate Jurisdiction,” I think it conveys, with respect
to the latter, the traditional accoutrements of appellate power.
There doubtless is room for some innovation . . . but the innovation
cannot be limitless without altering the nature of the power
conferred.147
Section 2016 also is relevant to the concerns of this Article insofar
as it has been cited in support of the proposition that appellate courts
should not only correct error, but also should do substantial justice,
including considering changes of law or fact that have occurred since
the decision below.148  Such changes provide the reason that some
questions that were not passed upon by a lower court are presented to
courts of appeals, although the Court has not always been convinced
that the circumstances warranted appellate intervention.  For exam-
ple, in Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc.,149 in which
judgments were affirmed, without opinion, by an equally divided
Court, Justices Black and Douglas dissented because the Court rebuf-
fed a defendant-petitioner patent-licensee that sought to attack the
145 See id. at 166 (majority opinion).
146 Id. at 181 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 189–90.
148 See Jordan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(observing that, under § 2106, an appellate court would have discretion to remand
for further proceedings when an agency invoked an FOIA exemption for the first
time on appeal because of an interim development in applicable legal doctrine); Ken-
neally v. First Nat’l Bank of Anoka, 400 F.2d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1968) (remanding with
directions to determine the validity of prior assignments of accounts receivable in
light of additional evidence to be offered, so that substantial justice could be done
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106)).
149 397 U.S. 586 (1970).
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validity of a patent for the first time on appeal, where it was only after
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the case that the Supreme Court
decided that a patent licensee could attack the validity of a patent and
was not estopped to do so.150  The dissenters found the situation to
satisfy criteria that the Court had used in deciding whether new argu-
ments could be considered.151  There was a material change in the
law, earlier assertion of the issue would have been futile, and an
important public interest (the elimination of specious patents) would
have been served by consideration of the issue.152  But no majority of
the Court agreed.
Section 2106 sometimes is cited in support of appellate affirm-
ance of decisions on grounds different from those relied upon by the
district court,153 and it has been cited in support of the proposition
that if a district court does not rule on an issue raised by the parties, a
federal appeals court may rule on the issue without remanding to the
district court, so long as the parties have been given a full and fair
opportunity to address the issue.154  The appeals court alternatively
may remand for further proceedings consistent with its rulings.
As was true of the Supreme Court’s actions and pronouncements,
while this history of the interpretation of § 2106 is interesting and
instructive, interpretations of § 2106 do not suffice to determine
whether particular contemporary instances of appellate courts’ taking
the first stab at issues is constitutional or otherwise proper.
150 Id. at 586.
151 Id. at 588.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 18 F. App’x. 80, 81 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming
denial of relief on ground that district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s peti-
tion); Jordan, 591 F.2d at 791 (MacKinnan, J., dissenting on other grounds) (invoking
§ 2106 in support of affirming even where a district court relied on a wrong ground
or gave wrong reasons).
154 See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Comm’rs, 549 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir.
2008), vacated, 2009 WL 1045462 (6th Cir. 2009). Smith was a case in which termi-
nated teachers alleged that defendants violated the teachers’ Establishment Clause
and due process rights and in which the district court granted summary judgment to
defendants and denied partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, making the statement
that appears in the text and applying that principle in reaching the question whether
plaintiffs had municipal-taxpayer standing, an issue that plaintiffs had raised below
but that the district court had not reached, although it held that the teachers did not
meet individual standing requirements for an Establishment Clause claim.  In Smith,
municipal-taxpayer standing was a jurisdictional issue, which made it all the more
clearly appropriate for the appellate court to reach.  The court concluded that some
of the plaintiffs did have municipal-taxpayer standing and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 209–16 (6th
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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Before moving on to consider the role of discretion (as opposed
to power) in appellate attention to issues that were not decided below,
we stop to make a point about how appellate power changes over the
life span of a case.
E. The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction Before and After Final Judgment
Before proceeding with exploration of appellate courts’ discre-
tion to decide new issues, one more area that derives from the federal
appellate courts’ statutory jurisdiction should be noted.  It has long
been held that when a federal court has jurisdiction over a claim, the
court has jurisdiction to resolve all issues that are encompassed by that
claim.  As a result, federal courts can hear state law issues between
non-diverse parties in cases that arise under federal law.155  Federal
courts also can hear state law claims that form part of an Article III
case or controversy.156  When it comes to pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal appellate courts
may decide issues for which there is no independent basis of federal
appellate jurisdiction when those issues are inextricably intertwined
with issues for which there is an independent basis of federal appel-
late jurisdiction or when it is necessary to resolve the former issues in
order to meaningfully review the latter.157
By implication, it follows that, when a federal appellate court is
entertaining an interlocutory appeal, it is a necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, condition to the appellate court’s consideration of an issue that
was not decided below that the new issue be inextricably intertwined
with issues for which there is an independent basis of interlocutory
federal appellate jurisdiction or be necessary-to-resolve in order to
155 See Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992) (holding that “sue
and be sued” provision in Red Cross’s federal corporate charter conferred original
federal jurisdiction over all suits in which the Red Cross was a party, and as a result the
court of appeals erred in  deciding that the removed tort suit against the Red Cross
should be remanded to state court);  Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 199 (1921) (upholding jurisdiction over a stockholder’s state-law created action
to enjoin a corporation from purchasing bonds that allegedly had been issued under
an unconstitutional statute); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 756 (1824) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that gave federal courts
jurisdiction over actions in which the Bank, a federally chartered corporation, was a
party, regardless of the source of the rights and obligations involved in the merits of
the case).
156 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
157 See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995). See generally
Joan Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Before and
After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337 (1998) (discussing Swint and pendent appellate
jurisdiction).
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afford meaningful review of the latter.  By contrast, after final judg-
ment, that restriction would be too limiting, as appellate jurisdiction
encompasses all of the lower court decisions that led up to and are
“merged” in the judgment.158  We might want to say, however, that the
new issue must be necessary-or-appropriate to resolve in order to
affirm the judgment or in order to avoid manifest injustice in cases in
which resolution of the issue would lead to reversal or vacatur of the
existing judgment.  If the litigant who raises the new issue had good
cause not to raise it below, that circumstance would tend to support
the conclusion that the appellate court should hear the new issue to
avoid manifest injustice.  As indicated in the sections of the Article
that follow, however, these would be necessary but perhaps not suffi-
cient reasons for an appellate court to take the first stab at new issues,
for we need to design the system so that it maintains or increases liti-
gants’ incentives to litigate their cases vigorously and thoroughly in
the trial court.
III. FROM POWER TO DISCRETION
Because the Supreme Court itself decides questions that were not
decided in the lower courts and because it approves federal intermedi-
ate courts of appeals’ and presumably state appellate courts’ doing so
on occasion, the most pressing questions are less about power than
about discretion.  The focus thus must turn from whether federal
courts of appeals can decide issues that were not ruled upon below to
the circumstances in which they should exercise their power to do so.
This part explores the principles that govern those exercises of
discretion.
Recently, the Supreme Court has settled for pronouncements
that it is within the discretion of IACs to determine on what occasions
they will resolve issues that were not resolved below.  The Court never
has attempted to comprehensively state the considerations that gov-
ern its own exercises of discretion to decide issues that were not
decided in either or both the district court or the intermediate court
of appeals.  For many reasons—including the constitutional and statu-
tory restrictions on appellate jurisdiction discussed above—the Court
can and should do better than it has done in governing itself and in
guiding federal IACs in their exercises of discretion to hear or not to
hear new issues.  Of course, the federal IACs themselves can confine
the manner in which they exercise their discretion, to keep their con-
duct within constitutional bounds and otherwise appropriate given
158 See generally 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3905.1 (1992) (discussing review, after final judgment, of pre-finality orders).
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their competence, their role, and the limits of both.  We will see what
principles the IACs have articulated to guide their own conduct in this
regard.
A. From Power to Discretion in the Supreme Court and in the Federal
IACs—What the Courts Say and What the Courts Do
Typical, recent statements of general principles by the federal
courts of appeals are these:
“[C]ourts of appeals have discretion to address issues raised for the
first time on appeal,” but exercise such discretion “only in excep-
tional circumstances, as, for example, in cases involving uncertainty
in the law; novel, important, and recurring questions of federal law;
intervening change in the law; and extraordinary situations with the
potential for miscarriages of justice.”159
“We will review an issue that has been raised for the first time
on appeal under certain narrow circumstances . . . [:](1) to prevent
a miscarriage of justice; (2) when a change in law raises a new issue
while an appeal is pending; and (3) when the issue is purely one of
law.” “The decision to consider an issue not raised below is discre-
tionary, and such an issue should not be decided if it would
prejudice the other party.”160
159 Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(quoting Flynn v. Comm’r, 269 F.3d 1064, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (holding that dis-
trict court’s determination that order imposing contempt sanctions, in civil proceed-
ing for contumacious conduct, was not impermissible criminal sanction, did not
constitute plain error or an exceptional circumstance warranting reversal where con-
temnor was sanctioned pursuant to a schedule of per diem fines set in an earlier
order enforcing a settlement agreement, and the contemnor had had the opportunity
to limit or avoid the fines altogether by complying with the settlement agreement
after the issuance of that order).
160 Comty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 468 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (quot-
ing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also McIntosh v. Partridge,
540 F.3d 315, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant, a
former state supervisor, on the basis of official immunity in a § 1983 defamation suit
based upon termination of employment, where the court concluded that affirmance
on a different ground than the district court relied on was proper because the record
appeared to be adequately developed, defendant had raised the defense of qualified
immunity although the district court did not specifically address it, plaintiff had
presented no evidence that no reasonable supervisor in defendant’s position would
have reported to the state dental board as defendant did, and plaintiff had not sug-
gested that he had other evidence that he would have tendered if official immunity
had been raised as a ground for summary judgment or had the qualified immunity
privilege been properly raised; the court thus ruled as a matter of law that defendant
was entitled to official immunity with respect to his statements to the state dental
board, that those statements were made without malice, and that there was no evi-
dence to support a contrary finding); Forest Guardians v. Forsgreen, 478 F.3d 1149,
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In deciding whether to reach issues we have considered: whether
the litigant’s failure to raise the issue has deprived the court of
appeals of useful factfinding, or whether the issue was of a purely
legal nature; whether the argument was highly persuasive and fail-
ure to reach it would threaten a miscarriage of justice; whether con-
sidering the issue would cause prejudice or inequity to the adverse
party; whether the failure to raise the issue was inadvertent and pro-
vided no advantage; whether the issue was of constitutional magni-
tude; and whether the issue implicates a matter of great public
concern.161
As the quotations above suggest, although there is not total uni-
formity among the circuits with respect to the circumstances under
which they will entertain issues raised for the first time on appeal, key
factors often are:
(1) whether the issue presents a pure question of law;
(2) whether the trial court made a “plain error”162 and/or
whether immediate appellate intervention is necessary to
avoid a miscarriage of justice; and
(3) whether the issue is of particular public interest or impor-
tance that justifies immediate appellate intervention.
These factors reflect concerns about appellate competence and
that there be adequate justification for departing from a contrary
norm.  A situation that often is not captured by the usual formula-
tions, but that may tempt an appellate court to address issues for the
first time on appeal, is the situation in which facts have changed dur-
ing the course of the appellate process, particularly if the facts will
continue to change so that it is unlikely that the factual situation that
1152 (10th Cir. 2007) (relying on the principle that an IAC may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, provided the parties had an opportunity to address that
ground, and affirming dismissal of complaint, concluding that plaintiff had not ade-
quately alleged the agency action necessary to trigger the Forest Service’s statutory
duty to consult with the Fish & Wildlife Service).  In Forsgreen, the IAC did not reach
the ground on which the district court had relied in dismissing the complaint. For-
sgreen, 478 F.3d at 1152.
161 Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Mass., Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., 608 F.3d
110, 125 (1st Cir. 2010) (deciding whether counter-defendant was a state actor, sub-
ject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and whether the actions for which it was sued were
protected by the First Amendment (both of which were raised for the first time on
appeal) on the grounds that, as to the first issue, the court was not deprived of useful
fact finding, the counter-plaintiff was not prejudiced, and the counter-defendant
gained no advantage, and, as to the second issue, that the issue was constitutional, was
significant to the administration of justice in the federal courts, and was a pure issue
of law, as to which the law was quite clear).
162 See Salazar, 602 F.3d at 434.
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would face the district court upon a remand would remain static and
be the factual situation that would face the court of appeals upon a
return of the case to that court.  Although appellate courts have vari-
ous options, including remand to the trial court, it has been argued
that, especially when the facts are not going to “hold still,” the most
attractive option is for the appellate court to make updated fact find-
ings, and rule based upon as current a factual base as it can.163
Some courts express reluctance to entertain arguments that were
forfeited by a failure to raise them in the trial court, noting that “to
preserve the integrity of the appellate structure, we should not be con-
sidered a second-shot forum, . . . where . . . back-up theories may be
mounted for the first time.”164  Other courts seem to think that it is
sufficient that the new question presents a pure question of law.165
The principal modern rationales for the general rule that appel-
late courts will not address issues newly raised by appellants on appeal
include the theories that:
163 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272, 309–15, 333–73 (1999).
164 Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 608 F.3d 709, 714
(10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cummings v. Norton, 393 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir.
2005)).
165 See, e.g., Borntrager v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 577 F.3d 913,
924 (8th Cir. 2009) (observing that whether a trust agreement provision was pre-
empted by ERISA was a purely legal question that did not require additional evidence
or argument, that the court therefore could review de novo “for the first time on
appeal”); Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 67 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
of a challenge to a contractual prohibition on contributions to candidates for the
office of State Attorney General from employees of private law firms that performed
legal work for the state, holding that the district court erred in dismissing on the
ground that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit but that the defendant was
qualifiedly immune from suit for money damages because any right plaintiff had to
receive campaign contributions was not clearly established at the time of the chal-
lenged conduct; although the argument of qualified immunity was argued for the first
time on appeal, the court entertained it, in its discretion, because whether plaintiff’s
claimed right was clearly established at the pertinent time was a question of law, and
there was no need for additional fact-finding). The opinion in Blumenthal suggests
that the court raised the question of qualified immunity sua sponte at oral argument.
See id.; Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491–94 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismis-
sal of pro se action seeking return of property seized by customs officials, relying on
principle that appeals court may affirm on any basis for which there is a record suffi-
cient to permit conclusions of law, whether or not district court relied on those
grounds, concluding that insofar as plaintiff’s claim constituted a claim under the
FTCA, it was barred by sovereign immunity, and insofar as plaintiff’s claim was a claim
for return of property under FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41(g), it was
time-barred).
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(1) by encouraging objections to be raised in the trial court, the
general rule enables trial courts to avoid and correct many errors;166
(2) the general rule prevents appellees from being prejudiced by
the failure of appellants to object at trial, where the appellee would
have had the opportunity to respond not only with arguments but
also, when appropriate, with evidence;167 and
(3) the general rule promotes development of a complete
record, both from an evidentiary point of view and with respect to
articulation of the trial court’s views, thus facilitating appellate review,
at the appropriate standard of review.168
At least one commentator has questioned these rationales.  Rhett
Dennerline observed that the general rule typically is unnecessary to
encourage attorneys to raise issues the resolution of which could favor
their clients, when the attorneys recognize the existence of the issues,
and that the rule cannot encourage attorneys to raise issues of which
they are unaware.169  Thus, the rule could affect attorney behavior
only when a trial attorney is contemplating intentionally withholding
an issue until appeal.170  Put slightly differently, the rule might influ-
ence an attorney who was trying to decide, as a strategic matter,
whether to raise an issue at trial (absent the rule, he or she might be
more tempted to wait to raise it on appeal), but it would not influence
others.171  Similarly, because the general rule truly affects trial con-
duct only when attorneys would not have raised issues in the trial
court absent the rule, it will not very often lead to the creation of a
more complete trial record than otherwise would exist.172  Dennerline
further noted that the rule “is not narrowly drawn to prevent unfair-
ness,”173 and similarly that the avoidance-of-prejudice rationale does
not always apply.  He thus argued that the rule should be limited to
situations in which a departure from it would be unfair and
prejudicial.174
166 See Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d Cir.
1982) (explaining why an appellant must identify errors to the trial court, in order to
provide an opportunity for avoidance or correction of error), vacated on other grounds
and remanded, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
167 See id.
168 See id.  See generally Martineau, supra note 14, at 1031, 1035–38 (same); Denner- R
line, supra note 15, at 987–88 (discussing the rationale for the general rule). R
169 See Dennerline, supra note 15, at 989.
170 See id. at 989–90.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 990.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 991.
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But if the rationales for the general rule listed above are not so
strong as might first appear, perhaps others that are grounded in
appellate courts’ strengths and weaknesses, their role, and judicial
economy at the appellate level, are stronger.  For example, because
the general rule discourages appeals courts from addressing new
issues, and because it does so regardless of whether the record is ade-
quate,175 it serves judicial economy at the appellate level.
Why then do appellate courts ever choose to entertain new
issues?  The answer harkens back to the history of review in equity.
Appellate judges—particularly appellate judges in intermediate appel-
late courts, to whom appeal is of right—often view it as a proper part
of their mission to “do justice,” and appellate judges want to do justice
between the parties, as best they can.176  As Professor Bruhl wrote in a
different context, “[w]e want courts to have some discretion because
[it allows them to make use of] . . . case-specific information that [firm
rules cannot accommodate].”177  At the same time, appellate courts
are constrained by their roles, their procedures, and the limits on
their competence.178
Have the courts acted consistently with these insights?  When
have the courts exercised discretion to decide new issues?  As you read
the pages that follow, you will see that the occasions on which appel-
late courts have been inclined to resolve issues that the district court
did not decide correspond to the conventional view of appellate
courts’ competency and role, the efficiencies apparently to be gained,
and the justifications for departing from the norm against deciding
new issues.  Thus, the “lawiness” (as contrasted with “factiness”) of an
issue, and the adequacy of the existing record, go to the appellate
court’s competence.  The “plain”ness of the error, the clarity of
proper resolution, the absence of objection, and the circumstance
that resolution of the new issue will support affirmance of the judg-
ment, go to the efficiency of having the appellate court resolve the
175 Id.
176 See supra text accompanying note 27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006) (empow- R
ering appellate courts to modify judgments in the interest of justice); Hormel v.
Comm’r, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (“A rigid and undeviating judicially declared prac-
tice under which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances
decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged
would be out of harmony with this policy [to promote the ends of justice].”); Denner-
line, supra note 15, at 993 (noting that “appellate courts hear new issues because they R
want disputes resolved correctly”).
177 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distrib-
utes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 249 (2011).
178 See supra text accompanying note 7; infra text accompanying notes 179–97,
204–10, 287, 331–54.
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issue rather than remand to the district court.  The jurisdictional
nature of the issue, the fact that an issue goes to governmental struc-
ture or officials’ rights or obligations, and the notion that injustice
might well result if the new issue were not addressed all relate to the
justification for departing from the norm against deciding new issues.
1. Unmixed Questions of Law
Appellate courts often say that they can decide new issues that are
questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact and “mixed ques-
tions” of law and fact.179  This position is grounded on the premise
that the appellate courts’ competence to decide “pure” questions of
law is not compromised by the risk that the factual record will be
incomplete or inadequate to allow for proper resolution of the new
issue.180
One might ask whether the line between questions of law, on the
one hand, and questions of fact and “mixed questions” of law and fact,
on the other, is a tenable one.  The slipperiness of the slope between
questions of law and mixed questions of law is notorious,181 and even
the reality of the distinction between law and fact has been ques-
tioned.182  Moreover, some commentators have challenged the notion
that appellate courts ever can be confident that the record from the
trial court is complete and that the party against whom the issue is
raised would not have done something differently if the new issue had
been raised in the trial court.183  I do not believe that these difficulties
justify abandonment of the distinctions between law, fact, and mixed
questions, which remain grounded in appellate courts’ core compe-
tencies.184  These insights do, however, properly caution appellate
179 See Dennerline, supra note 15, at 996. R
180 See id.
181 Compare Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (defining
mixed questions as those in which “the historical facts are admitted or established, the
rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statu-
tory [or constitutional] standard”) with WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR.,
THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 14–21 (1991) (arguing
that when the material facts are undisputed, application of law to fact is a matter of
law for the court, but when application of law depends on resolution of disputed
historical facts, the question is a “mixed question,” attempting to distinguish “ultimate
facts” from mixed questions, and noting that who should decide various questions, as
between judge and jury, involves policy considerations as well as analysis that seeks to
characterize the nature of issues).
182 See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 3, at 1769; Benjamin, supra note 163, at R
359–60.
183 See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1038–40; Dennerline, supra note 15, at 997. R
184 See infra note 336 and accompanying text. R
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courts to investigate the sufficiency of the record and to entertain
arguments from the parties before deciding that a particular question
is a question of law that the appellate court can hear without
prejudice to any party.185  By so doing, appellate courts can do their
best to limit themselves to new issues that are well-positioned to be
decided by appellate courts on the record that exists before those
courts.
Assuming that the line of distinction between questions of law
and other questions is workable, one might still ask whether the line is
appropriate.  In 1982, Judge John C. Godbold published an article in
which he defended appellate fact finding when done in a principled
fashion.186  He argued that appellate courts are not jurisdictionally
precluded from making fact findings in non-jury cases where district
courts have not made fact findings as to the point at issue,187 and
sought to debunk the notion that practical limitations make it difficult
for appellate courts to find facts,188 noting the resources that appel-
185 See Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1352 (11th Cir.
2011) (remanding to district court so that it could determine mootness argument,
raised for the first time on appeal, where the issue required additional factual devel-
opment); cf. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (enter-
taining the argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the Alien Tort Statute
does not recognize corporate liability, reasoning that the question was a question of
law, important and recurring, did not depend on any additional facts not considered
by the district court, that appellants did not suggest that they were prejudiced but
rather had fully addressed the issue on appeal, and that efficiency would be served, as
the complaint had been filed more than a decade earlier). See generally Dennerline,
supra note 15, at 997–98 (describing the “practical implications of applying the [pure R
law] exception”).
186 John C. Godbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts—An Available and Appropriate
Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 365–70 (1982); see also Chad M. Oldfather, supra note 3, R
at 445–66 (rejecting the conventional account of the relative institutional competen-
cies of appellate courts and trial courts when it comes to the assessment of historical
facts).
187 See Godbold, supra note 186, at 370–72 (contrasting the effect of FEDERAL RULE R
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52 in limiting appellate courts to setting aside a trial judge’s
findings of fact when those findings are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the
trial court’s opportunity to judge witnesses’s credibility).
188 Judge Godbold took a parallel position with respect to receiving new evidence.
Id. at 373.  That is, he wrote that federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to receive
new evidence, but that “[c]onsiderations of fairness to the trial court and of judicial
economy . . . severely restrict the instances in which new evidence may be taken.” Id.
at 384.  He opined that litigants should not be afforded an opportunity to present
evidence that should have been presented at trial but was not, due to their own fault.
Id. at 387.  And he acknowledged that “[i]t is sometimes impractical for appellate
courts to receive new evidence,” but he asserted and illustrated that this is not always
true. Id. at 384–89.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-4\NDL404.txt unknown Seq: 50 29-MAY-12 12:40
1570 notre dame law review [vol. 87:4
late courts have, the contexts (including original proceedings and
motion practice) in which they do frequently engage in fact finding,
and the issues (such as jurisdiction) as to which they commonly find
facts.189  Even Judge Godbold argued for limits that appellate courts
should observe in fact finding, however.  While he opined that appel-
late courts are free to find facts when the district court inadvertently
overlooked a necessary fact finding or purposely did not address a
factual issue because the court did not need to do so in light of the
different ground upon which it ruled, Judge Godbold drew the line at
appellate fact findings that would not have been relevant to the issues
raised in the trial court.190  He found that appellate fact finding as to
issues not raised in the trial court “would be contrary to effective judi-
cial administration,”191 as he thought it best to encourage parties to
bring their fact issues, as well as their legal issues, to the trial court.192
Judge Godbold backed away from this limitation insofar as parties are
not barred from raising new issues on appeal; that is, it appears to be
his view that appellate courts properly can make fact findings as to
issues not raised at trial if it is proper for the parties to raise those
issues on appeal.193
Among the problems I see with Judge Godbold’s analysis are
these: First, the proposition that appellate courts should not make fact
findings as to a new issue that was not properly raised on appeal does
not imply that appellate courts should make fact findings on new issues
that are properly raised on appeal.  Thus, there is a logical flaw in the
argument.  In addition, there is a circularity problem if the propriety
of raising a new issue in the appellate court depends on whether reso-
lution of the new issue would require the appellate court to make fact
findings (as many courts say), while the propriety of the appellate
court making fact findings depends on whether the new issue is prop-
erly before it.  What remains is Judge Godbold’s view that appellate
courts should not make fact findings that would not have been rele-
vant to the issues raised in the trial court.  That view is in accord with
the pronouncements of most federal appellate courts, and revives the
relative propriety of appeals courts focusing on new questions of law,
rather than on new questions of fact, that are raised on appeal.
Professor Oldfather has argued that:
189 See id. at 372–75; see also Benjamin, supra note 163, at 333–69 (making a case R
for appellate capability and experience in fact finding).
190 See Godbold, supra note 186, at 379–81. R
191 Id. at 380.
192 See id. at 381.
193 See id.
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Thought processes based on information from a textual source are
more compatible with systematic, rational (and therefore “legal”)
thought than are those based on information received orally. . . .
Moreover, research demonstrates that people consistently perform
poorly at using demeanor evidence to assess credibility and veracity
. . . . In addition, appellate courts are at least as well equipped as
trial-level fact finders to assess documentary and circumstantial evi-
dence, and also enjoy advantages arising from experience and per-
spective.  In sum, there are fundamental respects in which appellate
courts can function as superior fact finders.194
Even accepting all of these premises (which one might not do),
Professor Oldfather recognizes that whether appellate courts ought to
exercise their fact-finding prowess depends on the larger aims of the
system.195  Thus, he makes the prescriptive points that “appellate
review of facts should be reordered so as to require express considera-
tion of institutional competence as applied to the specific matters
before the court in a given case” and should account for systemic aims
in determining the extent to which appellate courts should utilize
their fact-finding competence.196 Professor Oldfather’s refined think-
ing is helpful for purposes of this Article and for the question when, if
ever, appellate courts should take first stabs at questions of fact or
mixed questions of law and fact that encompass questions of fact.  It
does make sense for appellate courts to consider their institutional
competence as applied to the specific matters before them in a given
case.  But, as Professor Oldfather agrees, even when the nature of the
evidence and the state of the record is such that an appellate court
would be competent to take the first stab at a factual issue, appellate
courts should be restrained in their exercise of their powers in consid-
eration of their role and of what best serves judicial economy.197  This
is not to say that matters of judicial economy and the role of appellate
courts invariably will cut against appellate courts taking the first stab at
issues, but it is to say that these factors need to be highly influential
when the relative competence of appellate and trial courts is not
determinative.  These matters, which bear upon the idea that appel-
late courts are not designed to and are not best suited to address fact
questions de novo, are further explored below.
The frequently cited requirement of an unmixed question of law
speaks to appellate courts’ competence to resolve issues.  It does not
194 Oldfather, supra note 3, at 440 (footnotes omitted). R
195 Id.
196 Id. at 444.
197 See id. at 440.
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however reflect any need for further justification for departing from
the norm of leaving issues to district courts, in the first instance.
2. Questions Proper Resolution of Which is Beyond Doubt
As noted earlier, in the Supreme Court’s decision in Singleton v.
Wulff, the Court stated that “[t]he matter of what questions may be
taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily
to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts
of individual cases.”198  Nonetheless, providing some guidance, Single-
ton, in dicta, made clear that the Court believes that the circumstances
in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not
passed on below include situations in which the proper resolution is
beyond any doubt, or where injustice otherwise might result.199  The
first of these instances (where proper resolution is beyond doubt) sug-
gests that efficiency and the utility or lack of utility, to the appellate
court, of a district court opinion are acceptable criteria for appellate
courts to use when deciding whether to resolve an issue not passed
upon below.  Efficiency seems to be one of the values that is promoted
by immediate appellate resolution of an issue the proper resolution of
which is beyond any doubt, and hence as to which a district court
opinion would have little utility to the appeals court.200  Does this rea-
soning hold up?
In the short run, immediate resolution by the appellate court may
be more efficient than remand to the district court would be.  How-
ever, judicial economy also can be furthered by the enforcement of
rules that require issues to be timely raised in the trial court, on pain
of waiver or forfeiture.  The latter presumptively would save resources
of the appellate courts, while expending resources of the district
courts, rather than expending resources of the appellate courts while
saving resources of the district courts.  Features of our appellate sys-
198 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).
199 See id. (citing Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962)) (treating the
appellant’s jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari prior to the judg-
ment of the court of appeals, granting the petition, vacating the district court’s order,
and remanding the case to the district court with directions to enter a decree grant-
ing appropriate injunctive relief against the discrimination complained of, as the reg-
ulation that plaintiff challenged was clearly unconstitutional under the Court’s
precedents). In Hormel v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941), also cited by the
Singleton Court, the Court stated that “[a] rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances
decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged
would be out of harmony with this policy [to promote the ends of justice].”
200 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
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tem, particularly the final judgment rule, suggest that we favor con-
serving the resources of our appellate courts.  Hence, a good reason
should be needed to justify appellate courts taking the first stab at a
new issue.
Of course, an appellate court lacks reason and motivation to
address a new issue whose resolution is beyond doubt if doing so
would not correct an injustice.  Hence, the “beyond doubt” criterion
normally is coupled with a requirement that the losing parties below
have been wronged by the lower court’s decision.201
3. Injustice Otherwise Might Result
The second of the instances cited by the Court in Singleton
(where injustice otherwise might result) indicates that the doing of
justice and the avoidance of injustice are acceptable criteria for appel-
late courts to use when deciding whether to resolve an issue not
passed upon below.  This of course harkens back to the equity side of
our history, but the criterion presents even more subtle and complex
consideration than does efficiency.  When might injustice result if the
appellate court does not immediately address an issue not previously
decided by an inferior court?  It would not seem that the possibility
that the lower court, on remand, would “get it wrong” in-and-of-itself
should render appropriate an appellate decision without benefit of
lower court consideration.  Our system ordinarily contemplates that
the trial court should make the initial decision, notwithstanding that it
may provide a “wrong” answer.  Delay before the appellate court
would get another opportunity to set things right might lead to injus-
tice in some circumstances, but such delay should not “automatically”
be regarded as imposing injustice that would justify early appellate
intervention.  Perhaps something approaching “irreparable harm”
should be required.202
The Court has not really focused on whether and when injustice
might result if the appellate court did not address an issue not previ-
ously decided by an inferior court.  It appears that the Court has
201 See Dennerline, supra note 15, at 999, 1001 (arguing that when appellate courts R
decide new issues on the ground that they pose pure questions of law or their proper
resolution is beyond doubt, they do so despite a failure of the “exception” to address
all of the concerns that underlie the general rule).  Dennerline concludes that these
therefore are not true exceptions to the general rule. Id. at 1001.  The logic behind
that inference eludes me.
202 We might gain some insight from cases in which the Court itself has resolved
issues that were not resolved in the inferior courts, although it also could be that the
Court believes that different standards should apply when it is deciding whether to
resolve a new issue than should apply when an IAC is deciding whether to do so.
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focused instead on the need for some court to address the new issue so
as to avoid injustice.  One seldom sees the Court (or intermediate fed-
eral courts of appeals) discuss why the appellate court, rather than a
lower court on remand, should address the new issue that commands
judicial attention so that injustice may be avoided.  Instead, the Court
has seemed to assume that—barring some obstacle such as the need
for additional evidence—the appellate court should address an issue
raised when the case is pending before it, when justice hangs in the
balance.  But if the avoidance of injustice really is the Court’s concern,
then efficiency may be all that drives the doctrine or practice that per-
mits the appellate court to immediately address the new issue.  And, as
the preceding discussion indicates, having the appellate court address
the new issue will not necessarily be most efficient.203  While it is the
appellate court’s job to decide whether courts should hear an issue
that is raised for the first time on appeal, it does not follow that it is
the appellate court that should hear the issue in the first instance.
4. The Appeals Court Will Not Benefit from Further Proceedings
in the Lower Court
We have seen that, in reaching the merits in Singleton, one of the
rationales that the Eighth Circuit relied upon—that the answer on the
merits was beyond doubt—was a rationale that the Supreme Court
approved.204  The circuit’s second rationale—that the appeals court
would not benefit from further proceedings in the district court
because the question of the challenged abortion statute’s validity
could not profit from further refinement—also makes good sense in
theory, and goes to an appellate court’s competence to decide the
new issue well, under the circumstances.  However, the Court dis-
agreed with the circuit’s application of this criterion, and thereby made
clear that appellate courts’ discretion to decide what questions may be
taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is not unfettered;205
indeed, it can be abused even when the IAC has invoked acceptable
criteria.  This is the next noteworthy aspect of the decision.  Why was
the discretion abused here?  The Court indicated that the answer to
the merits question was not beyond doubt because the issue never had
been passed upon by the Supreme Court.206  Moreover, in this case
the defendant never had had an opportunity to offer evidence in
defense of the challenged abortion statute and had not had occasion
203 See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. R
204 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 118.
205 Id. at 119–20.
206 Id. at 121.
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to present its legal arguments on the constitutionality of the statute;
the case had not proceeded to that point in the district court, and
defendant was justified in not presenting those merits arguments to
the court of appeals as the appellee on an appeal from a dismissal for
lack of standing.207  In these circumstances, the Court found that
“injustice was more likely to be caused than avoided by” the Eighth
Circuit’s decision of the issue.208
So, the “takeaway” from Singleton is that: (1) there are unresolved
questions as to whether and when federal court of appeals have juris-
diction or power to reach merits questions that were not decided in
an inferior court;209 (2) the appellate courts have some discretion to
choose the theretofore undecided questions that they will resolve; (3)
proper resolution being beyond any doubt and the possibility that
injustice otherwise might result are among the relevant considerations
(but those considerations themselves need additional clarification);
(4) the discretion to decide new issues can be abused even when the
IAC has invoked acceptable criteria; and 5) appellate courts need to
be sure that interested litigants have had a fair opportunity to be
heard before they resolve issues that the lower courts have not
resolved.210
The Supreme Court has said that a litigant seeking review in that
Court generally has the ability to choose how to frame the questions
to be decided.211  Although, on occasion, the Court has rephrased the
question presented by a petitioner or requested the parties to address
an important question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari,
ordinarily the Court does not consider questions outside those
presented in the petition for certiorari.  This rule is prudential in
nature, but the Court disregards it “ ‘only in the most exceptional
cases,’ where reasons of urgency or of economy suggest the need to
address the unpresented question in the case under consideration.”212
The Court also seeks to avoid situations in which the respondent
207 Id. at 120.
208 Id. at 121.
209 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. R
210 The Supreme Court’s recent plain error decision, United States v. Marcus, 130 S.
Ct. 2159 (2010), might provide reason to believe that the Court has tightened-up after
Singleton, but the Court does not seem to regard plain error doctrine as covering the
waterfront of new issues that appellate courts may decide.
211 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992).
212 Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.15 (1976)); see also Blonder-
Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971) (referring to the
Court’s authority to notice plain error and indicating the relevance of whether the
parties had briefed and argued an issue beyond that on which certiorari had been
granted).
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would lack any opportunity to argue that the un-presented questions
are not worthy of review.  In light of the Supreme Court’s discretion-
ary docket, it often can avoid taking cases in which the parties have
failed to raise all of the relevant legal questions.  However, as Profes-
sor Frost has observed, in view of the Court’s role in our system, the
especial importance of the precedents that the Supreme Court sets
and of the pronouncements of law that it makes, its responsibilities to
address questions of pressing national importance and to maintain
appropriate balance among the branches of the federal government
and between the state and federal governments and the people, on
occasion the Court will have strong incentives to raise, and sometimes
to decide, issues that the parties failed to raise below, or that the lower
courts did not address.213
What more can we learn from Supreme Court decisions?
5. “Jurisdictional” Issues, Whether or Not the Court Raises Them
Sua Sponte
Federal court original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction are
prerequisites to federal courts’ addressing questions on the merits,
and so questions of federal court jurisdiction and of appellate jurisdic-
tion are logically prior to any questions on the merits that are posed
by an appeal.  Thus, appellate courts should be able, and indeed
should be obligated, to raise those questions.214  Nonetheless, if the
jurisdictional questions are based on factual matters as to which there
is a dispute, and a fortiori if the relevant factual matters were not
explored in the trial court and made part of the record, reasons will
exist to remand to the trial court for resolution of issues that go to the
213 See Frost, supra note 20, at 514–15. R
214 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).  Which
issues are “jurisdictional” and which are something else is not always clear, however.
Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631 (2008) (analyzing
holding of Bowles v. Russell); Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2007/21 (criticizing Bowles v. Russel decision for not producing a framework
by which rules could be characterized as jurisdictional or not); Scott Dodson,
Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Mandatory Rules]
(analyzing the role of nonjurisdictional rules); Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescrip-
tions, Nonjurisdictional Processing Rules, and Federal Appellate Practice: The Implications of
Kontrick, Eberhart & Bowles, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 847 (2007) (analyzing Supreme
Court decisions affecting the conception, as jurisdictional or not, of various timing
prescriptions that confront federal appellate litigants); Steinman, supra note 40, at R
865–68, 878–91, 923–27 (exploring what issues would be jurisdictional for purposes
of the Supreme Court’s insistence that a federal court determine jurisdictional issues
before reaching merits issues).
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federal district court’s jurisdiction.  District courts and parties already
have incentives to reach subject-matter jurisdiction issues before
spending time, money, and effort on merits questions, but knowing
that they may have to face the issue on a limited remand if the appel-
late court thinks there is an issue presumably would add still further to
the incentives to get subject-matter jurisdiction resolved early on, and
certainly prior to any appeals.  However, appellate courts are empow-
ered to utilize special masters to resolve in the first instance any dis-
puted factual matters that are material to determinations that are
ancillary to proceedings in the court—which could include matters of
appellate jurisdiction, such as standing to appeal—and it might be pos-
sible for appellate courts to utilize special masters to help them
resolve in the first instance disputed factual matters that are material
to determinations of original federal court jurisdiction.215  Appellate
courts could decide, in their discretion, when use of such adjuncts
would be preferable to remand to the district court and to the appel-
late court’s unaided resolution of the factual questions that are posed.
The Supreme Court has raised sua sponte and decided issues of
prudential ripeness that had not been raised in or addressed by the
lower federal courts.216  It has entertained the arguments in support
215 Although FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53 applies only to district courts,
“its principles have been applied by analogy in references ordered by courts of
appeals,” 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 2602 (2008), which may appoint masters under authority that derives from
“inherent traditional equity powers . . . to seek assistance in discharging their duties.”
Id.  Moreover, FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 48 authorizes a court of
appeals to
hold hearings, if necessary, and to recommend factual findings and disposi-
tion in matters ancillary to proceedings in the court. Unless the order refer-
ring a matter to a master specifies or limits the master’s powers, those
powers include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) regulating all
aspects of a hearing; (2) taking all appropriate action for the efficient per-
formance of the master’s duties under the order; (3) requiring the produc-
tion of evidence on all matters embraced in the reference; and (4)
administering oaths and examining witnesses and parties.
FED. R. APP. P. 48.  The Advisory Committee Notes make clear that the Advisory Com-
mittee did not intend to alter the ordinary practice of federal appeals courts to
remand a case to the district court or agency when a factual issue needs to be
resolved, but it recognized that, “when factual issues arise in the first instance in the
court of appeals . . . it would be useful to have authority to refer such determinations
to a master for a recommendation.” FED. R. APP. P. 48 advisory committee’s note. See
generally 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3993
(2008) (discussing local rules and practices).
216 See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (citing Reg’l Rail Reor-
ganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974)) (indicating that the Court can raise
issues of ripeness sua sponte, even when they are prudential).
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of the judgment below, and made for the first time in the Supreme
Court, that no justiciable controversy existed,217 and that a case has
become moot.218  The Court has even reached the issue, raised for the
first time on appeal, whether a case fell within the equity jurisdiction
that had been exercised below.219
The Court also sometimes has held that a statutory requirement
that might be thought to be jurisdictional was not, and hence could
not be raised for the first time on appeal.  In Grubbs v. General Electric
Credit Corp.,220 the Court was confronted with a civil action that had
been removed to federal court on the petition of the United States,
which had been brought into the suit ostensibly because it claimed a
lien on property that was involved in the action.221  Before judgment,
no party objected to the removal, but the court of appeals held sua
sponte that the removal had been improper because the purported
interpleader of the United States was spurious.222  It therefore vacated
the judgment and directed remand to state court.223  The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that erroneous removal did not require vaca-
tur of the district court’s judgment so long as the requirements of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction were met when judgment was
entered.224 For our purposes, the important point is the Court’s decla-
ration that, where jurisdiction existed at judgment time, “the validity
of the removal procedure followed may not be raised for the first time
on appeal,”225 as matters of mere removal procedure are not
jurisdictional.226
217 See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 134 (1947) (refusing
to consider the argument that the State lacked capacity to bring the suit, reasoning
that failure to so object in the trial court constituted a waiver of that defect).
218 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1978) (raising
and resolving sua sponte the question of mootness).
219 See New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U.S. 600, 601–02 (1882) (finding equitable
jurisdiction and hence rejecting the challenge).
220 405 U.S. 699 (1972).
221 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1444, 2410 (2006).
222 Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 702.
223 Id.
224 At judgment, the court had subject-matter jurisdiction because, in the suit’s
posture at judgment, the suit was one that could have been brought in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 700.
225 Id.
226 Although federal courts sometimes disagree as to whether particular defects
are jurisdictional or merely procedural, the removal statutes clearly distinguish
between those categories.  For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of
the notice of removal under section 1446(a).  If at any time before final
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The exception for jurisdictional issues does not derive from
appellate courts’ presumptive competence to decide these issues;
sometimes the issues will require factual discovery and fact findings.
Rather, it derives from a justification for departing from the norm
that appellate courts will not decide new issues.  Here, the justification
has been thought to lie in separation of powers and in the federal
structure of government, to keep federal courts from over-stepping
their bounds vis-à-vis the states and to keep appellate courts from over-
stepping their congressionally established bounds vis-à-vis the district
courts.
It should be noted that the categories that were discussed above
(unmixed questions of law, proper resolution beyond doubt, injustice
otherwise might result, the appeals court will not benefit from further
proceedings in the lower court) are not categories that in-and-of-
themselves imply anything about when particular issues should be
reached in relation to other issues.  The same is true of many of the
categories discussed below.  By contrast, because the Supreme Court
has established sequencing rules with respect to jurisdictional issues
and insists that courts determine that they have subject-matter juris-
diction before they decide merits issues, when a court of appeals
decides in the first instance that the district court lacked subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over a case after the district court has addressed issues
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
the case shall be remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  It is far from clear, however, that a removal under § 1444 that
the United States may not properly effect is tainted by a merely procedural—rather
than a jurisdictional—defect, 28 U.S.C. § 1444; foreclosure action against the United
States, provides: “Any action brought under [28 U.S.C. § 2410] against the United
States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the district court of
the United States for the district and division in which the action is pending.” Id.; see
also Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming denial
of leave to amend a complaint against the Secretary of HUD because the federal dis-
trict court would have lacked jurisdiction over the claims, where the suit purportedly
had been removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1444, but the court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction because the removed claim was ultimately a tort claim, rather than
one for foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien, and there was no present valid lien that
plaintiff could enforce); Mongelli v. Mongelli, 849 F. Supp. 215, 218–19 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (remanding to state court suit removed by intervenor United States, holding in
part that under New York law the United States had no lien, and because there was no
lien as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2410, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
the action, and the case had to be remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)); Page v.
Greenwood, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14926, at *2–8 (D. Or. 1990) (remanding to state
court ejectment action removed by third-party defendant United States pursuant to
§ 1444, because by the time the action was brought the United States no longer had a
lien on the property involved, having sold it to the plaintiffs in the ejectment action).
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on the merits and likely procedural issues as well, the intended
sequencing of issues is thrown off.  The various consequences that
Rutledge explores (such as consequences for party behavior, litigation
costs, settlement incentives, the relationship between trial and appel-
late courts, and the allocation of judicial resources) are very evidently
involved.227  However, that would be true even if the appellate court
remanded for the district court to address its subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, subject to review by the court of appeals.
Finally, it is important to note—as some of the discussion above
may have implied—that the line between which issues are “jurisdic-
tional” and which are not is not a clear and obvious line.  Indeed,
Professor Scott Dodson has made us realize that even “nonjurisdic-
tional rules exhibit some attributes of jurisdictionality”228 and may
have jurisdictional effects.  The dichotomy is false.  From the perspec-
tive of this Article, the implications relate to both mandatory sequenc-
ing (which, if any, rules that are nonjurisdictional for some purposes
need to be addressed before merits questions?) and to the duty of
appellate courts to raise issues sua sponte (which, if any, issues that are
nonjurisdictional for some purposes are issues that a court of appeals
must raise sua sponte, if the parties have failed to raise those issues?).
Professor Dodson’s insights also have direct relevance to what the
Supreme Court sometimes as referred to as “quasi-jurisdictional
issues,” which are discussed immediately below.
6. But Not Necessarily Quasi-Jurisdictional Issues
Hypothesis: If an appellate court can reach the same ultimate disposition
on other grounds, it is preferable that the court not exercise its discretion to
consider and decide a quasi-jurisdictional issue, of constitutional dimensions,
that the parties did not litigate below.
The Supreme Court sometimes has refrained from addressing
sua sponte quasi-jurisdictional matters that neither the parties nor the
intermediate appellate courts raised.  Thus, in Wisconsin Department of
Corrections v. Schacht,229 for example, the Court refrained from raising
sua sponte and taking the first stab at the question whether, by giving
its express consent to removal of a case against a state department,
Wisconsin waived its Eleventh Amendment230 immunity from suit in
227 See generally Rutledge, supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 39–53 R
(advancing a multi-disciplinary approach to “decisional sequencing”).
228 Dodson, Mandatory Rules, supra note 214, at 6. R
229 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
230 U.S. CONST. amend. XI states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
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federal court.231  In deference to the bar’s “hybrid nature,” rooted in
the jurisdictional language of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
had held that a State may raise the Eleventh Amendment bar for the
first time on appeal, despite the strategic advantages that that ability
gives to a State.232  However, where neither the parties nor the inter-
mediate appellate courts had raised the issue, the Court decided that
“the proper course [was] for [it] to defer addressing the question
until it [was] presented . . . [and] supported by full briefing and argu-
ment, in some later case.”233  The Court may have acted with restraint
in this instance because it had other grounds upon which to hold that
the district court had not erred in hearing the claims that the plaintiff
had asserted against Department of Corrections employees sued in
their personal capacity, and in granting summary judgment to those
employees, prompting Schacht’s appeal.234  Thus, the Court had no
need to reach out to decide whether removal waived the State’s Elev-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
231 See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 381.
232 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.8 (1984)
(noting that Eleventh Amendment defense can be raised at any time in the proceed-
ings); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279–81 (1977)
(addressing whether the school board had an Eleventh Amendment immunity, where
the district court had skipped that question and decided instead that an Ohio statute
and decisional law had waived any such immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
678 (1974) (approving Seventh Circuit’s dealing on the merits with a defense that the
Eleventh Amendment barred suit against Illinois officials, which had not been raised
in the trial court; reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment “sufficiently partakes of
the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court;”
relying on Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945), in which the
Court considered an Eleventh Amendment issue that was urged for the first time in
the Supreme Court, stating that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and
sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force
that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even
though urged for the first time in this Court”).
233 Schacht, 524 U.S. at 398 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy, in dicta,
articulated arguments in support of finding waiver by removal. See id. at 394–97.  The
Court later did, in a unanimous opinion, hold that a State does waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by removing a case from state to federal court. See Lapides v.
Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617–24 (2002).  Its holding, however, was limited to the
situation presented, that is, to state-law claims where the State had waived immunity
from state-court proceedings. See id.
234 The Court held that the presence in an otherwise removable case of a claim or
claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment does not destroy jurisdiction that other-
wise would exist. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 386–93.  Upon removal, a federal court can
proceed to hear the remaining claims, and the district court did not err in doing so in
this case. Id. at 383.
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enth Amendment immunity.  A lesson may be implied here: If an
appellate court can reach the same result on other grounds because a
quasi-jurisdictional issue is not critical to the federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion over the case as a whole, it is preferable that the court not exer-
cise its discretion to consider and decide a quasi-jurisdictional issue
that the parties did not litigate below—particularly where the issue
involves constitutional interpretation.235  Alternatively, one might con-
clude that sovereign immunity is a doctrine that is mandatory when
raised by the parties (it is, for example, not subject to exceptions
based on equity), but is not jurisdictional in the sense that the court
has a duty to raise it sua sponte.236
7. Questions Going to Governmental Structure and Government
Officials’ Rights and Duties
The Supreme Court also has taken-up issues, raised for the first
time on appeal, when those issues went to fundamental principles of
the structure of the federal government or government officials’
rights and duties.  Thus, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,237 in one of the suits
before the Court a decision had been rendered by a Second Circuit
panel on which sat a judge of the Court of Claims, sitting by designa-
tion of the Chief Justice of the United States, pursuant to statute.238
In the other suit before the Court, the trial of a criminal case had
been presided over by a retired judge of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, sitting by similar designation.
In both cases the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
question whether the judgment was vitiated by the participation of the
judges mentioned above.  The challenge to the participation of these
judges was raised for the first time on the appeal to the Supreme
Court.  The Court concluded that, while there often is reason to reject
post-judgment challenges to judges’ authority, that “rule does not
obtain . . . when the alleged defect of authority operates also as a
limitation on this Court’s appellate jurisdiction [or i]n other circum-
stances . . . when the statute claimed to restrict authority . . . embodies
a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial busi-
ness.”239  Then, “this Court has treated the alleged defect as ‘jurisdic-
235 See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1050 (taking the position that Eleventh R
Amendment issues—and perhaps, by implication, other quasi-jurisdictional issues—
should not be exceptions to the general rule against considering new issues on
appeal).
236 See Dodson, Mandatory Rules, supra note 214, at 28–34. R
237 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
238 Id. at 530.
239 Id. at 535–36 (citations omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-4\NDL404.txt unknown Seq: 63 29-MAY-12 12:40
2012] appellate  courts  as  f irst  responders 1583
tional’ and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not
raised at the earliest practicable opportunity.”240
A fortiori is this so when the challenge is based upon nonfrivolous
constitutional grounds [as this case was]. . . . At the most is weighed
in opposition the disruption to sound appellate process entailed by
entertaining objections not raised below, and this is plainly insuffi-
cient to overcome the strong interest of the federal judiciary in
maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of powers.241
Glidden illustrates that the importance of the issue raised for the
first time on appeal also is significant in the Court’s exercises of dis-
cretion to hear or not to hear such issues.  Again, however, while the
importance of the issue speaks to whether the courts should address
it, it does not necessarily speak to which court should address the issue
first—the trial court, the intermediate court of appeals, or the
Supreme Court.  This seems to be overlooked in the Court’s decisions.
It also is worth noting that the Court sometimes decides merits-
related issues that were decided in the district court but were not
decided in the intermediate court of appeals, when those issues go to
240 Id. at 536.
241 Id.; see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (considering an issue that
had been raised for the first time on appeal to the court of appeals, namely, whether
the assignment of complex cases to a special trial judge was not statutorily authorized
and violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution).  The challenge in Freytag
went to the validity of the Tax Court proceeding that was the basis for the litigation
and, thus, was “a non jurisdictional structural constitutional objection that may be
considered, even though petitioners consented to the assignment.” Freytag, 501 U.S.
at 868–69.  The IAC had heard the issue on the theory that the attack was on the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the special trial judge.  Freytag v. Comm’rs, 904 F.2d
1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990).  The Court said:
It is true that, as a general matter, a litigant must raise all issues and objec-
tions at trial.  But the disruption to sound appellate process entailed by
entertaining objections not raised below does not always overcome what Jus-
tice Harlan called ‘the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining
the constitutional plan of separation of powers.’  We conclude that this is
one of those rare cases in which we should exercise our discretion to hear
petitioners’ challenge to the constitutional authority of the Special Trial
Judge.
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 879 (citation omitted) (quoting Glidden Co., 370 U.S. at 535–36);
see also Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2010) (enter-
taining an argument, raised for first time on appeal, that the Terrorism Risk Insur-
ance Act of 2002 was unconstitutional as applied in this case because it mandated
reopening of a final judgment in violation of separation of powers, reasoning that a
contention that legislative enactment intrudes on the courts’ powers is the kind of
claim that appropriately now be considered for the first time on appeal); Frost, supra
note 20, at 485–91 (discussing judicial issue creation to enforce constitutional restric- R
tions on government power and to safeguard legislative power).
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federal officials rights and duties.  In Mitchell v. Forsyth,242 for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in holding that
former Attorney General John Mitchell was not entitled to summary
judgment on the ground of qualified immunity from suit, reaching
the purely legal question on which his claim of immunity turned,
where the IAC had not reached that issue because it had held that the
denial of summary judgment on this ground was not immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.243  The Court might
have held merely that the denial of summary judgment for lack of
qualified immunity was immediately appealable, and remanded the
case to the court of appeals to address the rejected claim to qualified
immunity.  Instead, the Court said that the purely legal question on
which Mitchell’s claim of immunity turned (i.e., whether the legal
norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at
the time of the challenged actions) was appropriate for its immediate
resolution,244 just as the Court had considered the question of the
President’s absolute immunity from suit in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,245 where
the intermediate appellate court also had dismissed for lack of appel-
late jurisdiction.246  Concerns of judicial economy and the importance
of the question presented warranted the Court’s immediate decision,
in its view.  Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, argued that there was
an issue of fact as to the nature of the wiretap in question that the trial
court never had resolved.247  He thus reasoned: “To hold on this
record that Mitchell was entitled to summary judgment is either to
engage in de novo factfinding—an exercise that this Court has
neither the authority nor the resources to do—or intentionally to dis-
regard the record below to achieve a particular result in this case.”248
Did Mitchell present an appropriate occasion for the Court to
address the qualified immunity issue, and should it matter that the
issue had been addressed in the district court, although not in the
court of appeals?  The fact that the district court had addressed the
issue would obviate the concern that a party would be unfairly sur-
242 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
243 See id. at 530.
244 See id.
245 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
246 Id. at 743 n.23.
247 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (noting, in an
opinion joined by Justice Marshall, that “Forsyth alleged that the Davidon wiretap was
not a national security wiretap, but was instead a simple attempt to spy on political
opponents” and that “[t]his created an issue of fact as to the nature of the wiretap in
question, an issue that the trial court never resolved”).
248 Id.
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prised by the raising of the issue and would obviate the concern that
the opposing parties would not have had an opportunity to make the
evidentiary record necessary to enable an appellate court to reach a
fully informed decision.  Here, however, at least in Justices Brennan’s
and Marshall’s view, the district court had failed to make a critical fact
finding, and if they were correct, then remand to the district court
would have been appropriate.249  The absence of intermediate appel-
late consideration of the qualified immunity seems to me less impor-
tant.  While the Supreme Court might benefit from the IAC’s
reasoning, the Court would review de novo, so it would not be failing
to give deference that normally would be due to the IAC.  Concerns of
judicial economy as well as the importance of the legal questions
presented favored immediate decision, as the question—which went
to the vulnerability of high federal officials to the distractions and
other burdens of litigation—was sufficiently important that the Court
was determined to decide it, whether or not the intermediate appel-
late court also had devoted resources to it.
8. Merits Questions—When Essential to Justice, Fairness, and
Correct Disposition of Important Issues
The importance to the Supreme Court of doing justice and the
philosophy of the Court concerning the power and discretion of
appellate courts to consider issues not presented at the trial level is
nowhere articulated better than in Hormel v. Commissioner.  There the
petitioner in the Supreme Court challenged the power of a federal
court of appeals to pass on questions that had not directly and
squarely been presented in the proceedings before the Board of Tax
Appeals.250  The appellate court’s authority to review decisions of the
Board rested on statutes that provided in part that the appeals court
had “power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in accor-
dance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with
or without  remanding . . . for a rehearing, as justice may require.”251
The Court noted that “[i]n general, it is the function of the Board to
determine the facts of a tax controversy on issues raised before it and
to apply the law to those facts; and it is the function of the reviewing
court to decide whether the Board has applied the correct rule of
law.”252  The Court further noted:
249 See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text. R
250 Hormel v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 552, 555–56 (1941).
251 26 U.S.C. § 1141(c)(1) (Supp. 1939).
252 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556.  The Court added:
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Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to
issues not raised below.  For our procedural scheme contemplates
that parties shall come to issue in the trial forum vested with author-
ity to determine questions of fact.  This is essential in order that
parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they
believe relevant to the issues which the trial tribunal is alone compe-
tent to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants may not
be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which
they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence. . . . But [our]
cases do not announce an inflexible practice, as indeed they could
not without doing violence to the statutes which give to Circuit
Courts of Appeals . . . the power to modify, reverse or remand deci-
sions not in accordance with law ‘as justice may require.’ There may
always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will
prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might other-
wise result, to consider questions of law which were neither pressed
nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency below.
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the
ends of justice, not to defeat them.  A rigid and undeviating judi-
cially declared practice under which courts of review would invaria-
bly and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions
which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of
harmony with this policy.  Orderly rules of procedure do not
require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice. . . .
[Various described] decisions and others like them, while rec-
ognizing the desirability and existence of a general practice under
which appellate courts confine themselves to the issues raised
below, nevertheless do not lose sight of the fact that such appellate
practice should not be applied where the obvious result would be a
plain miscarriage of justice.  Analogous in principle is the philoso-
phy which underlies this Court’s decisions with relation to appellate
practices in other cases: those in which it has been held that a deci-
sion of the Board of Tax Appeals can be supported in the reviewing
court on a new theory of law; those which have been remanded
because the lower courts failed to give consideration to a phase of
the case involving legal theories not presented; and those in which
there have been judicial interpretations of existing law after deci-
sion below and pending appeal—interpretations which if applied
might have materially altered the result.  Whether articulated or
not, the philosophy underlying the exceptions to the general prac-
The Board’s rulings on questions of law, while not as conclusive as its find-
ings of fact, are nevertheless persuasive, and it is desirable that a reviewing
court have the benefit of such rulings.  This is true not only of the Board of
Tax Appeals but of other administrative bodies as well.
Id. at 556 n.5 (citations omitted).
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tice is in accord with the statutory authority given to courts review-
ing decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals—decisions not in
accordance with law should be modified, reversed or reversed and
remanded ‘as justice may require.’253
In accordance with this principle, the Court opined that the
court of appeals properly considered an intervening interpretation of
a particular statutory provision, in determining petitioner’s tax liabil-
ity.254  When the Board of Tax Appeals made its decision in this case,
the Supreme Court had not yet handed down an opinion in a case
that was indistinguishable from this case.  It explained:
Therefore to apply here the general principle of appellate practice
for which petitioner contends would result in permitting him wholly
to escape payment of a tax which . . . he clearly owes.  Thus viewed,
this is exactly the type of case where application of the general prac-
tice would defeat rather than promote the ends of justice, and the
court below was right in so holding.255
It is noteworthy that there is particularly strong policy that simi-
larly situated tax payers not be treated differently.256  It also is note-
worthy, however, that because the Board of Tax Appeals had neither
found the facts nor considered the applicability of the relevant Inter-
nal Revenue Code section in the light of the intervening Supreme
Court case, and because Congress entrusted the Board with exclusive
authority to determine disputed facts, the Court held that petitioner
should get an opportunity to offer evidence before the Board, how-
ever unlikely it was that he could show that his case should not be
governed by the rule of the intervening case.257  Accordingly, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court reversing the decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals, but directed the case to the Board of Tax
Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with the Court’s opin-
ion.258  In so doing, the Court paid appropriate respect to the Board
of Tax Appeals and to the role that Congress had assigned to the
Board as fact finder and applier of the law to the facts.259
At times, the Court continues to entertain arguments on the mer-
its that were not addressed below.  In Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of
253 Id. at 555–59 (footnotes omitted).
254 See id. at 559.
255 See id. at 560.
256 See id.; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 641 F.2d 435, 440 (6th Cir.
1981) (seeking to effectuate policy of maintaining parity between similarly situated
taxpayers).
257 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 560.
258 See id.
259 See id.
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Valdez,260 oil transporters challenged the City’s ad valorem property tax
on large vessels docking at the city’s ports, on ships engaged in inter-
state commerce of $1 million or more.261  In the Supreme Court, the
City pointed to a separate City tax, and argued that its tax on ships was
merely another form of value-related tax on oil-related property,
which would have put it outside the prohibitions of the Tonnage
Clause of the Constitution.262  The Court noted that the City had not
made this argument in the lower courts; nor had the State, which filed
a brief in support of the City, supported this contention.  Lacking an
explanation of how the other tax worked, the Court said it ordinarily
might decline to consider the argument, but as the parties had argued
the matter in their Supreme Court briefs, and the Court’s decision
would reduce the likelihood of further litigation, it chose to consider
the argument.263
The reasons stated by the Court for taking on the new issue in
Polar Tankers appear to be weak.  True, the parties had briefed the
argument (as will not yet be the case with respect to an issue that an
appeals court raises sua sponte), but that factor should not weigh
heavily against the many policy reasons that disfavor permitting par-
ties to raise on appeal arguments that were available in the district
court.  Moreover, having held Valdez’s tax unconstitutional because it
violated the Tonnage Clause, res judicata would bar re-litigation of the
constitutionality of the ad valorem property tax on large vessels as
between the parties to the suit, and the precedent set by the case
would render unnecessary litigation by others who might have been
subject to and challenged the tax.  Thus, it is not evident how the
Court’s decision of the new contention would reduce the likelihood
of further litigation.  It appears that the Court must have taken-on the
new argument for different reasons.  Perhaps the Court wanted to be
sure that the decision it would issue on the constitutionality of the tax
would be correct, and it believed it necessary to entertain the new
argument in order to do that.  That would be a better reason in sup-
port of the Court’s decision to decide the new issue than the reason
that the Court gave.264  Perhaps too the Court regarded the new mat-
260 557 U.S. 1 (2009).
261 Id. at 1–2.
262 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
263 The Court nonetheless concluded that the challenged tax violated the Ton-
nage Clause of the Constitution. Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 14.
264 See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1050–51 (arguing that when an appeals court R
considers a newly raised statutory issue—an issue of statutory interpretation—in order
to avoid a constitutional question, that should not be considered an exception to the
general rule).  I differ with Martineau on this point.  The reason to depart from the
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ter as a new argument as to an existing issue (the constitutionality of
the state tax under the Tonnage Clause) as contrasted with a new
issue.  The Court did not say this (it referred to the new matter as a
“claim,”265 rather than as an argument or an issue), but one could
view the case in this way.
9. New Issues to which No One Objects
Sometimes the Court (or an intermediate court of appeals) will
hear an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal because the
appellee fails to object, or fails to object until too late.  For example,
in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,266 the Supreme Court permitted a
defendant’s objection to a jury instruction to be raised for the first
time on appeal to the Court because the plaintiff failed to argue the
untimeliness of the objection until its brief on the merits in the
Supreme Court.267  The Court prefers such objections to be brought
to its attention no later than the respondent’s brief in opposition to
the grant of certiorari.268
10. Plain Error—A Category-Crossing Doctrine
The failure to raise any kind of issue (jurisdictional, merits, or
procedural) in the district court can involve attorney error and can
raise the prospect of an appellate court entertaining the issue pursu-
ant to the plain error doctrine.  One of the debates in the Supreme
Court over use of 28 U.S.C. § 2106 and the plain error doctrine arose
just a few years ago in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,269
general rule differs from the reasons that courts give in other circumstances, but this
still seems to be a departure from, and an exception to, the general rule, as I under-
stand it.  Despite Martineau’s position, he also asserted that “the general rule should
not be enforced . . . [in] cases in which principles of federalism or constitutional
adjudication are involved.” Id. at 1059; cf. Dennerline, supra note 15, at 1001–02 R
(finding that “if an appellate court considers the new issue . . . to be of importance to
the public, the new issue will be heard . . . . [T]he exception typically involves the first
judicial review of a statute or a constitutional provision which the court sees as having
an impact on the public or on future litigants”).  Dennerline sees this practice as not
accounting for any of the concerns that the general rule seeks to protect and as
reflecting policy simply outweighing the rule. Id. at 1003.
265 Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 3.
266 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
267 Id. at 815–16.  For an example from the intermediate courts of appeals, see Soo
Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
while defendant arguably waived for purposes of appeal a judicial admission by Soo,
Soo never argued the waiver and so waived the waiver argument).
268 See Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 816.
269 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
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where tensions flared between the policy to enforce procedural rules
requiring timely objection, timely motions, or other particular actions,
and the policy to do justice under the substantive law.270  In Unitherm,
the Court held that a defendant’s failure to file a Federal Civil Rule
50(b) post-verdict motion deprived a federal appellate court of power
to direct the district court to enter judgment contrary to the judgment
entered on the verdict, and similarly deprived the appellate court of
power to order the district court to conduct a new trial, as even the
district court was not authorized by the Federal Rules to order a new
trial when the losing litigant had failed to request that relief in its pre-
verdict motion.271  Because the defendant failed to renew its pre-ver-
dict motion in the manner specified by Rule 50(b), the Federal Cir-
cuit erred in vacating the judgment rendered on the verdict and in
ordering a new trial on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.272
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented.  He cited 28
U.S.C. § 2106273 in support of the power of federal appellate courts to
direct entry of judgments and orders “as may be just under the cir-
cumstances,” and argued that neither Rule 50(b) nor general princi-
ples of waiver or forfeiture stripped federal appellate courts of their
authority to execute their powers under § 2106.  Justice Stevens found
no basis to conclude that the federal appeals courts lack power to
review the sufficiency of the evidence and direct a verdict in favor of a
party who lost below and who failed to make a timely Rule 50(b)
motion, however unfair or abusive of discretion such a decision might
be in particular circumstances.274  In his discussion, Justice Stevens
invoked Congress’s preservation of the federal appeals courts’ power
to correct plain error, although trial counsels’ omissions ordinarily
yield binding waivers,275 and stated that it is “well settled that a liti-
gant’s waiver or forfeiture of an argument does not, in the absence of
270 Id. at 396–97.
271 Id. at 394–95.
272 Id. at 395.
273 Section 2106 states:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006); see supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. R
274 Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 409.
275 Id. at 407.
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a contrary statutory command, preclude the courts of appeals from
considering those arguments.”276
Notwithstanding Justice Stevens’ minority viewpoint, Unitherm
indicates that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and presumably
other codified federal rules such as the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) may restrict the federal
appellate courts’ freedom to utilize the plain error doctrine and 28
U.S.C. § 2106 to address issues that are newly raised on appeal.
Although in the past there were debates over whether the plain
error doctrine ever should apply in civil litigation,277 and the U.S.
Supreme Court has not explicitly approved the use of plain error doc-
trine in civil cases,278 its use in the civil context is now well-accepted by
the intermediate federal courts of appeals.279
276 Id. at 408 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)).  For a critique of
Unitherm, see Steven Alan Childress, Revolving Trapdoors: Preserving Sufficiency Review of
the Civil Jury After Unitherm and Amended Rule 50, 26 REV. LITIG. 239 (2007).
Other cases in which the Supreme Court decided a procedural issue that the
district court did not resolve include Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (affirming
ruling for Neff in ejectment action; where lower court had rested its holding of inva-
lidity of the judgment pursuant to which Pennoyer acquired the land in question
upon defectiveness of the affidavit used to prove service by publication upon Neff, the
Supreme Court disagreed with that conclusion but affirmed on the ground that the
judgment against Neff and pursuant to which Pennoyer acquired the land was void
for want of personal jurisdiction over Neff).  This argument was made in the lower
court, but was not ruled upon there. Id. at 721–22.
277 Compare CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 1.22, at 157 (4th ed. 2009) (“[FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE] 103 makes the plain error
principle fully applicable in civil cases, and pre-Rules case law makes clear that plain
error was not new to civil cases.”) with Martineau, supra note 14, at 1055–56 (approv- R
ing the view that the plain error rule should not apply to civil cases on the ground
that due process in such cases requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard).
278 But see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 255–57 (1981)
(refusing, for a variety of policy reasons, to be limited by the plain error doctrine in
reviewing whether a municipality may be held liable for punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941) (reversing judgment
due to plain error in district court’s imposition of a contempt citation for plaintiff’s
refusal to submit to a physical examination pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 35).
279 See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 442–43 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (discussing the availability of the plain error doctrine in civil cases); see also
Williams v. Lu, 335 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2003) (addressing the question whether
persons had been unlawfully seized in the course of service of summons and com-
plaint in a § 1983 action, though the issue had not been raised in the trial court,
because its proper resolution was beyond any doubt and it involved a purely legal
issue as to which no additional evidence was necessary). See generally HARRY T.
EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 91 (2007) (stat-
ing that “[w]hile there is no broadly applicable rule of civil procedure comparable to
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The Supreme Court restated the test for plain error review of
alleged errors not raised at trial in United States v. Marcus.280 Although
Marcus was a criminal case, the test for plain error in a civil case would
be at least as stringent.281 Marcus stated that an intermediate appel-
late court, in its discretion, may correct an error not raised at trial
when the appellant demonstrates that (1) there was an error, (2) that
is clear or obvious, (3) that affected the appellant’s substantial rights,
that is, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings or is a struc-
tural error (a category that the Court has not defined clearly)282
whose effect is difficult to assess, and (4) that seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.283
By definition, whenever appellate courts utilize plain error doc-
trine, they are addressing errors that were not raised or ruled upon in
the trial court.284  I therefore regard the doctrine as representing an
exception to the general rule.  Professor Martineau does not so regard
it because he distinguishes between issues newly raised by parties on
appeal and issues raised sua sponte by the court to protect the integ-
rity of judicial proceedings, a function that “transcends the adversary
process.”285  He also appears to believe that plain error doctrine has
no proper place in civil cases.286  Because many federal appellate
courts now do employ plain error doctrine in civil cases, and use it
with reference to issues raised by the parties on appeal as well as sua
sponte, it is within the scope of the matters I consider here.
Criminal Rule 52(b), it is well accepted that plain error review is generally available
for unpreserved claims of error affecting substantial rights in civil cases”).
280 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010).
281 See Wiser v. Wayne Farms, 411 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that a
standard at least as stringent as that applied in criminal prosecutions should apply in
the civil context where the plain error doctrine is judicially, rather than statutorily,
created; citing Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit opinions to that same effect).
282 Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 2164. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain-
Error Rule, 71 GEO. L.J. 945 (1983) (concluding that the plain error rule is justifiable if
it advances federalism objectives); David William Navarro, Comment, Jury Interrogato-
ries and the Preservation of Error in Federal Civil Cases: Should the Plain-Error Doctrine Apply?,
30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1163 (1999) (arguing that the plain error doctrine should apply to
unpreserved error in jury interrogatories).
284 The converse, of course, is not true.  Courts may address new issues on appeal
under doctrines other than the “plain error” doctrine.
285 Martineau, supra note 14, at 1054. R
286 Id. at 1054–56.  At the same time, however, Professor Martineau asserted that
“the general rule should not be enforced . . . when the integrity of the judicial process
is threatened.” Id. at 1059.
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11. New Issues Raised by Appellees in Favor of Affirmance
It is black letter law that appellate courts may affirm on any
ground that has support in the record.  Appeals courts are not
required to agree with the reasoning of a district court, but merely
with its ultimate disposition of a case, in order to affirm the judgment
below.  The requirement that the ground on which the appellate
court affirms be supported by the record made in the trial court con-
strains the appellate court, however, and to some significant degree
implies that the ground on which the judgment is affirmed must not
be new to the case.  That ground must have been addressed in some
fashion by one or both of the parties, if not by the district court, for it
to be reflected in the record of the case.  Thus, while an argument
that an appellee makes in support of affirmance may be one that has
long been forgotten by the appellant, it usually will not concern an
issue that is new to the case.
It is perhaps possible, however, that an appellee may argue on
appeal a reason to affirm that it did not present to the trial court, in
support of judgment, in precisely the way that it is presenting its posi-
tion to the court of appeals.  It also may be possible for an appeals
court to find in the record a reason to affirm that the appellee did not
present to the trial court in precisely the way that the appellate court
sees it.  In those instances, one might say that the appeals court is
deciding a new issue.287
B. Reasons to Decline to Consider New Issues
When considering what is and should be going on in the federal
appellate courts when they consider whether to decide issues that
were not decided in the district courts, it is appropriate to survey not
only the cases in which those courts chose to decide new issues but
also to survey the cases in which those courts chose not to decide new
issues.  The discussion below reflects a sample of recent such cases.
287 See, e.g., Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(affirming denial of a Rule 60(b) motion that was predicated on “extraordinary cir-
cumstances,” purportedly reviewing under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review
but ruling against the Rule 60(b) movant on the basis of a new interpretation of
“extraordinary circumstances” that had not been argued in the district court). See
generally Scott Dodson, Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COL-
LOQUY 111 (2011), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2011/11/rethink-
ing-extraordinary-circumstances.html (arguing that Aikens applied far too broadly the
Ackermann ruling that a federal Rule 60(b) movant is not entitled to relief if his own
litigation choices caused his predicament).
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As you read the pages that follow, you will see that the occasions
on which appellate courts have been disinclined to resolve issues that
the district court did not decide correspond to the appellate courts’
role and lack of competency, the lack of efficiencies apparently to be
gained, and the absence of strong justifications for departing from the
norm against deciding new issues.  Thus, the “factiness” (as contrasted
with “lawiness”) of an issue, and the inadequacy of the existing record,
go to the appellate court’s lack of competence.  Those two also relate
to the impropriety of a court of appeals deciding, in the first instance,
many issues that are left to the district court’s discretion.  The lack of
plainness of an error, the difficulty of determining the proper resolu-
tion, the existence of objections to the appellate court’s decision of an
issue not first resolved by the district court, and the circumstance that
resolution of the new issue would lead to reversal or vacatur of the
judgment, go to the inefficiency and impropriety of having the appel-
late court resolve the issue, rather than remand to the district court.
The non-jurisdictional nature of the issue, and the belief that no great
injustice would result if the new issue were not addressed, both relate
to the lack of justification for departing from the norm against decid-
ing new issues.  In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,288 for example, the Court declined to consider whether the
Court should imply a cause of action from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that would not be subject to the limits of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
whether plaintiff stated a claim for relief, or whether a school district
is a person for purposes of § 1983.289  It observed that these questions
were not of the jurisdictional sort that the Court raises on its own
motion, and chose to leave them for another day.290
In Patsy v. Board of Regents,291 the Supreme Court declined to
address an Eleventh Amendment issue that the defendant-respondent
had not raised in the district court and that neither the intermediate
appellate panel nor that court en banc had addressed, although the
respondent had raised the issue in the court of appeals.  The respon-
dent did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument before the
Supreme Court, although the respondent had mentioned a possible
Eleventh Amendment defense in its opposition to the petition for cer-
tiorari.292  The Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment was not
the kind of issue that courts must raise on their own motion, that the
288 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
289 Id. at 279–87.
290 Id. at 279.
291 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
292 Brief for Respondent, Patsy, 457 U.S. 496 (No. 80-1874).
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defense was waivable, that the respondent had expressly requested
that the Court address a different question and not pass on its poten-
tial Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the respondent could raise
the issue on remand, and that the district court was in the best posi-
tion to address the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the first
instance because of the questions of fact and state law that would need
to be resolved.293  Thus, a combination of factors, including the
immunity-holders’ request that the Court not consider the issue, the
continuing ability of the immunity-holder to raise the issue in the dis-
trict court, and the district court’s superior ability to decide the issue,
were at work in Patsy.
Occasionally, the Court has said that it lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider an issue that was not raised below.294  One sometimes sees the
Court refuse to decide a new issue simply on grounds of waiver295 or
of judicial economy.296  Often intermediate courts of appeals’ reasons
lie in a mesh of circumstances that involve the lack of the necessary
293 See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516.
294 See, e.g.,Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181 n.3 (1983) (holding that
the Court had no jurisdiction to consider whether the Emergency Petroleun Alloca-
tion Act preempted the application of a pass-through prohibition as to oil because it
did not affirmatively appear that the issue was decided below).  The Court noted:
The decision below does not discuss this issue, and when ‘the highest state
court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the
omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless
the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.’  No
such showing has been made here. . . . Nor does anything in the record
before us indicate that this issue was raised in the trial court.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
295 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 134 (1947)
(entertaining the argument, made for the first time in the Supreme Court, in support
of the judgment below, that no justiciable controversy as to the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress was presented, while refusing to consider the argument that the state
lacked capacity to bring the suit, reasoning that failure to so object in the trial court
constituted a waiver of that defect); United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280
U.S. 234, 248–49 (1930) (refusing to entertain challenges and objections to a valua-
tion that were raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, holding that they came
too late); see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cnty. of King, 264 U.S. 22, 25
(1924) (dismissing the writ filed by the City of Seattle on the ground that it sought to
raise in its assignment of errors to the Court an objection based on the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution that it had not raised in the state court sys-
tem from which the case came).
296 See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815–16 (1985) (refus-
ing to consider, for reasons of judicial economy, the procedural argument that, at
trial, petitioner failed to object to a jury instruction with sufficient specificity to satisfy
FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 51, where respondent first raised that argument at oral argument
in the Supreme Court and in a supplemental post-argument brief).
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factual record and the lack of opportunity for the adversary to have
responded with evidence, or the issue having been poorly presented
even in the court of appeals.297  Appellate courts may cite the fact that
they would benefit from district court consideration of the issue,298 or
focus on the district court not having had the issue put before it in
such a way as to invite its consideration, or not having needed to
address the issue because of the way that the district court ruled on
other matters.  For example, in Mansourian v. Regents of the University of
California,299 a putative class action brought by women wrestlers
against the state university and university officials, alleging that plain-
tiffs’ exclusion from a wrestling team violated Title IX and their equal
protection rights, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the argument
that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against individual defendants was pre-
cluded by qualified immunity.300  The district court had dismissed the
§ 1983 claim on other grounds, as to which the Ninth Circuit
reversed.301  Although the defendants raised a qualified immunity
defense in their answer, they did not raise it in any of their dispositive
motions to the district court.302  Noting that the Ninth Circuit’s “dis-
297 See, e.g., Shaner v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 587 F.3d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 2009)
(declining to address a new issue where the argument was not fleshed out and sup-
ported by citations).
298 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977)
(“This litigation exemplifies the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through
full consideration by the courts of appeals.  By eliminating the many subsidiary, but
still troubling, arguments raised by industry, these courts have vastly simplified our
task, as well as having underscored the reasonableness of the agency view.”); Bowie v.
Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating the dismissal of conspir-
acy claims, declining to consider intra-corporate conspiracy defense, raised for the
first time on appeal, in part because the doctrine raised several questions of first
impression as to which the appeals court wanted the benefit of the district court’s
thinking); Palmyra Park Hosp. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1305
n.13 (11th Cir. 2010) (declining to affirm dismissal on alternative ground that plain-
tiff failed to state a claim, stating that appellate court would benefit from reasoned
deliberation by the district court); Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the district court’s reasons for dismissing plaintiff’s
antitrust claim and declining to exercise its discretion to consider alternative grounds
to affirm the dismissal, on which the district court had not relied, finding it more
appropriate that the district court address them in the first instance because the alter-
native grounds “appear[ed] to involve complex and difficult questions of Fifth Circuit
antitrust law, which the parties sharply dispute and the answers to which m[ight] be
far from clear [and] . . . require careful study of an already substantial record or even
augmentation of that record”).
299 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
300 Id. at 964.
301 Id. at 963.
302 Id. at 964.
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cretion to affirm on grounds other than those relied on by the district
court extends to issues raised in a manner providing the district court
an opportunity to rule,”303 the appellate court refused to affirm on
the basis of qualified immunity and remanded the case to the district
court, to have it consider the issue.
Closely related to the rationale for eschewing an issue that looks
to the absence of a factual record that is adequate for the appellate
court to comfortably find the facts is the appellate courts’ rejection of
issues that are best left to the discretion of the district court. Kode v.
Carlson,304 for example, presented an issue of first impression in the
Ninth Circuit, namely, whether the appeals court might rule on the
merits of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial based on the weight of the
evidence where the district court had not done so because it (errone-
ously) found the motion to have been waived.305  Assuming, without
deciding, that it had the power to entertain the issue, the Ninth Cir-
cuit refrained.  It vacated the district court’s order denying a new trial
to a plaintiff to whom the jury had awarded zero dollars in damages,
and remanded for consideration of the merits of plaintiff’s motion for
a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.306  The appellate
court concluded that remand was preferable where the record did not
demonstrate that the district court necessarily would have abused its
discretion had it refused to grant a new trial based on the clear weight
of the evidence, and the trial court was in a better position to rule on
the motion, in the first instance, because the trial judge could weigh
the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, whereas the court
of appeals was not permitted to do so.307  The court cited a Supreme
Court case that had observed that “the authority to grant a new trial
. . . is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part
of the trial court,”308 and indicated that the Ninth Circuit is very defer-
ential to district court determinations that a verdict is not against the
weight of the evidence.309  Thus, the deferential standard of review
that applied to determinations of the question that plaintiff proposed
that the IAC answer—and the reasons for the allocation of the issue to
the trial judge—very much influenced the court of appeals’ unwilling-
303 Id. at 974.
304 596 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2010).
305 Id. at 611–12.
306 Id. at 611.
307 Id. at 612.
308 Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).
309 Kode, 596 F.3d at 612.
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ness to take the first stab at an issue that the district court erroneously
had not answered.310
Often appellate courts invoke a number of factors but rely heavily
on the absence of any obvious miscarriage of justice that will flow from
a refusal to consider a new issue.311  Of course, if the court is consider-
ing hearing a new issue solely on the basis of the “plain error” doc-
trine, the court will make its determination by reference to the
requirements of that doctrine.312  Appellate courts also sometimes are
310 Id. at 612–13; see also Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 419, 427 (10th Cir. 2006)
(declining to affirm dismissal under forum non conveniens where the appellate court
found that the district court dismissal rested on a forum selection clause, and the
forum non conveniens issue was raised but not ruled upon by the district court, rely-
ing on the principle that proper judicial administration generally favors remand for
the district court to examine the issue initially in such a circumstance, notwithstand-
ing that the parties devoted substantial portions of their briefs to the forum non con-
veniens issue).
311 See, e.g., Export-Import Bank v. Advanced Polymer Scis., Inc., 604 F.3d 242,
247–48 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming judgment against defendants in an action against
borrowers and guarantors, holding that defendants waived a statute of limitations
defense that they failed to raise in the district court, having noted that whether to
hear an issue not raised below is based on several factors, such as whether the issue is
a question of law, whether it requires or necessitates determination of facts, and
whether failure to take up the issue for first time on appeal will result in miscarriage
of justice or denial of substantial justice).  Although the statute of limitations issue was
a question of law requiring no further factual development, refusal to address the
defense would not work a substantial miscarriage of justice on the guarantors, as the
statute of limitations was merely an affirmative defense which could be waived by the
failure to assert it in a timely fashion. See Salazar ex rel Salazar v. District of Columbia,
602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that district court’s determination that an
order imposing contempt sanctions for contumacious conduct, in civil proceeding,
was not impermissible criminal sanction and did not constitute plain error or an
exceptional circumstance warranting reversal, where contemnor was sanctioned pur-
suant to a schedule of per diem fines set in an earlier order enforcing a settlement
agreement, and it had an opportunity to limit or avoid the fines altogether by comply-
ing with the settlement agreement); Wiser v. Wayne Farms, 411 F.3d 923, 926–28 (8th
Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider argument that Georgia law should determine the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate, noting that the court typically will not
consider a choice of law argument not made in the district court, and noting that the
consequence—that the case would be heard in federal court rather than be arbi-
trated—hardly constituted a miscarriage of justice).
312 See, e.g., Wallace v. McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 421 (7th Cir. 2010) (reciting
requirements for plain error review in the Seventh Circuit, noting that plain error
review of a forfeited evidentiary issue in a civil case is available only when the party
seeking review can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist, substantial
rights are affected, and a miscarriage of justice will occur if review is not afforded—
though the court did not find such in the instant case); White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d
525, 539 (8th Cir. 2010) (considering but rejecting plain error argument in a civil
case, failing to find plain error that affected substantial rights on the facts presented);
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explicitly concerned that litigants might strategically try to avoid the
normal sequence of decision and try to maneuver to have the appel-
late court decide in the first instance issues that initially should go to
the district court.313
On occasion, the reason an appellate court gives for declining to
resolve an issue that was not decided below is its perception that
resolving the issue might lead to an expansion of the rights of an
appellee who failed to cross-appeal.  In American Roll-On Roll-Off Car-
rier, LLC v. P & O Ports Baltimore, Inc.,314 the Fourth Circuit so rea-
soned, even though it regarded the cross-appeal requirement as a rule
of practice, not a requirement for appellate jurisdiction.315
Rather than stating affirmative reasons not to entertain a new
issue, appellate courts may list the circumstances in which they are
inclined to decide new matters and explain that the case at bar does
not meet any of those criteria.  For example, in Community House, Inc.
v. City of Boise,316 a non-profit organization that had managed a city-
owned homeless shelter sued the city and others after the city
assumed management of the shelter and leased it to a religiously affili-
ated organization.  The district court ordered injunctive relief.317  On
Salazar, 602 F.3d at 431; United States v. JG-24, Inc., 478 F.3d 28, 32 & n.3 (1st Cir.
2007); Wiser, 411 F.3d at 923.
313 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.
2007) (reversing a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and then declining
to decide in the first instance whether to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim, where the defendant had not made a FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 12(b)(6) motion in
the district court).  In Stone, while acknowledging that the appeals court could affirm
dismissal on any ground supported by the record, the court reasoned that to decide
the issue might encourage defendants to circumvent district courts by filing a motion
to dismiss exclusively on jurisdictional grounds, appealing denial of the motion, and
asking the court of appeals to decide whether plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief.
Id. at 1039–40.  It also observed that addressing the issue at that point would be incon-
sistent with the general rule that defendants are not entitled to interlocutory appel-
late review of the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id.  This reasoning is problematic
because a defendant ordinarily would not be able to take an interlocutory appeal of a
district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  In this case, the
district court had granted the motion to dismiss, leading to a final judgment, and it
was plaintiffs that appealed that grant. Id.
314 479 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2007).
315 Id. at 295–96 (reversing district court’s holding that an indemnity claim was
untimely, and refusing to rule on an issue that the district court did not address,
namely whether recovery on an indemnity claim was limited by the terms of a bill of
lading and stevedoring agreement, on the grounds that the defendant had not cross-
appealed and accepting defendant’s arguments would require the court to modify the
district court’s judgment in a way that would expand the defendants’ rights).
316 468 F.3d 1118, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2006).
317 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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appeal, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the district court should
have granted broader preliminary injunctive relief than it did with
regard to their religious establishment claims because the City’s lease
violated the Idaho Constitution and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.318  The City
argued that the court should not consider the plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims because they were being raised for the first time on appeal.319
The court said:
“We will review an issue that has been raised for the first time
on appeal under certain narrow circumstances . . . [:] (1) to prevent
a miscarriage of justice; (2) when a change in law raises a new issue
while an appeal is pending; and (3) when the issue is purely one of
law.  The decision to consider an issue not raised below is discre-
tionary, and such an issue should not be decided if it would
prejudice the other party.”320
The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ contentions based
on the Idaho Constitution, reasoning that none of the three narrow
circumstances which had to exist was present.321  There was no miscar-
riage of justice that the court needed to prevent, there had been no
change of applicable law, and although the plaintiffs argued that the
City’s lease violated two provisions of the Idaho Constitution, that
question was not a pure question of law.322  At the same time, how-
ever, the appellate court agreed to consider the plaintiffs’ Establish-
ment Clause claim where the parties disputed whether the
Establishment Clause challenge had been raised before the district
court, and in any event this court generally did not deem an issue to
have been waived if the district court actually considered it, which it
had here.323
As suggested by some of the discussion above, parties sometimes
fail to bring an issue to the district court’s attention, and sometimes
they bring an issue to the district court but it does not decide the issue
because it disposes of the case on a separate ground or for some other
reason.  A party that is defending a judgment (an appellee) com-
monly is permitted to assert grounds other than those pressed or
passed upon below, consistent with the doctrine that an appeals court
318 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Cmty. House, 468 F.3d 1118 (No. 05-36195).
319 Brief for Respondent at 9, Cmty. House, 468 F.3d 1118 (No. 05-36195).
320 Cmty. House, 468 F.3d at 1128 (citations omitted) (quoting Kimes v. Stone, 84
F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)).
321 Id. at 1128–29.
322 Id. at 1129.
323 Id. at 1129–31.
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may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record.324  But
sometimes the record on an issue that was raised but not decided
never was fully fleshed out.  In that circumstance (just as in the cir-
cumstance where a party did not raise an issue at all), the appeals
court may decline to entertain it.  The situation was of this kind in
Guevara v. Republic of Peru,325 where the district court had dismissed
claims against Peruvian officials on the basis of sovereign immunity,
the court of appeals reversed that holding and declined to consider
the officials’ argument that the court should affirm their dismissal on
the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction, an issue that they had timely
raised in the district court but that the district court had not decided
because it was mooted by the sovereign immunity dismissal.326  The
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court should resolve the per-
sonal jurisdiction issue because the minimum contacts inquiry would
be fact specific and the IAC wanted the benefit of fact findings by the
district court.327  The court noted that the principle that it must
affirm if the district court reached the correct decision for the wrong
reason does not apply where determinations of fact will determine
whether the lower court’s conclusion was correct.328
Speaking generally, it could be argued that—other things being
equal—an appellate court should allow the district court to take the
first cut at an issue that the parties did not put before it, whereas an
appellate court should be more inclined to address an issue that the
parties did present to the district court but that it chose not to
address.  One might view this as a situation in which the district court
waived its right to have its say on the issue.  Some readers might
respond that it was the parties’ right to have the district court resolve
the issue, and that the district court had an obligation to decide the
issue, but no right that it could waive.  However, the notion that the
parties had a right to have the district court resolve one particular
issue rather than another is untenable, except in the few instances
324 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 526 n.11 (1998) (cit-
ing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468–69 n.12 (1983)) (concluding that respon-
dent could defend the judgment on a ground not previously raised); United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166 n.8 (1977) (“[T]he prevailing party may defend a
judgment on any ground which the law and the record permit that would not expand
the relief it has been granted.”); Saturn Telecomms. Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that a party defending a
judgment usually is allowed to assert grounds other than those pressed or passed
upon below, but that that is not true of a party attacking a judgment).
325 468 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2006).
326 Id. at 1305–06.
327 Id. at 1306.
328 Id.
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where the Supreme Court has laid down a mandatory sequencing
rule,329 so the “parties’ right” argument often would fail.  In any event,
there is no reason why an appellate court should be bound by a dis-
trict court’s waiver of its “right” to have the first say on an issue, if any
such “right” exists.  Thus, while the “waiver” could support an appel-
late court’s otherwise warranted decision to take the first stab at an
issue,330 the appellate court would be entitled to remand to have the
district court address an issue it previously bypassed, if the appellate
court believed that having the district court’s decision would be
preferable.
Based on my review of many cases, it does not appear that appel-
late courts in fact systematically afford different treatment to cases in
which the parties did not put an issue before the district court and
cases in which the parties did present an issue but the district court
chose not to address it.  Indeed, appellate opinions often fail to make
clear whether an issue that the appellate court chooses or refuses to
decide was raised in the district court.
IV. EVALUATION OF APPELLATE PRACTICES IN TAKING FIRST STABS
Let us begin with the institutional and functional arguments for
appellate courts not to decide issues for the first time on appeal.
A. The Institutional and Functional Arguments for Appellate Courts
Not to Decide Issues for the First Time on Appeal,
and Responses to those Arguments
Several justifications have been argued in support of the general
rule that an appellate court should not address issues that the district
court did not address or at least have the opportunity to address by
virtue of presentation by the parties.  One could take the stricter posi-
tion that appellate courts should review only the decisions made by
the district court judge and not consider even issues that the parties
329 See Clermont, supra note 46, at 307 (finding only two significant sequencing R
rules, one of which addresses which jurisdictional defenses a court must decide before
reaching the merits, and the other of which dictates that when a common factual
issue will come before both judge and jury within the same federal case, because it is
“common to the merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the same
case,” the jury must decide the common fact issue first, to avoid the preclusive effect
of a judicial decision subverting the constitutional jury right).
330 See, e.g., Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 608 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2010)
(addressing de novo whether Peru was subject to federal subject-matter jurisdiction
where the district court had failed to address the question after a prior interlocutory
appeal and remand, as the appeals court intended it should, and the appeals court
believed that the appropriate disposition was clear).
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presented to the district court but that the district court did not
address.  Consider the institutional and functional justifications for
each of these positions.
The general rule maintains the trial as the “main event.”331  Lim-
iting appellate courts to issues that the district court did address, or
that the district court at least had the opportunity to address, has been
thought to encourage parties to raise their issues and voice their
objections in the trial court, where the judge can take immediate steps
to avoid or correct party errors or proposed conduct by the court itself
that would be erroneous.332  Party motions and objections also pro-
vide the occasion for trial courts to explain their rulings.  All of this
assists appellate courts in their work.  The general rule also has been
championed as avoiding prejudice to the adverse party that might
result from the belated raising of an objection or an issue, when it is
too late for the adverse party to respond effectively with additional
evidence or argument.333  It avoids reversals of a trial judge on the
basis of points that were not brought to his or her attention.  And it
helps to lead to a trial that is complete and the record of which is
complete, so that the appellate court has a fully developed record to
consult when it reviews the issues that the parties bring to it.  The
331 The Supreme Court often refers to the trial as “the main event.” See, e.g.,
Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614 (2009) (noting that the federal system often
grants the trial judge broad discretion when his ringside perspective at the main event
offers him a comparative advantage in decisionmaking); McFarland v. Stott, 512 U.S.
1256, 1263 (1994) (noting that the trial is the main event, where adversaries battle to
reach a presumptively reliable result); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)
(“[T]he state trial on the merits [should be] the ‘main event,’ so to speak, rather than
a ‘tryout on the road’ for what will later be the determinative federal habeas
hearing.”).
332 See Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982)
(“For there to be reversible error, it is mandatory for the appellant properly to iden-
tify the error to the trial court and to suggest a legally appropriate course of action.
The reasons for this requirement go to the heart of the common law tradition and the
adversary system.  It affords an opportunity for correction and avoidance in the trial
court in various ways: it gives the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the chal-
lenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court’s action; and it pro-
vides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of
ordering a more fully developed record for review.”). See generally Dennerline, supra
note 15, at 987 (finding one of the modern justifications for the general rule discour-
aging appellate courts from hearing new issues on appeal to be that it encourages
correction and avoidance of errors in the trial court).
333 See Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n.1. See generally Dennerline, supra note 15, at
987–88, 990–92, 998 (finding additional modern justifications for the general rule
discouraging appellate courts from hearing new issues on appeal to be that it avoids
prejudice and facilitates appellate review, but questioning the cogency of these
justifications).
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general rule also limits the number and scope of appeals by limiting
the issues that the appellate court will entertain and, insofar as it oper-
ates, it ensures that every issue that comes before an appellate court
has been teed up for, if not actually passed upon by, a trial court.
Furthermore, even assuming that federal appellate courts pursue
worthy goals when they take the first stab at issues, practical problems,
as well as structural issues, are raised by appeals courts’ addressing
issues that were not raised before or ruled upon in the trial court.
Some problems derive from appellate courts’ procedures: They are
not built to take new evidence, for example, though they occasionally
do so.  Other problems derive from appellate courts’ presumptively
inferior competence to do certain tasks: They are less experienced
than trial judges at making fact-findings and in making discretionary
judgments of the kind that trial judges often have to make.  They are
perceived to be inferior to trial courts in resolving questions of fact,
particularly those that depend on witness credibility.334  Thus, at the
level of function, it is questionable for appellate courts to reach new
issues that would require fact-gathering, initial fact-finding—particu-
larly that which must be based in whole or in part on oral testimony—
or the exercise of discretion as to certain kinds of issues.
At the same time, the implications of the rationales listed above
have limits too.  Federal appellate courts need to assure that they have
jurisdiction over an appeal and that the district court had jurisdiction
over the case so that the federal courts do not act beyond their consti-
tutionally and statutorily limited powers, in violation of separation of
powers and states’ rights.  Many would say that it is important that the
federal appellate courts do justice, and that they act efficiently, partic-
ularly in these times of strained judicial resources.  To the extent that
appellate courts are taking more first stabs than they used to, this may
be a product of the “crisis of volume” and of a resulting effort to dis-
pose of cases without remand to trial courts, when possible.  Yet, fed-
eral appellate courts do not necessarily have to take the first stab at
district court jurisdiction over a case, even if the issue is raised for the
first time on appeal.  Federal appellate courts do not necessarily have
to take the first stab at issues that arise for the first time on appeal in
order for justice to be done.  Taking these first stabs may be most effi-
cient but there are competing arguments if the goal is to make the
federal judicial system as a whole work most efficiently.  And, of
334 See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 51, 52 (2007) (acknowledging trial
judges’ superior position to find facts and evaluate their import); Anderson v. Besse-
mer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (noting trial courts’ particular ability to assess the
credibility of witnesses).
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course, it is a question whether increased efficiency can justify appel-
late first stabs when such efforts exceed the appellate courts’ paradig-
matic role and alter the balance of power between trial and appellate
courts.
Do the exceptions that the federal appellate courts have made to
the general rule make sense in terms of appellate procedure, appel-
late court competencies and functions, and in light of other relevant
considerations?
B. The Fit of Exceptions to Competence, Role, and Justification, and the
Value of Exceptions in Fostering Efficiency
1. Of Obvious Errors, Factual Records, and Legal Issues
In making exceptions to the general rule that appellate courts
will not entertain new issues, conditions should have to be satisfied
that relate to the competence and role of appellate courts.  In addi-
tion, appellate courts should consider the relative efficiency of their
making a decision as a matter of first impression rather than remand-
ing to trial courts or adjuncts to do that, subject to appellate review.  If
the answer to a question appears to be obvious (as it is under the
“plain error” doctrine), that tends to argue for appellate self-help, but
the answer can be obvious only if the factual record is complete and
the parties have been given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on
the legal issues.335  If these conditions are satisfied and an error was
obvious, it would seem that the opposing party should have seen it
coming and taken steps to avoid it, even without the error having
been pointed out by another participant below.  It would seem not to
be unfair for the appellate court to conclude that a party waived its
objection to an appellate court’s correction of an obvious error.  How-
ever, more is involved than that.
Being a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact as to
which the parties had a full and fair opportunity to make the factual
record complete, does seem to be a necessary condition for an appel-
late court to answer a question that the trial court did not address.
335 Professor Martineau seems to question the notion that it ever will be of little
use for the trial court to have weighed-in and to argue that appellate decision of a new
issue will deprive the opposing party and the trial court of the opportunity to avoid an
alleged error. See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1040.  I am not convinced of the for- R
mer point in its extreme form and sandbagging will be infrequent so long as the
general rule of rejecting new arguments on appeal remains the general rule, for then
withholding an argument for appeal will be very risky.  Moreover, once an issue is
raised for the first time on appeal, the opportunity for the trial court to avoid the
alleged error already will have been lost.
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But is it a sufficient condition, a sufficient reason for an appellate court
to address such a question?  Even when review is de novo—as it is for
questions of law and for some mixed questions of law and fact336—I
submit that, without more, an appellate court exceeds the scope of its
role when it addresses such questions.
One might argue that the efficiency and judicial economy that is
gained by having the appellate court address a legal issue, de novo, is
adequate justification for an appellate court to answer a question that
the trial court did not address.  But this position is untenable.  Taken
to the extreme, its logical implication would be that district courts
routinely should save their resources and punt on all questions that
the appeals court would review de novo.  Even if that would be effi-
cient and judicially economical, that is not how our system is designed
to work.  At a practical level, the trial court would not get to the final
judgment that ordinarily is a prerequisite to appeal, if the trial court
were not deciding issues of law and mixed questions subject to de
novo review.  In addition, the appellate court would not enjoy the
benefits of knowing the trial judge’s thoughts on such issues.  The
appellate court would no longer be reviewing a lower court’s decision,
and the appellate court might formulate the issue differently than the
trial court would have done.  Thus, one would be changing not only
the identity of the initial decision maker (who), but potentially pre-
cisely what was being decided (what), the process by which it was
being decided—given the absence of district court thinking to inform
the appellate court (how), and the timing—the temporal context—of
the decision within the course of the litigation (when).337  As Profes-
sor Rutledge’s exposition on decisional sequencing reveals, this has a
variety of consequences, and (I would argue) should be avoided
absent very good reason.338
One also should question the premise that such a system would
be more economical and efficient than a system that requires trial
judges to make the initial determinations of (even) questions of law
and mixed questions that are subject to de novo review.  From a short-
sighted perspective, economies and efficiencies appear to be gained—
336 For mixed questions that are subject to review for clear error, having the appel-
late court decide the questions without benefit of district court decision would make
the applicable standard of review impossible to apply.  It would reallocate decision-
making authority from the trial court to the court of appeals, and significantly change
the question that the appellate court has to address.  The same would, of course, be
true for pure questions of fact.
337 Of course, the “where” of the decision also would change from the district
court and its location to the appellate court and its location.
338 See Rutledge, supra note 38, at 7–10. R
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remands and possible second appeals are avoided—but a system that
freely allowed appellate courts to address new issues would change the
trial from the “main event” and would encourage appeals.  In creating
such a system, we would shift a burden from the trial courts to the
courts of appeals.  More appellate judges would be needed, all appel-
lants and appellees would experience delays in the resolution of their
cases and, whenever the opportunity to raise a new issue on appeal
resulted in appellate consideration that otherwise would not occur,
three or more judges would consider an issue that a single trial judge
could have resolved, perhaps finally.
The impropriety of having appellate courts freely decide ques-
tions that the trial court did not address whenever review is de novo,
and the failure of wisdom in doing so, is reflected in the many state-
ments that appeals courts should review new questions only in excep-
tional or extraordinary circumstances.339
In the usual case, where the factual record was not fully devel-
oped or the proper resolution of a legal question is not obvious, there
are even clearer institutional reasons to allow the trial court to take
the first stab.  True, there are problems of cost and delay entailed in
moving cases back and forth between the trial and appellate courts,
and it may be that in today’s world those costs are sufficiently great
that we should be willing to accept more flexibility and a less rigid
division of labor between the trial and appellate courts.  Our notion of
an ideal division of labor may be changing or already have changed.
But doubt should be resolved in favor of remand to the district court
so that the record can be fully developed and district courts can fulfill
the functions that ordinarily are theirs.
An alternative way to reduce remands to trial courts would be to
establish doctrine that, in recognition of the difficulties that face
appellate courts to whom new issues are brought, district courts (in
their discretion) should rule on multiple grounds so that appellate
339 See, e.g., text at note 159; see also Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 635
F.3d 401, 413 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating judgment and remanding to the district court
with instructions that it consider the parties’ motions to confirm and to vacate an
arbitration award, under the appropriate standard of review, noting the appellate
court’s entitlement to the benefit of the district court’s judgment, and citing Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), in support of the appropriate roles of trial and appellate
courts).  In Arn, the Supreme Court upheld a circuit rule under which failure to file,
with the district judge, a written objection to a magistrate’s report barred appellate
consideration of the objection, citing judicial efficiency including the appropriate
division of trial and appellate court functions. Arn, 474 U.S. at 140–45.  The Ninth
Circuit cited cases in which courts of appeals remanded where a district court’s opin-
ion was too sparse to serve as a basis for review, even where review would be de novo.
Johnson, 635 F.3d at 413.
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courts that may disagree with one ground can affirm on another, with-
out having to decide an issue in the absence of a district court deci-
sion of the point to review.  While this would burden district courts, it
would lighten the load of appellate courts, and would leave more “first
looks” on the shoulders of those who are intended to be taking
them.340  When district courts perceive themselves to be even busier
than the appellate courts or, in their discretion, decide not to base
their decision on multiple grounds for other good reasons (such as
prudential doctrines that counsel avoidance of constitutional ques-
tions), appellate courts could take on legal issues that were presented
but were not decided below, so long as the record is adequate to per-
mit the appeals court to render a well-grounded decision, proper reso-
lution of the legal issue is obvious, appellate jurisdictional requisites
are satisfied, and other factors that should influence the exercise of
discretion favor a decision by the court of appeals.  Professor Marti-
neau has argued that
[t]o suggest that an appellate court can look at the record and con-
clude that no additional, relevant evidence could have been intro-
duced on a completely new legal issue had the parties known it
would be decisive . . . flies in the face of what we know about the
trial process . . . [and that f]orcing the appellee to show prejudice
. . . places the appellee in an almost impossible position.341
I agree that an appellee should not have to show that it would be
prejudiced by appellate court resolution of an issue in the first
instance.  That showing usually would be impossible, and to require it
misses the point that the problem with an appellate court taking the
first stab is structural as well as personal to the parties.  Instead, the
burden should be on the party who seeks to have the appellate court
address an issue that the trial court did not address to demonstrate
that all parties had the opportunity to enter all relevant, admissible
material into evidence, and that the other relevant considerations
make initial resolution by the court of appeals proper and desirable.
340 See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2865 (2011).  In Beer, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision below and remanded. Id. at 2865–66.
The Federal Circuit had entered judgment against a group of federal judges who
sought cost-of-living salary adjustments to which they asserted entitlement pursuant to
the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.  Beer v. United States, 361 F. App’x. 150, 150–52 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2865 (2011).  The Supreme Court directed the Federal
Circuit to decide whether the judges’ suit also was barred by res judicata because
“[t]he Court consider[ed] it important that there be a decision on th[at] question,
rather than that an answer be deemed unnecessary in light of prior precedent on the
merits.” Beer, 131 S. Ct. at 2865.
341 Martineau, supra note 14, at 1037–38. R
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Faced with good reasons to remand—for the taking of additional
evidence, because of the non-obviousness of proper resolution of legal
issues, or otherwise—the appeals court should remand, and refrain
from deciding a proffered new issue.  If an appellate court decides to
entertain a new legal issue, despite all of the foregoing arguments, it
should freely exercise its discretion to allow the opposing party suffi-
cient time to respond to any issue that the opposing party previously
was not on notice of the need to research and consider, as applied to
the facts of its case.342
2. Of Importance, Probable Recurrence, and Miscarriages of
Justice
The public importance of an issue, while it might well provide a
further reason to decide an issue the proper resolution of which is
obvious, is inadequate alone to justify an appellate court’s taking the
first stab.  The court cannot competently do so if the record is not
complete, for example. Similarly, the fact that the new issue is likely to
arise in other cases is not a good reason to consider the issue when it
was not timely raised in the instant case.  There will be time enough to
address the issue in a case that properly presents it, and doing so will
have the advantages of likely presenting a more complete record,
avoiding any surprise to the opposing litigant, and offering the
appeals court the benefit of the district court’s thinking on the mat-
ter, among other things.  And, of course, this “reason” to consider a
new issue cannot be independent; it can have weight only if the new
issue is otherwise suitable for an appellate court to hear because the
new issue is a legal question that is presented in the context of an
adequately developed record and its proper resolution is obvious or
the benefits of having a district court decide the issue in the first
instance are outweighed by an urgent need for precedential resolu-
tion or by other factors.
The oft-stated requirement of a miscarriage of justice requires, at
a minimum, a reversible error; harmless error would result in no mis-
carriage of justice.343  But some courts may intend an even higher
342 See id. at 1039 (decrying the few days that an appellee has to research and
develop theories and arguments that it might have had months or more to develop,
had the issue been raised in the trial court). FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
31(a) allows an appellee thirty days after the appellant’s brief is served to serve and
file its response brief. FED. R. APP. P. 31(a).
343 “Harmless error” is an error that does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties, and is to be disregarded by the courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006):
Harmless Error (“On the hearing of any appeal . . . the court shall give judgment after
an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect
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standard; it is difficult to be sure.  In any event, like the considerations
whether a new issue is “important” or likely to recur, this criterion for
considering a new issue cannot be independent; it can have weight
only if the new issue is otherwise suitable for an appellate court to
hear.344  Moreover, as discussed earlier,345 the fact that justice would
be ill-served if an error newly raised in the court of appeals were not
corrected does not necessarily imply that it is the appellate court that
needs to do the correcting.  Justice may be better served by remand to
the district court for correction of the error.
3. Intervening Changes in the Law
One of the exceptional circumstances that sometimes is cited as
justification for having appellate courts reach new issues is the pres-
ence of a change in the law that intervened between the district
court’s decision and the forthcoming appellate decision.  As Professor
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl recently has noted, however, “[w]hat retroactiv-
ity giveth, plain error often taketh away.”346  That is to say, although
new law theoretically applies to all cases still pending on direct review
when the new law is made, unless the losing litigant was sufficiently
prescient or discerning to object to the judicial conduct that became
erroneous under the new law, the losing litigant will not have made
the necessary argument below, and the appellate court will review the
newly complained-of behavior only to determine whether it consti-
tuted “plain error.”347  As described above, this is a demanding stan-
the substantial rights of the parties.”); FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 61: Harm-
less Error (“The court . . . must disregard any error . . . which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”); FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52(a):
Harmless Error (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect sub-
stantial rights must be disregarded.”).  Errors that are not harmless may be grounds
for reversal of a judgment.
344 See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2010) (agreeing,
on appeal of decision that state labor regulations violated the Commerce Clause, to
consider argument raised for the first time on appeal that state was acting as a partici-
pant in a private market, where the public interest weighed heavily in favor of decid-
ing the issue because the trial court’s decision cast into doubt the constitutionality of
the regulatory schemes of many states, no party had a plausible claim or surprise or
prejudice, and, because the issue was closely related to arguments raised in the district
court and neither party suggested that further development of the record would be
helpful, further fact-finding was unnecessary, leaving a pure question of law); Marti-
neau, supra note 14, at 1043–44. R
345 See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. R
346 Bruhl, supra note 177, at 213. R
347 Id.; see also Waldman, supra note 18, at 523–26 (discussing the challenges R
presented when a litigant in a federal court case seeks to have a circuit court of
appeals apply post-trial legal developments to a case on appeal).
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dard.348  Hence, an exception that permits appellate courts to
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, based upon argu-
ments that the judgment should be reversed because the trial judge
erred under law that developed post-trial, rarely will result in reversal.
That does not mean that the exception is inappropriate; it just means
that it will have little impact.349
But do we need an exception to the general rule for situations of
intervening change in the law?  Once the appellant makes the argu-
ment, the court of appeals could remand for the district court judge
to reconsider its own earlier decision.  Moreover, in opening the time
within which a Federal Civil Rule 60(b) motion may be made, that
Rule now permits a litigant to present a motion for relief from judg-
ment to the district court while an appeal is pending.  Under Federal
Civil Rule 62.1(a)(3), if the district court recognizes that the motion
raises a substantial issue or states that it would grant the motion, the
litigant can seek a limited remand from the court of appeals to restore
the district court’s authority to rule.350  If the district court judge then
decides that he or she committed reversible error in light of the
change in law, the case can proceed—to settlement or new trial, or
whatever else might be necessary—without further immediate use of
the resources of the appellate court.351  And if the district court judge
348 See supra text accompanying notes 280–83. R
349 As Professor Bruhl further notes, the ability of the injured party to get relief
may be hampered even further by appellate forfeiture rules that require issues to be
raised in the appellant’s opening brief. See Bruhl, supra note 177, at 213–14.  If the R
law changes after that brief has been filed, the appellant needs special dispensation
from the appellate court to raise the issue in another document. See id.  Some courts
are more permissive than others in this regard. See id. at 214; Prior, supra note 18, at R
249.  In view of Professor Martineau’s general hostility to exceptions from the general
rule, it is perhaps ironic that such difficulties attend something he favors, namely
permitting an issue not raised in the trial court to be raised on appeal if the issue
could be a basis for relief from the judgment, so long as “the matter upon which relief
is sought was not known and could not reasonably have been known in time to have
been raised at trial.”  Martineau, supra note 14, at 1060.  Dennerline criticized this R
position of Martineau’s on the grounds that this approach would focus too much on
whether the trial attorney was guilty of excusable neglect and too little on the
prejudice to the litigant-client, and that the law provides too little guidance for deter-
mining excusable neglect with respect to failure to raise objections at trial.  Denner-
line, supra note 15, at 1006–10.  Moreover, this approach does not does not take into R
account the matters that influence an appellate court’s capability to fairly address
issues that were not raised in the district court.
350 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 62.1(a)(3); see also FED. R. APP. P. RULE 12.1(b) (“If the
district court states that it would grant the motion or that the motion raises a substan-
tial issue, the court of appeals may remand for further proceedings but retains juris-
diction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal.”).
351 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 62.1(a)(3).
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decides that he did not commit reversible error in light of the change
in law, that decision would be reviewable on the renewed appeal.352
The case could even be maintained on the appellate court’s docket
while the trial judge decided the Rule 60(b) issue, so that the parties
would not have to start all over in the appellate process.353  By pro-
ceeding in this way, the intermediate appellate court would approxi-
mate the United States Supreme Court’s use of the GVR procedure,
granting certiorari, vacating the decision below without finding error,
and remanding the case for further consideration by the district




The story that this Article told about Article III and congressional
legislation conferring appellate jurisdiction and appellate powers, the
short history of the appeal, and the guidance to be distilled from The
Federalist Papers and the Supreme Court’s actions and words are impor-
tant because they remind us that constitutionally grounded limits on
appellate jurisdiction do exist, and that intermediate appellate courts
as well as the Supreme Court itself should keep those limits in mind
when they contemplate deciding issues that were not decided by lower
tribunals.  Until the Supreme Court better delineates the boundaries
between appellate and original jurisdiction, however, we are left
largely fumbling in the dark when we try to determine whether partic-
ular contemporary instances of appellate courts’ taking the first stab at
issues were or would be constitutional.  Hence, the proposal that fol-
lows emphasizes discretion, rather than power.
While Professor Martineau and Mr. Dennerline disagreed on a
number of matters related to appellate courts’ entertaining new
issues, they agreed that the “exceptions” place into question whether
there is any general rule against appellate consideration of new
issues.355  It probably still is true, as Professor Martineau charged years
ago, that the uncertainty that surrounds whether an appellate court
will consider a new issue encourages appeals and reduces the value of
prevailing in the trial court.356  Broad discretion makes this inevitable.
352 See id.
353 See id.
354 See Bruhl, supra note 177, at 217, 263. R
355 See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1024, 1057–58, 1061; Dennerline, supra note R
15, at 985, 993, 1003–05, 1012. R
356 See Martineau, supra note 14, at 1024. R
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However, refinement of the considerations that govern the exercise of
this discretion, and clear announcement of the criteria that an appel-
late court will use, can help to reduce both the uncertainty and the
number and scope of appeals.  Both greater uniformity of response
from the appellate courts and clearer guidelines would be desirable.
Narrowing of the circumstances in which appellate courts will enter-
tain new issues would help even more.  Moreover, while appellate
courts have to devote some time to deciding whether to consider new
issues,357 the appeals courts can control how much time they will
spend making those decisions by narrowly circumscribing the discre-
tion they embrace and by defining as clearly as they can the circum-
stances in which they will entertain new issues.
Because of the roles and competencies of the respective courts,
appellate and trial, and for other reasons elaborated above, including
reasons of long-term efficiency, the general rule against appellate con-
sideration of new issues should truly be the presumptive position
taken by appellate courts.
I have submitted that, by virtue of principles of appellate jurisdic-
tion, when a federal appellate court is entertaining an interlocutory
appeal, it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to the appellate
court’s consideration of an issue that was not decided below that the
new issue be inextricably intertwined with issues for which there is an
independent basis of interlocutory federal appellate jurisdiction or be
necessary-to-resolve in order to afford meaningful review of the latter.
By contrast, after final judgment, when appellate jurisdiction encom-
passes all of the lower court decisions that led up to and are “merged”
in the judgment, the new issue must be necessary-or-appropriate to
resolve in order to affirm the judgment or in order to avoid manifest
injustice in cases in which resolution of the issue would lead to rever-
sal or vacatur of the existing judgment.  However, these would be nec-
essary, but not sufficient, reasons for an appellate court to take the
first stab at new issues, for we need to design the system so that it
maintains or increases litigants’ incentives to litigate their cases vigor-
ously and thoroughly in the trial court. If the litigant who raises the
new issue had good cause not to raise it below, that circumstance
would tend to support the conclusion that the appellate court should
hear the new issue.
Based upon the institutional and functional arguments for appel-
late courts not to decide issues for the first time on appeal, and the
responses to those arguments, I propose (in addition to the forego-
ing) that:
357 Id. at 1032.
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I.A. A new issue should be heard on appeal of a civil case only
when the party raising the issue shows—or when a court raising an
issue sua sponte concludes—that:
(1)  Immediate decision by the appellate court would not be
inconsistent with lack of entitlement to review of the new issue at the
time in question (for example, on an interlocutory appeal that stat-
utes, rules, and doctrines do not authorize);
(2)  Immediate decision by the appellate court, in the appellee’s
favor, would not require the court to modify the district court’s judg-
ment so as to expand the appellee’s rights or contract the appellant’s
rights, when the appellee has not cross-appealed;
(3)  The new issue goes to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals
or the district court (or other lower tribunal), if the new issue does
not satisfy (4), below.  If the new issue goes to the court of appeals’
jurisdiction, that court should, if feasible, use a special master to
resolve in the first instance any disputed factual matters that are mate-
rial to the court’s appellate jurisdiction.  If the new issue goes to the
district court’s (or other lower tribunal’s) jurisdiction, the appeals
court should, if feasible, either use a special master or remand to the
district court (or other lower tribunal) to resolve in the first instance
any disputed factual matters that are material to the district court’s
(or other lower tribunal’s) jurisdiction, particularly if oral testimony
will be proffered.
If an appellate court can reach the same ultimate disposition on
other grounds, the court should not consider and decide a quasi-juris-
dictional issue, of constitutional dimensions, that the parties did not
litigate below.
(4) Outside the realm of jurisdictional issues, no further factual
development of the record is necessary or appropriate to assure:
(a) that the record before the appellate court provides an ade-
quate basis for fair and accurate resolution of the new issue, and
(b) that the opposing parties will not be prejudiced by their lack
of occasion to present additional evidence,
(c) unless the facts are so dynamic that remand for new factual
findings would be futile in that the facts will have changed before
another appeal can be heard;
(5) Based on precedent existing at the time of the trial court pro-
ceedings, there was no reason to object to the conduct now com-
plained of or to raise the issue in the trial court, or the failure to
object or to raise the issue was excusable and the litigant whose attor-
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ney now raises the issue should not be penalized for the failure of his/
her/its counsel to object or raise the issue below;358
(6) Proper resolution of the new issue is obvious, or the benefits
of having a district court decide the issue in the first instance are out-
weighed by an urgent need for precedential resolution or other con-
siderations.  Thus, the appellate court should consider whether
immediate appellate attention is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of jus-
tice or prejudice to a party, or whether trial court attention to the new
issue, on remand, would suffice.
B. If all of those requirements are met, in deciding whether to
exercise its discretion to hear a new issue, an appellate court also may
consider other factors.  These include, without limitation:
(1) how appellate decision of the new issue (as opposed to
remand to the trial court) would affect the sequence in which the
court system (the appellate and the trial court, collectively) will
address the issues presented by the case—and thereby alter other
dynamics of the litigation, such as settlement incentives—and how, if
at all, the choice between the appellate and the trial court would likely
affect the nature of the issue to be resolved, in light of changes in the
issue that would more likely occur in the trial court than in the court
of appeals;
(2) whether the appellate court’s making of a decision would sup-
plant the more institutionally competent decisionmaker in favor of
the less institutionally competent decisionmaker or would disrespect
the role of the trial judge.  The appeals court should consider, for
example, whether the district court judge had the opportunity to rule
on the issue, and whether the issue is confided to an exercise of the
district court’s discretion or to the district court subject to clear error
review.  An appeals court ordinarily should decline to address an issue
that has been left to the discretion of the district court in particular or
that ordinarily is subject to review only for clear error.  Other things
being equal, an appellate court should allow the district court to take
the first cut at an issue that the parties did not put before it, and
should be more inclined to address an issue that the parties did pre-
sent to the district court but that it chose not to address;
358 Dennerline had proposed that a new issue should be heard on appeal only
when the party raising the issue could show, inter alia, that there was no intentional
choice to fail to raise the issue in the trial court below. See Dennerline, supra note 15, R
at 1011.  I omit that requirement.  Because of the subjective nature of this criterion,
establishing its satisfaction could require discovery into matters that would likely be
protected by attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, which would cre-
ate unduly burdensome satellite litigation.  The objective can be met by an objective
test such as I have proposed.
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(3) the increase in appellate resources that would be required if
the appellate court took the first stab at an issue rather than reviewing
a trial court’s resolution of the issue, including whether first-stab
appellate decision-making would require careful study of a large
record;
(4) whether the appellate court would have to decide an issue de
novo that it would decide under a more deferential standard of review
if the trial court resolved the issue in the first instance and, even if the
appellate court would review the issue de novo in any event, whether
the appellate court would likely benefit from a prior ruling by the trial
court;
(5) whether appellate decision-making would allow the appellate
court to avoid a complex area of law on which the district court
relied;359
(6) whether an immediate appellate decision would reduce the
likelihood of further litigation360 or other circumstances make an
immediate precedential decision highly desirable.  Matters of equity
including the length of time the case had been pending, the financial
consequences for the litigants, and effects on settlement leverage
could be taken into account under this rubric; and
(7) whether appellate decision-making would be supported by a
particular statute, Supreme Court directive, or the like.361
Because these factors would apply only after a court of appeals
determined that the essential prerequisites stated in subsections (1)
through (5) were satisfied, they would not turn the decision whether
to hear a new issue into a matter of totally unfettered and unpredict-
able discretion.
359 See, e.g., Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (11th Cir.
2007) (affirming summary judgment in favor of Lil’ Joe, finding it “less than clear”
that a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order precluded all of Thompkins’ claims, as
the district court held, but “find[ing] it unnecessary to enter that thicket,” and
affirming on other grounds).
360 The Supreme Court has cited, in support of considering a new issue, the par-
ties having argued the new matter in their briefs and the fact that decision now would
reduce the likelihood of further litigation. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,
557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009).
361 See, e.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 958 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding, after
having found that district court abused its discretion in setting attorneys’ fees award
to prevailing party, that because “the record before us is clear, [and] remand would
be inefficient, . . . it is necessary for us to determine an appropriate attorney fees
award in this case in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s command that ‘[a]
request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation’” (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983))).
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B. Should the Analysis that the Supreme Court Conducts Differ from that
which the Intermediate Appellate Courts Conduct?
I will start from the position that the principles proposed above
to govern the exercise of discretion in the IFACs ordinarily should
govern in the Supreme Court as well.  If the Supreme Court has or
should have more leeway to reach new issues than do IFACs, the rea-
son must lie outside the definition of appellate jurisdiction in Article
III and in the statutes conferring appellate jurisdiction, unless that
term is defined differently for the Supreme Court than it is for IFACs.
It could be defined differently,362 but there is no apparent reason why
it should be.  If it is not, then any added latitude would be in the
realm of “discretion.”  One could argue that, because the Supreme
Court’s caseload is almost entirely of its choosing and because the
Court can and does choose which issues to address within the cases it
chooses to take, the Court has little warrant to address new issues on
occasions when it would be improper for IFACs to do so.  The Court
can avoid taking cases in which the parties have failed to raise all of
the relevant legal questions.  On the other hand, one might argue that
because the Court hears relatively few cases, and yet plays a uniquely
important role in making decisions that are binding nationwide, that
situation in-and-of itself suggests that the Court should be relatively
unfettered in its exercises of discretion to hear new issues.363
Although it is the Court’s own doing that it takes as few cases as it
does, the Court cannot control the course of the lower-court proceed-
ings to assure that all of the issues that the Court would have liked to
be raised and decided were in fact raised and decided.  In view of the
Court’s role in our system, the especial importance of the precedents
that the Supreme Court sets and of the pronouncements of law that it
makes, as well as its responsibilities to address questions of pressing
362 Cf. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329–32 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(urging an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that become moot while
pending before the Supreme Court).  In Honig, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned
whether the mootness doctrine truly is compelled by Article III. Id. at 330.  His con-
clusion, purportedly drawn from cases and “from the historical development of the
principle of mootness, [wa]s that while an unwillingness to decide moot cases may be
connected to the case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated con-
nection that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override it.” Id. at
331.  Chief Justice Rehnquist proposed that the Court decide cases that become moot
after the grant of certiorari or noting of probable jurisdiction to avoid wasting Court
resources already invested in such cases and to fully utilize the opportunities to bind
all other U.S. courts by decisions of federal issues that the Court had decided were
worthy of its attention. Id. at 331–32.
363 These arguments were suggested to me by Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl.
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national importance and to maintain appropriate balance among the
branches of the federal government and between the state and federal
governments and the people, on occasion the Court will have good
reason to raise, and sometimes to decide, issues that the parties failed
to raise below, or that the lower courts did not address.364  These con-
siderations sometimes might support allowing the Supreme Court
more leeway to reach new issues than this Article proposes that IFACs
should enjoy.
Another perspective one might bring to bear relates to the dual
functions of appellate courts to correct error and to pronounce and
harmonize the law.  To generalize broadly, IFACs do primarily the for-
mer, while the Supreme Court does primarily the latter.  In general,
the Court purports to care little about error correction for the benefit
of the particular parties before it.  Perhaps one should infer that the
Supreme Court would be more justified than an IFAC would be to
hear a new issue for the purpose of declaring the law, whereas an
IFAC would be more justified than the Supreme Court would be to
hear a new issue for the purpose of correcting an injustice to the par-
ticular parties.  That reasoning would indicate that the Supreme
Court should have more latitude than IFACS to reach new issues for
precedent-setting purposes, but less latitude than IFACS to reach new
issues for party-specific purposes.  This way of thinking also brings to
mind the law-equity distinction that the courts of appeals struggle
with, with the law-side history focusing on error and the equity-side
history focusing on doing justice and operating with “breezier infor-
mality,” in the words of Jim Pfander.365  Once again, the Supreme
Court’s prototypical lack of interest in doing justice in the particular
case argues against the position that it should enjoy greater discretion
than IFACs to hear new issues, insofar as the purpose would be to do
such justice in the particular case.
I further propose366 that:
II.  The appellate court should see to it that the opposing parties
are afforded a full and fair opportunity to present arguments on any
new issue in the court of appeals, if the appeals court is going to con-
sider the issue;367 and
364 See Frost, supra note 20, at 514–15. R
365 See Pfander, supra note 91, at 1525. R
366 The first proposal is set out in Part V.A, supra.
367 Appellate courts should not encourage sandbagging.  An appeals court thus
should consider whether the parties had a full and fair opportunity to address the
issue below or whether there is a good reason, such as changed facts or changed law,
for them to be first bringing it now.  If the issue arose for the first time while the case
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III.  If the court of appeals determines that a new issue should be
heard but determines that the issue is better suited to being decided,
in the first instance, in a trial court, the court of appeals shall remand
the case to the district court inter alia to ensure full factual develop-
ment and to ensure that the opposing party is not prejudiced by the
raising of the new issue.  In its discretion, the court of appeals may
maintain the case on its calendar to facilitate resolution of any subse-
quent appeal.
CONCLUSION
Neither the word “review” nor the phrase “jurisdiction of
appeals” suggests that appellate jurisdiction encompasses authority to
determine issues that no inferior court has reached.  On a number of
occasions the Supreme Court has sought to confine its own appellate
jurisdiction and that of the intermediate federal courts of appeals
(IFACs), and to distinguish appellate from original jurisdiction.  At
additional times, dissenting Justices on the Court have complained
that the Court was permitting and even requiring IFACs to exceed the
proper bounds of appellate jurisdiction and to exercise what
amounted to original jurisdiction.  While this history is interesting,
instructive, and important, and indicates that there are limits on the
activities that fall within appellate jurisdiction, even an exhaustive
examination of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence would not defini-
tively determine whether particular contemporary instances of appel-
late courts’ taking the first stab at issues are constitutional.  Similarly,
the scope of the appellate powers of the Supreme Court and the fed-
eral IACs that abide in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 is limited, though the limits
are unclear.  While the Court has read the statute to provide appellate
courts with power to consider issues that were not properly raised in
the trial court, in the interest of doing substantial justice, the Court
also has concluded that the courts must exercise their § 2106 powers
consistently with the requirements of the Federal Rules.  Because the
constitutional and statutory constraints on appellate courts are so
unclear with regard to when appellate courts may decide new issues,
the realm has been left to discretion.  But the Supreme Court can and
should do better than it has done in governing itself and in guiding
federal IACs in their exercises of discretion to hear or not to hear new
issues.  And the federal IACs themselves should confine the manner
in which they exercise their discretion, to keep their conduct within
was on appeal as mootness (an aspect of jurisdiction), for example, may do, that
would provide a good reason for the parties to raise it then.
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constitutional bounds and otherwise appropriate given their compe-
tence, their role, and the limits of both.
In this Article, I have examined the constitutional, statutory, and
common law constraints on federal appeals courts, surveyed when the
Supreme Court and intermediate federal appellate courts in fact do
consider new issues, and evaluated the circumstances in which appel-
late courts should, and the circumstances in which they should not,
decide issues that were not ruled upon in the district courts.  I have
sought to offer theoretically and practically defensible answers to
these questions, and made a proposal, bringing to bear insights from
sequencing theory and from facets of appellate jurisdiction doctrine
that others have not considered.  Sometimes I have recommended
that appellate courts utilize adjuncts to the appellate branch to make
initial determinations that appellate courts can review.  I have pro-
posed how the gorilla should be tamed368 so that appellate courts can
perform their functions but remain within their institutional roles and
play to their highest competencies.  Whether anything will change
remains to be seen.
368 See supra Part V.A, B.
